Meade was appointed
brigadier general of volunteers on August 31, 1861, a few months after the start of the
American Civil War, based on the strong recommendation of
Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin. He was assigned command of the 2nd
Brigade of the
Pennsylvania Reserves under General
George A. McCall. The Pennsylvania Reserves were initially assigned to the construction of defenses around Washington, D.C.
Peninsula campaign In March 1862, the Army of the Potomac was reorganized into four corps, Meade served as part of the
I Corps under Maj. Gen
Irvin McDowell. The I Corps was stationed in the Rappahannock area, but in June, the Pennsylvania Reserves were detached and sent to the Peninsula to reinforce the main army. With the onset of the
Seven Days Battles on June 25, the Reserves were directly involved in the fighting. At
Mechanicsville and
Gaines Mill, Meade's brigade was mostly held in reserve, but at
Glendale on June 30, the brigade was in the middle of a fierce battle. His brigade lost 1,400 men and Meade was shot in the right arm and through the back. He was sent home to Philadelphia to recuperate. Meade resumed command of his brigade in time for the
Second Battle of Bull Run, then assigned to Major General
Irvin McDowell's corps of the
Army of Virginia. His brigade made a heroic stand on
Henry House Hill to protect the rear of the retreating Union Army.
Maryland campaign The division's commander
John F. Reynolds was sent to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to train militia units and Meade assumed temporary division command at the
Battle of South Mountain and the
Battle of Antietam. Under Meade's command, the division successfully attacked and captured a strategic position on high ground near
Turner's Gap held by
Robert E. Rodes' troops which forced the withdrawal of other Confederate troops. When Meade's troops stormed the heights, the corps commander
Joseph Hooker, exclaimed, "Look at Meade! Why, with troops like those, led in that way, I can win anything!" On September 17, 1862, at Antietam, Meade assumed temporary command of the I Corps and oversaw fierce combat after Hooker was wounded and requested Meade replace him. On September 29, 1862, Reynolds returned from his service in Harrisburg. Reynolds assumed command of the I Corps and Meade assumed command of the Third Division.
Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville On November 5, 1862,
Ambrose Burnside replaced McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside gave command of the I Corps to Reynolds, which frustrated Meade as he had more combat experience than Reynolds. Meade was promoted to
major general of the Pennsylvania Reserves on November 29, 1862, and given command of a division in the "Left Grand Division" under
William B. Franklin. During the
Battle of Fredericksburg, Meade's division made the only breakthrough of the Confederate lines, spearheading through a gap in
Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's corps at the southern end of the battlefield. However, his attack was not reinforced, which resulted in the loss of much of his division. He led the Center Grand Division through the
Mud March and stationed his troops on the banks of the Rappahanock. On December 22, 1862, Meade replaced
Daniel Butterfield in command of the V Corps which he led in the
Battle of Chancellorsville. On January 26, 1863, Joseph Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker had grand plans for the Battle of Chancellorsville, but was unsuccessful in execution, allowing the Confederates to seize the initiative. After the battle, Meade wrote to his wife that, "General Hooker has disappointed all his friends by failing to show his fighting qualities in a pinch." Meade's corps was left in reserve for most of the battle, contributing to the Union defeat. Meade was among Hooker's commanders who argued to advance against Lee, but Hooker chose to retreat. Meade learned afterward that Hooker misrepresented his position on the advance and confronted him. All of Hooker's commanders supported Meade's position except
Dan Sickles.
Gettysburg campaign In June 1863, Lee took the initiative and moved his
Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Hooker responded rapidly and positioned the Army of the Potomac between Lee's army and Washington D.C. However, the relationship between the Lincoln administration and Hooker had deteriorated due to Hooker's poor performance at Chancellorsville. Hooker requested additional troops be assigned from Harper's Ferry to assist in the pursuit of Lee in the
Gettysburg campaign. When Lincoln and General in Chief
Henry Halleck refused, Hooker resigned in protest.
Command of the Army of the Potomac In the early morning hours of June 28, 1863, a messenger from
President Abraham Lincoln arrived to inform Meade of his appointment as Hooker's replacement. Upon being woken up, he'd assumed that army politics had caught up to him and that he was under arrest, only to find that he'd been given leadership of the
Army of the Potomac. He had not actively sought command and was not the president's first choice.
