From the time the
Critique of Dialectical Reason was published in 1960, there has been much discussion about where it stands in relation to Sartre's earlier, seminal work,
Being and Nothingness. Some Sartre scholars and critics, like George Kline, see the work as essentially a repudiation of Sartre's existentialist stance. Marjorie Grene thinks that the
Critique of Dialectical Reason can be readily translated into the categories of
Being and Nothingness.
Hazel Barnes and Peter Caws see a shift in emphasis between the two works but not a difference of kind. Sartre's analysis of "groups-in-fusion" (people brought together by a common cause) resonated with the events of the
May–June 1968 uprising in France and allowed him to sideline for a while the competing influence of
Louis Althusser's structuralist interpretation of Marxism. Situating the
Critique of Dialectical Reason in the context of May–June 1968, the psychoanalyst
Didier Anzieu stated that "Sartre first described in his book the passive and anonymous forms of individual alienation--this is what he calls the 'practico-inert'--and then he showed how a group introduces negation into history and shapes itself (instead of being shaped), invents itself by breaking with this passive and anonymous society that an American sociologist called 'the lonely crowd.' The students who sparked the outbreak of the revolution of the spring of 1968 were shaped by, if not this second Sartrean philosophy, at least a dialectical philosophy of history. May of 1968 is the historical upsurge of a 'wild-flowering' force of negation. It is the inroad of 'Sartrean' freedom, not that of the isolated individual but the creative freedom of groups." The philosopher
Sidney Hook described the work as a philosophical justification for widespread human rights abuses by the Communist leadership of the Soviet Union. The psychiatrists
R. D. Laing and
David Cooper consider the
Critique of Dialectical Reason an attempt to provide a dialectical basis for structural anthropology, and to establish through a dialectical approach the limits of dialectical reason.
Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari endorsed Sartre's view that there is no "class
spontaneity" but only "group spontaneity".
Leszek Kołakowski argues that the
Critique of Dialectical Reason represents an abandonment of Sartre's original existentialism and that it absurdly depicts Marxism as "invincible". Kołakowski nevertheless considers the book an interesting attempt to find room for creativity and spontaneity within Marxism, noting that Sartre rejects the dialectic of nature and
historical determinism while preserving the social significance of human behavior. Kołakowski criticizes Sartre for failing to explain how Communism could restore freedom. In his view, Sartre gives such a generalized account of revolutionary organization that he ignores the real difficulties of groups engaging in common action without infringing the freedom of their individual members. Kołakowski criticizes Sartre for introducing many superfluous neologisms, writing that aside from these he does not provide a genuinely new interpretation of Marxism; he sees Sartre's view of the historical character of perception and knowledge and its rejection of the dialectic of nature as stemming from the work of
György Lukács. In his view, neither Sartre's view that freedom must be safeguarded in revolutionary organization nor his view that there will be perfect freedom when Communism has abolished shortages is new in a Marxist context, and Sartre fails to explain how either could have been brought about. The conservative philosopher
Roger Scruton writes that the
Critique of Dialectical Reason "shows a total rejection of the rules of intellectual enquiry—a determined flight from the rule of truth. To suppose that the book might actually fulfill the promise offered by its title is in fact a gross impertinence." == See also ==