De-Ba'athification

The goal of the policy is contained in the language of the preamble of Order No. 1: : Recognizing that the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human rights abuses and depravations [sic] over many years at the hands of the Ba'ath Party, : Noting the grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat posed by the continuation of Ba'ath Party networks and personnel in the administration of Iraq, and the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Ba'ath Party officials, : Concerned by the continuing threat to the security of the Coalition Forces posed by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, ==Formation==

acted as key figure on the 2003–2004 Supreme National De-Baathification Commission created by Paul Bremer. De-Ba'athification, as a part of the overall occupation strategy, was delegated to the United States Department of Defense per National Security Presidential Directive 24 issued on 20 January 2003, only 60 days prior to the 20 March 2003 invasion. Although the idea of a de-Ba'athification policy was articulated by Ahmad Chalabi and Iraqi National Congress, their comparisons to de-Nazification caught the attention of Douglas Feith, the head of the Office of Special Plans. The actual time-frame for the development of the policy was a matter of weeks. On 10 March 2003, a National Security Council meeting was held to determine the extent of de-Ba'athification because of disagreements between the Department of Defense, the United States Department of State, and the CIA. ==Drafting and planning phase==

The drafting and planning of the policy began with a paper, which was issued by Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Council, describing the possibility of removing Ba'ath Party influence from the Iraqi political sphere and comparing such a possibility to the Allied policy of De-Nazification articulated in the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. During the 60 days allotted for post-war occupation, the more stringent Department of Defense version was drafted by the Office of Special Plans in spite of the 10 March National Security Council compromise. Prior to Paul Bremer's arrival in Iraq on 12 May 2003, he met with Douglas Feith and the Office of Special Plans, where he received his first briefing regarding de-Ba'athification. the U.S. Department of Defense was the principal organization in charge of the occupation. Then director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet later wrote "We knew nothing about it until de-Baathification was a fait accompli... Clearly, this was a critical policy decision, yet there was no NSC Principals meeting to debate the move." Another important actor in the creation of the policy of de-Ba'athification was exile leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Ahmad Chalabi. Considered an unreliable informant by the CIA and the State Department, Chalabi was nonetheless influential within the Department of Defense's construction of a post-war occupation strategy for dealing with the Ba'ath Party. According to Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Douglas Feith, one of the primary architects of the de-Ba'athification policy, was heavily influenced by the ideas promoted by Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress. The most frequently compared strategy was the US de-Nazification policy in post-war Germany. == 100 Orders ==

During the tenure of the CPA, the Administrator, Paul Bremer, was charged with overseeing the US occupation and democratization process. As the highest authority in Iraq, orders issued from his office carried the force of law in Iraq. It was through CPA orders that Bremer and his administrative team enacted the policy of de-Ba'athification crafted in the Office of Special Plans at the Department of Defense. A total of 100 orders were issued by the CPA between May 2003 and June 2004. Order No. 1 Entering into force on 16 May 2003, Order No. 1, entitled "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society", describes the objectives of the de-Ba'athification policy developed by the Office of Special Plans. Specifically, the order states that all members of the Ba'ath Party, from senior leadership to 'Udw (Member) are "removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector." It demonstrates its broad sweep of society by stating: : Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba'ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security. Order No. 4 Entering into force on 25 May 2003, Order No. 4, entitled "Management of Property and Assets of the Iraqi Baath Party", is viewed as a continuation of the financial penalties and rules contained in Order No. 2. Within the preamble, the Order also mentions it is being promulgated "on behalf, and for the benefit, of the Iraqi people." It defines the assets of the Ba'ath Party as being any and all "movable and immovable property, records, data, cash, funds, realizable assets and liquid capital" that was either owned by the Ba'ath Party or by members of the Ba'ath Party as rewards, or such assets that they received without paying the full value. Other aspects of the Order include the suspension of "all financial obligations of the Ba'ath Party". An appeals committee was also created by the Order, and the CPA was given authority to administer and use all assets seized "for the use and benefit of the Iraqi people". Additionally, the Iraqi de-Ba'athification Council was permitted to provide information to the CPA regarding the location of Ba'ath Party assets. Finally, concomitant with Order No. 2, failing to provide information regarding Ba'ath Party assets was a punishable offense, and under the terms of the Order, an individual could be fined $1000 USD or 1 year imprisonment. Both punishments were under the discretion of the Administrator. Order No. 5 Entering into force on 25 May 2003, Order No. 5, entitled "Establishment of the Iraqi De-Baathification Council", established the title entity, the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council. The Council was to enforce Orders Nos. 1 and 4 at the discretion of the CPA Administrator or an Iraqi government. The Council was to be composed only of Iraqis, but selected by the Administrator and serving at his discretion. The Council was charged with the following duties provided the Administrator deemed the Council competent to fulfill these functions: • the extent, nature, location and current status of all Iraqi Baath Party property and assets including property and assets owned by Baath Party officials and members and any methods of concealment or distribution adopted to avoid detection; • the identity and whereabouts of Iraqi Baath Party officials and members involved in human rights violations and exploitations of the Iraqi people; • details of any criminal allegations that may be made against Iraqi Baath Party officials and members; and • any other information relevant to the Order for the De-Baathification of Iraqi Society, issued by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority on 16 May 2003... and the Order on the Management of Property and Assets of the Iraqi Baath Party. Further duties of the Council included: • the most efficient and equitable means of eliminating the structure and means of intimidation and patronage of the Iraqi Baath Party; • a means of identifying and classifying Iraqi Baath Party officials and members; • the most efficient and equitable means of reclaiming Iraqi Baath Party property and assets; and • individuals who the Council considers should be exempt from the Order for the De-Baathification of Iraqi Society... Another important clause in this Order was the fact that "any live testimony or written statements provided by individuals to the Council may not be tendered in evidence against them in any criminal proceedings." Consistent with other Orders, a monetary fine and possible imprisonment were the possible punishments for those who failed to comply with requests from the Council. Finally, the Administrator had authority over the Council and its decisions, and the Council was required to comply with all of the CPA's regulations. Entering into force on 3 June 2003, an additional Memorandum entitled "Implementation of De-Ba'athification Order No. 1" describes the process by which the objectives described in Order No. 1 and Order No. 5 are to be carried out. Order Memorandum No. 7 Entering into force on 4 November 2003, the Memorandum entitled "Delegation of Authority Under De-Baathification Order No. 1" reflects a changing position of the CPA regarding the implementation and force of the De-Ba'athification policy expressed in Order No. 1. This change in position is reflected in the preamble which states, "Observing that under the prior regime some Iraqis may have become affiliated with the Baath Party for reasons not primarily related to their ideological beliefs..." The memo, rescinding CPA Order No. 5, which created the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council, instead defers the tasks of implementing Order No. 1 to the Governing Council's Supreme National De-Baathification Commission. While the powers and duties normally tasked to the CPA for the De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, were transferred to the Governing Council and its subsidiary entities, the CPA, within the memo, retained the authority to review actions by the Governing Council and its affiliates. Furthermore, any actions by the Governing Council and its affiliates deemed to cause a potential security risk were to be discussed with the CPA Administrator prior to implementation. The Governing Council and its affiliates were also held accountable by way of submitting monthly reports to the CPA regarding actions taken against Iraqi citizens, and the names of individuals hired to replace those removed under the criteria of Order No. 1. Order No. 100 The final order issued by the CPA entered into force on 30 June 2004 (but was written and signed 28 June 2004), and was titled "Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority". True to its title, the purpose of the order was to phase out the authority of the CPA and transfer power to the new "Interim Government of Iraq", which was to enter into force on the same day as the dissolution of the CPA, 30 June 2004. The first sections of the order ensure that any previous issuances from the CPA cover all foreign personnel operating legally in Iraq. In other sections of the Order, previous Orders are "rescinded in [their] entirety". Finally, the Memorandum No. 7, which transferred CPA authority over the De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society to the Supreme National De-Baathification Commission was rescinded by Order No. 100 only until such time that "the Iraqi Interim Government issues an order establishing the Independent Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council." In effect, Order No. 100 removes the authority and language of the CPA de-Ba'athification policy, but allows for its continuity under subsequent Iraqi governments. ==Implementation and enforcement==