John F. Reynolds, one of four major generals who outranked Meade in the Army of the Potomac, had earlier turned down the president's suggestion that he take over. Three corps commanders,
John Sedgwick,
Henry Slocum, and
Darius N. Couch, recommended Meade for command of the army and agreed to serve under him despite outranking him. While his colleagues were excited for the change in leadership, the soldiers in the Army of the Potomac were uncertain of Meade since his modesty and lack of theatrical and scholarly demeanor did not match their expectations for a General. Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863. In a letter to his wife, Meade wrote that command of the army was "more likely to destroy one's reputation then to add to it."
Battle of Gettysburg of Meade and the Council of War - July 2, 1863 Meade rushed the remainder of his army to Gettysburg and deployed his forces for a defensive battle. Meade was only four days into his leadership of the Army of the Potomac and informed his corps commanders that he would provide quick decisions and entrust them with the authority to carry out those orders the best way they saw fit. He also made it clear that he was counting on the corps commanders to provide him with sound advice on strategy. Since Meade was new to high command, he did not remain in headquarters but constantly moved about the battlefield, issuing orders and ensuring that they were followed. Meade gave orders for the Army of the Potomac to move forward in a broad front to prevent Lee from flanking them and threatening the cities of Baltimore and Washington, D.C. He also issued a conditional plan for a retreat to
Pipe Creek in Maryland in case things went poorly for the Union. By 6 pm on the evening of July 1, 1863, Meade sent a telegram to Washington informing them of his decision to concentrate forces and make a stand at Gettysburg. On July 2, 1863, Meade continued to monitor and maintain the placement of the troops. He was outraged when he discovered that Daniel Sickles had moved his Corps one mile forward to high ground without Meade's permission and left a gap in the line which threatened Sickles' right flank. Meade recognized that
Little Round Top was critical to maintaining the left flank. He sent chief engineer
Gouverneur Warren to determine the status of the hill and quickly issued orders for the V Corps to occupy it when it was discovered empty. Meade continued to reinforce the troops defending Little Round Top from Longstreet's advance and suffered the near destruction of thirteen brigades. One questionable decision Meade made that day was to order Slocum's
XII Corps to move from
Culp's Hill to the left flank, which allowed Confederate troops to temporarily capture a portion of it. On the evening of July 2, 1863, Meade called a "council of war" consisting of his top generals. The council reviewed the battle to date and agreed to keep fighting in a defensive position. On July 3, 1863, Meade gave orders for the XII Corps and XI Corps to retake the lost portion of Culp's Hill and personally rode the length of the lines from Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top to inspect the troops. His headquarters were in the Leister House directly behind Cemetery Ridge, which exposed it to the 150-gun cannonade that began at 1 pm. The house came under direct fire from incorrectly targeted Confederate guns; Butterfield was wounded, and sixteen horses tied up in front of the house were killed. Meade did not want to vacate the headquarters and make it more difficult for messages to find him, but the situation became too dire and the house was evacuated. During the three days, Meade made excellent use of capable subordinates, such as Maj. Gens.
John F. Reynolds and
Winfield S. Hancock, to whom he delegated great responsibilities. He reacted swiftly to fierce assaults on his line's left and right, which culminated in Lee's disastrous assault on the center, known as
Pickett's Charge. By the end of three days of fighting, the Army of the Potomac's 60,000 troops and 30,000 horses had not been fed in three days and were weary from fighting. On the evening of July 4, 1863, Meade held a second council of war with his top generals, minus Hancock and Gibbon, who were absent due to duty and injury. The council reviewed the status of the army and debated staying in place at Gettysburg versus chasing the retreating Army of Northern Virginia. The council voted to remain in place for one day to allow for rest and recovery and then set out after Lee's army. Meade sent a message to Halleck stating, "I make a reconnaissance to-morrow, to ascertain what the intention of the enemy is … should the enemy retreat, I shall pursue him on his flanks."
