Bleichenbacher is particularly notable for devising attacks against the
RSA public-key cryptosystem, namely when used with the
PKCS#1 v1 standard published by
RSA Laboratories. These attacks were able to break both RSA encryption and signatures produced using the
PKCS #1 standard.
BB'98 attack: chosen ciphertext attack against the RSA PKCS#1 encryption standard In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher demonstrated a practical attack against systems using RSA encryption in concert with the
PKCS #1 encoding function, including a version of the
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol used by thousands of
web servers at the time. This attack was the first practical reason to consider
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks.
BB'06 attack: signature forgery attack against the RSA PKCS#1 signature standard In 2006 at a rump session at
CRYPTO, Bleichenbacher described a "pencil and paper"-simple attack against RSA signature validation as implemented in common cryptographic toolkits. Both
OpenSSL and the NSS security engine in
Firefox were later found to be vulnerable to the attack, which would allow an attacker to forge the
SSL certificates that protect sensitive websites. == References ==