While still a major general, Shoup was unexpectedly nominated to become Commandant of the Marine Corps by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the behest of
Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. To prepare for this duty he was promoted to
lieutenant general on November 2, 1959, and briefly assigned duties as chief of staff, Headquarters Marine Corps. He was elevated to
general on January 1, 1960, upon assuming the post as the 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps. He would later serve under the
administration of
John F. Kennedy from 1961 to 1963, and the
administration of
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1963.
Leadership overhaul By 1959, Gates and other officials viewed the Corps as fraught with internal squabbling and alienated from the other services. Because of this condition, combined with the reputation gained from the Ribbon Creek incident, it was decided that Pate needed to be replaced. Gates believed Shoup was a strong leader who could steer the Corps in the right direction. Shoup was selected over five lieutenant generals and four major generals senior to him in rank. Lieutenant General
Merrill B. Twining was considered the likely appointee to the position; Lieutenant Generals Edward Pollock and
Vernon E. Megee also aspired to the position of commandant. Twining openly vied for the position and retired immediately after Shoup was selected, reportedly in protest, as did several other officers. Shoup emphasized military readiness, training, and inter-service cooperation, which differed from the political climate of the time. He rapidly gained a reputation as being extremely demanding and critical of poor performance, especially by Marine generals and leaders. He was sometimes blunt in his criticism of what he saw as poorly performing officers, to the extent that some considered him a bully. Eisenhower favored Shoup because he feared other officers spent too much time in political affairs, and felt Shoup would reduce the influence of the
military industrial complex. Immediately after his appointment, Shoup sought to place new officers in key positions, in an attempt to overhaul the leadership of the Marine Corps. He and Pate disagreed over some of the new appointments, as Shoup transferred many senior officers and encouraged others to retire. Shoup later wrote he felt the Joint Chiefs of Staff had an undue weight in the direction of military strategy. He also sought to curtail politicking by lower-level Marine officers seeking career advancement.
Budget strategy and
James Enoch Hill, who had won medals in the
1960 Summer Olympics.|alt=Three men converse During the first year of Shoup's service as commandant, he served under the
Eisenhower administration, in which military budget policy was dominated by the
"New Look" policy, under which a strong
nuclear deterrent was favored over
conventional warfare forces. Eisenhower focused on
containment without entangling the United States in
proxy wars such as the
Korean War. The result of this was spending cuts and force reductions within the Marine Corps. The
1960 election of Kennedy ushered in a major change in military strategy with the adoption of the
"Flexible Response" strategy, which saw a return to conventional military forces as a deterrent to
nuclear war. Under the Kennedy administration there was increased civilian participation in defense policy-building, and the new secretary of defense,
Robert McNamara, sought more inter-service cooperation. Shoup favored a more frugal approach to the military budget, feeling the military was too susceptible to influence from large corporations arguing for expensive and unnecessary programs. As the Kennedy administration brought more emphasis on conventional warfare, Shoup sought to use increased funds to improve
military logistics. He is credited with formulating an entirely new system of financial management, supply, and inventory management. He also created a new Data Processing Division to centralize the data processing functions of several
combat service support branches.
Cold War conflicts Shoup's outlook on
Cold War conflicts was greatly influenced by his upbringing, and he was frequently an opponent of military action against the
Soviet Union. He refused to fall into what he referred to as the "hate the Communists movement," indicating he would fight them if required by circumstances, but avoided undue prejudice. When
U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond criticized the military for not training its troops about
communism, Shoup regarded the criticism as interference. He appealed to
Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, and the matter was dropped. At the behest of the Kennedy administration, Shoup integrated
counterinsurgency warfare into combat doctrine. Though he was not in favor of the idea, he appointed Major General
Victor H. Krulak as an adviser on counterinsurgency. Shoup opposed military action against
Cuba, warning against any attempt to intervene militarily against
Fidel Castro. He was initially not involved or aware of the plans for the
Bay of Pigs invasion. He was asked by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to furnish an officer, but became furious when he learned the CIA was requisitioning Marine supplies without his permission. He finally learned the intent of the CIA when the officer, Colonel
Jack Hawkins, contacted him on the night of the invasion, pleading with him to appeal to Kennedy for air support. Following the failure of the operation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were blamed, which Shoup thought was unfair, as they had not been aware of the early planning. Shoup later warned against an armed response during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, noting how difficult it would be to invade the country. Still, he prepared a team of Marines to invade Cuba should it be necessary. He and the other Joint Chiefs unanimously recommended a quick airstrike to knock out the missiles once they were discovered there. Kennedy subsequently sought Shoup's advice in evaluating the implications of the
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. While his position in the Joint Chiefs of Staff was intended to be limited, he had gained Kennedy's confidence and was often called on for private consultations. Shoup supported the test ban, seeing it as a deterrent to nuclear war. Shoup was strongly opposed to military intervention in
Indochina from the beginning. In 1961, when the
Pathet Lao threatened the American-backed government of
Laos, he rejected calls for armed intervention. He deployed
Task Unit Shufly to
South Vietnam in 1962 only because he was ordered to, and cautioned against further involvement in South Vietnam, which he toured in October 1962. He opposed the
Strategic Hamlet program, as well as efforts to train the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam. He opposed any plans for combat in Vietnam, and later said "every responsible military man to my knowledge" was against the war as well. Shoup's staunch opposition to involvement there had a great impact on Kennedy, who, before
his assassination on November 22, 1963, indicated that he wanted to end U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, seeing it as an internal struggle. While Eisenhower appreciated Shoup's fiscal experience and apolitical outlook, Shoup was called upon most often by Kennedy. With Kennedy's relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff strained, particularly following the Cuban Missile Crisis, he called upon Shoup privately for many consultations. Shoup's biographer Howard Jablon wrote that Shoup was Kennedy's favorite general. In turn, Shoup was the most supportive of Kennedy of all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kennedy had requested Shoup to serve a second term as commandant in 1963, but Shoup declined in order to make way for the promotion of other Marine generals. ==Later life and opposition to the Vietnam War==