Lee's retreat On July 4, it was observed that the
Confederate Army was forming a new line near the
nearby mountains after pulling back their left flank, but by July 5 it was clear that they were making a retreat, leaving Meade and his men to tend to the wounded and fallen soldiers until July 6, when Meade ordered his men to Maryland. Meade was criticized by President Lincoln and others for not aggressively pursuing the Confederates during their retreat. Meade's perceived caution stemmed from three causes: casualties and exhaustion of the Army of the Potomac, which had engaged in forced marches and heavy fighting for a week, heavy general officer casualties that impeded effective command and control, and a desire to guard a hard-won victory against a sudden reversal. Halleck informed Meade of the president's dissatisfaction, which infuriated Meade that politicians and non-field-based officers were telling him how to fight the war. He wrote back and offered to resign his command, but Halleck refused the resignation and clarified that his communication was not meant as a rebuke but an incentive to continue the pursuit of Lee's army. At one point, the Army of Northern Virginia was trapped with its back to the rain-swollen, almost impassable
Potomac River; however, the Army of Northern Virginia was able to erect strong defensive positions before Meade, whose army had also been weakened by the fighting, could organize an effective attack. Lee knew he had the superior defensive position and hoped that Meade would attack and the resulting Union Army losses would dampen the victory at Gettysburg. By July 14, 1863, Lee's troops built a temporary bridge over the river and retreated into Virginia. Meade was rewarded for his actions at Gettysburg by a promotion to brigadier general in the
regular army on July 7, 1863, and the
Thanks of Congress, which commended Meade "... and the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, for the skill and heroic valor which at Gettysburg repulsed, defeated, and drove back, broken and dispirited, beyond the
Rappahannock, the veteran army of the rebellion." Meade wrote the following to his wife after meeting President Lincoln:
Bristoe and Mine Run campaign and staff in
Culpeper, Virginia, outside Meade's headquarters, 1863 During the fall of 1863, the Army of the Potomac was weakened by the transfer of the
XI and
XII Corps to the
western theater. Meade felt pressure from Halleck and the Lincoln administration to pursue Lee into Virginia, but he was cautious due to a misperception that Lee's Army was 70,000 in size when the reality was they were only 55,000 compared to the Army of the Potomac at 76,000. Many of the Union troop replacements for the losses suffered at Gettysburg were new recruits, and it was uncertain how they would perform in combat. Lee petitioned Jefferson Davis to allow him to take the offensive against the cautious Meade, which would also prevent further Union troops from being sent to the western theater to support
William Rosencrans at the
Battle of Chickamauga. ,
Gouverneur K. Warren,
William H. French, George G. Meade,
Henry J. Hunt,
Andrew A. Humphreys, and
George Sykes in September 1863 The Army of the Potomac was stationed along the north bank of the Rapidan River and Meade made his headquarters in
Culpeper, Virginia. In the
Bristoe Campaign, Lee attempted to flank the Army of the Potomac and force Meade to move north of the Rappahannock River. The Union forces had deciphered the Confederate
semaphore code. This, along with spies and scouts, gave Meade advance notice of Lee's movements. As Lee's troops moved north to the west of the Army of the Potomac, Meade abandoned his headquarters at Culpeper and gave orders for his troops to move north to intercept Lee. Meade successfully outmaneuvered Lee in the campaign and gained a small victory. Lee reported that his plans failed due to the quickness of Meade's redeployment of resources. However, Meade's inability to stop Lee from approaching the outskirts of Washington prompted Lincoln to look for another commander of the Army of the Potomac. In late November 1863, Meade planned one last offensive against Lee before winter weather limited troop movement. In the
Mine Run Campaign, Meade attempted to attack the right flank of the Army of Northern Virginia south of the Rapidan River, but the maneuver failed due to the poor performance of
William H. French. There was heavy skirmishing, but a full attack never occurred. Meade determined that the Confederate forces were too strong and was convinced by Warren that an attack would have been suicidal. Meade held a council of war, which concluded to withdraw across the Rapidan River during the night of December 1, 1863.
Overland campaign 1864 was an election year, and Lincoln understood that the fate of his reelection lay in the Union Army's success against the Confederates. Lt. Gen.
