During 2005, a “second generation" of cyber-insurance literature emerged targeting risk management of current cyber-networks. The authors of such literature link the
market failure with fundamental properties of information technology, specially correlated risk information asymmetries between insurers and insureds, and inter-dependencies. According to Josephine Wolff, cyber insurance has been "ineffective at curbing cybersecurity losses because it normalizes the payment of online ransoms, whereas the goal of cybersecurity is the opposite—to disincentivize such payments to make ransomware less profitable."
Ambiguities in terms FM Global in 2019 conducted a survey of CFOs at companies with over $1 billion in turnover. The survey found that 71% of CFOs believed that their insurance provider would cover "most or all" of the losses their company would suffer in a cyber security attack or crime. Nevertheless, many of those CFOs reported that they expected damages related with cyber attacks that are not covered by typical cyber attack policies. Specifically, 50% of the CFOs mentioned that they anticipated after a cyber attack a devaluation of their company's brand while more than 30% expected a decline in revenue.
War exclusion clauses Like other insurance policies, cyber insurance typically includes a
war exclusion clause - explicitly excluding damage from acts of war. While the majority of cyber insurance claims will relate to simple criminal behaviour, increasingly companies are likely to fall victim to
cyberwarfare attacks by nation-states or terrorist organizations - whether specifically targeted or simply collateral damage. After the US and UK, governments characterized the
NotPetya attack as a Russian military cyber-attack insurers are arguing that they do not cover such events. == Insurance Linked Securities for Cyber Risk Management ==