In
Principles of Social Justice Miller proposes a
pluralist account of
social justice, arguing that there can be no single measure of
justice. This puts him in opposition to
theorists such as
Robert Nozick or
John Rawls, who both argue for some sort of 'unifying theory' in understandings of justice. He claims that 'social justice' (defined as the 'just' distribution of benefits and burdens within society) can only be defined in reference to our 'considered judgements'. That is, philosophy must come from lived experience and
empirical evidence. This is what leads him to argue for multiple sources of justice as in his opinion people believe in a range of rationales for justice. Miller states that the most 'just' distribution depends on the type of relationship between the people involved. In 'solidaristic communities,' where people identify themselves as holding a shared
culture or belief, distributions should be made in accordance with need (e.g. family or church group). In 'instrumental associations', where people are acting together with a common purpose but each for their own good (and not necessarily sharing a common
identity or 'conception of the good'), justice is best served by allocating by desert (e.g. in the workplace). Contributions should be recognised with proportionate rewards. In 'citizenship', where people are related through political and legal structures, equality should prevail (e.g. in countries). His definition of equality involves equal status for members by the allocation of equal
civil,
political and
social rights. Equal social rights entails the equal ability to make use of the political and civil rights, and therefore demands a
welfare state and some
redistribution of wealth. In
On Nationality and
Citizenship and National Identity Miller defends a moderate, liberal form of nationalism, which he views as an important factor in maintaining support for welfare states (including institutions such as the British
National Health Service). The
nation state, he argues, performs the role of replicating the
social solidarity found in local communities at the level of states in which populations are largely anonymous. He argues that we have greater ethical duties to our co-nationals than nationals of other states: "nations are ethical communities ... The duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to humans as such". ==Criticisms==