Ulysses S. Grant, fresh off his success in the western theater, was appointed commander of all Union armies in March 1864. In his meeting with Lincoln, Grant was told he could select who he wanted to lead the Army of the Potomac.
Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, told Grant, "You will find a very weak, irresolute man there and my advice to you is to replace him at once." Meade offered to resign and stated the task at hand was of such importance that he would not stand in the way of Grant choosing the right man for the job and offered to serve wherever placed. Grant assured Meade he had no intentions of replacing him. Grant later wrote that this incident gave him a more favorable opinion of Meade than the great victory at Gettysburg. Grant knew that Meade disapproved of Lincoln's strategy and was unpopular with politicians and the press. Grant was not willing to allow him free command of the Army of the Potomac without direct supervision. Grant's orders to Meade before the
Overland Campaign were direct and to the point. He stated, "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." On May 4, 1864, the Army of the Potomac left its winter encampment and crossed the Rapidan River. Meade and Grant both believed that Lee would retreat to the North Anna River or to Mine Run. Lee had received intelligence about the movements of the Army of the Potomac and countered with a move to the East and met the Union Army at the
Wilderness. Meade ordered Warren to attack with his whole Corps and had Hancock reinforce with his II Corps. Meade ordered additional Union troops to join the battle, but they struggled to maintain formation and communicate with each other in the thick woods of the Wilderness. After three days of brutal fighting and the loss of 17,000 men, the Union Army called it a draw, and Meade and Grant moved with their forces south toward Spotsylvania Court House to place the Union Army between Lee's forces and Richmond in the hopes of drawing them out to open field combat. headquarters in
Brandy Station, Virginia, February 1864. The Union Army moved ponderously slowly toward its new positions, and Meade lashed out at Maj. Gen.
Philip Sheridan and his cavalry corps blamed them for not clearing the road and not informing Meade of the enemy's movements. Grant had brought Sheridan with him from the western theater, and he found the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps run down and in poor discipline. Meade and Sheridan clashed over the use of cavalry since the Army of the Potomac had historically used cavalry as couriers, scouting and headquarters guards. Sheridan told Meade that he could "whip
Stuart" if Meade let him. Meade reported the conversation to Grant, thinking he would reprimand the insubordinate Sheridan, but he replied, "Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it." Meade deferred to Grant's judgment and issued orders to Sheridan to "proceed against the enemy's cavalry" and, from May 9 through May 24, sent him on a raid toward
Richmond, directly challenging the Confederate cavalry. Sheridan's cavalry had great success, they broke up the Confederate supply lines, liberated hundreds of Union prisoners, mortally wounded Confederate General
J.E.B. Stuart and threatened the city of Richmond. However, his departure left the Union Army blind to enemy movements. Grant made his headquarters with Meade for the remainder of the war, which caused Meade to chafe at the close supervision he received. A newspaper reported the Army of the Potomac was, "directed by Grant, commanded by Meade, and led by Hancock, Sedgwick and Warren." Following an incident in June 1864, in which Meade disciplined reporter Edward Cropsey from
The Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper for an unfavorable article, all of the press assigned to his army agreed to mention Meade only in conjunction with setbacks. Meade apparently knew nothing of this arrangement, and the reporters giving all of the credit to Grant angered Meade. Additional differences caused further friction between Grant and Meade. Waging a war of attrition in the Overland Campaign against Lee, Grant was willing to suffer previously unacceptable losses with the knowledge that the Union Army had replacement soldiers available, whereas the Confederates did not. Meade was opposed to Grant's recommendations to directly attack fortified Confederate positions which resulted in huge losses of Union soldiers. Grant became frustrated with Meade's cautious approach and despite his initial promise to allow Meade latitude in his command, Grant began to override Meade and order the tactical deployment of the Army of the Potomac. Meade became frustrated with his lack of autonomy, and his performance as a military leader suffered. During the
Battle of Cold Harbor, Meade inadequately coordinated the disastrous frontal assault. However, Meade took some satisfaction that Grant's overconfidence at the start of the campaign against Lee had been reduced after the brutal confrontation of the Overland Campaign and stated, "I think Grant has had his eyes opened, and is willing to admit now that Virginia and Lee's army is not Tennessee and [Braxton] Bragg's army." After the
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, Grant requested that Meade be promoted to major general of the regular army. In a telegram to
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on May 13, 1864, Grant stated that "Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and William Tecumseh Sherman| [William T.] Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with." Meade felt slighted that his promotion was processed after that of Sherman and Sheridan, the latter his subordinate. The
U.S. Senate confirmed Sherman and Sheridan on January 13, 1865, and Meade on February 1. Subsequently, Sheridan was promoted to lieutenant general over Meade on March 4, 1869, after Grant became president and Sherman became the commanding general of the U.S. Army. However, his date of rank meant that he was outranked at the end of the war only by Grant,
Halleck, and Sherman.
Richmond-Petersburg campaign Meade and the Army of the Potomac crossed the James River to attack the strategic supply route centered on Petersburg, Virginia. They probed the defenses of the city, and Meade wrote, "We find the enemy, as usual, in a very strong position, defended by earthworks, and it looks very much as if we will have to go through a siege of Petersburg before entering on a siege of Richmond." An opportunity opened up to lead the
Army of the Shenandoah, to protect Washington D.C. against the raids of
Jubal Early. Meade wanted the role to free himself from under Grant; however, the position was given to Sheridan. When Meade asked Grant why it did not go to himself, the more experienced officer, Grant stated that Lincoln did not want to take Meade away from the Army of the Potomac and imply that his leadership was substandard. During the
Siege of Petersburg, he approved the plan of Maj. Gen.
Ambrose Burnside to plant explosives in a mine shaft dug underneath the Confederate line east of Petersburg, but at the last minute he changed Burnside's plan to lead the attack with a well-trained African-American division that was highly drilled just for this action, instructing him to take a politically less risky course and substitute an untrained and poorly led white division. The resulting
Battle of the Crater was one of the great fiascoes of the war. in Washington, D.C., June 1865 Although he fought during the
Appomattox Campaign, Grant and Sheridan received most of the credit, and Meade was not present when Lee surrendered at
Appomattox Court House. With the war over, the Army of the Potomac was disbanded on June 28, 1865, and Meade's command of it ended.
Political rivalries Many of the political rivalries in the Army of the Potomac stemmed from opposition to the politically conservative, full-time officers from West Point. Meade was a
Douglas Democrat and saw the preservation of the Union as the war's true goal and only opposed slavery as it threatened to tear the Union apart. He was a supporter of McClellan, the previously removed commander of the Army of the Potomac, and was politically aligned with him. Other McClellan loyalists who advocated a more moderate prosecution of the war, such as
Charles P. Stone and
Fitz John Porter, were arrested and court-martialed. When Meade was awakened in the middle of the night and informed that he was given command of the Army of the Potomac, he later wrote to his wife that he assumed that Army politics had caught up with him and he was being arrested. Meade's short temper earned him notoriety, and while he was respected by most of his peers and trusted by the men in his army, he did not inspire them. While Meade could be sociable, intellectual and courteous in normal times, the stress of war made him prickly and abrasive and earned him the nickname "Old Snapping Turtle". He was prone to bouts of anger and rashness and was paranoid about political enemies coming after him. His political enemies included
Daniel Butterfield,
Abner Doubleday, Joseph Hooker,
Alfred Pleasonton and
Daniel Sickles. Sickles had developed a personal vendetta against Meade because of Sickles's allegiance to Hooker, whom Meade had replaced, and because of controversial disagreements at Gettysburg. Sickles had either mistakenly or deliberately disregarded Meade's orders about placing his
III Corps in the defensive line, which led to that corps' destruction and placed the entire army at risk on the second day of battle. Halleck, Meade's direct supervisor prior to Grant, was openly critical of Meade. Both Halleck and Lincoln pressured Meade to destroy Lee's army, but gave no specifics as to how it should be done.
Radical Republicans, some of whom like
Thaddeus Stevens were former
Know Nothings and hostile to Irish Catholics like Meade's family, in the
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War suspected that Meade was a
Copperhead and tried in vain to relieve him from command. Sickles testified to the committee that Meade wanted to retreat his position at Gettysburg before the fighting started. The joint committee did not remove Meade from command of the Army of the Potomac. ==Reconstruction==