The process of implementing de-Ba'athification was complicated by the chaos following the initial invasion, Delegation of Enforcement Powers Per the opening section of the Memorandum, the initial entity tasked with de-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society (CPA Order No. 1) were Coalition Forces and military investigators. Further delegation relied on military investigators and tribunal-style Accreditation Review Committees (ARCs) (ibid). The power structure followed a clear hierarchy with the CPA Administrator overseeing the executive authority of the Coalition Forces and eventually the Iraqi De-Baathification Council once the Administrator deemed the body competent to carry out these duties. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) The primary actors within this phase were the military or other investigators responsible for gathering data on employees within government ministries. They were authorized to gather information in a variety of ways, and based on the relevant facts determine if an individual was deemed to have an affiliation with the Ba'ath Party. The investigator was then to inform the individual of their right to appeal the "factual finding". Based on his information, unless an appeal was approved, the Senior Ministry Advisor [sic] would then take the appropriate actions to enforce CPA Order No. 1. Exceptions could be requested by ministries, but such requests must pass military investigators' judgment that such an individual is eligible for an exception. If the individual was eligible, then the investigator was to prepare the case for the exception. Under the phase governed by the CPA, the ARCs were three-member military-civilian appeals panels under the authority of the Commander of Coalition Forces, who reported to the CPA Administrator. The purpose of the ARCs were to evaluate appeals by Iraqis who believed themselves to be wrongly deemed "Ba'athists". The ARC was to review applications and approve or deny the exceptions or appeals presented to them. All decisions were also subject to the approval of the administrator. The burden of proof in these cases fell on the individual to demonstrate that he or she was not a Ba'ath Party member under the criteria laid out in the Memorandum. De-Ba'athification Council (IDC) The phase under the De-Ba'athification Council (IDC) was only to occur when the Administrator determined "that the responsibility for identifying Ba'ath Party members [could] effectively... be transferred to Iraqi citizens..." Once this had occurred, all investigative authority would be delegated to the IDC. However, throughout the initial phase, the IDC would be encouraged to nominate individuals for the ARCs, as well as participate in the data gathering phase to prepare themselves for full assumption of duties. However, despite the possibility of taking over the investigative and determinative roles, the ARCs were to remain in place "until the people of Iraq adopt a representative form of self-government." ==Criteria for punitive action==

The criteria for punitive action articulated in Memorandum No. 1 is any affiliation with the party. This reflects the general criteria of affiliation expressed in Order No. 1, in which an individual is subject to punishment if he or she is affiliated or known to be a member, of any level, within the Ba'ath Party. Furthermore, Order No. 4 states that individuals who have received any sort of property compensation or bonuses as a result of affiliation are subjected to dispossession of property. The criteria for punishment were expansive, with the policy affecting any and all affiliated members. Only those who could clearly demonstrate that they were no longer members of the Ba'ath Party, prior to its dissolution by the CPA, and demonstrate that they were members for non-ideological reasons could hope to avoid the punishments of the policy. ==Impact==

It is estimated that, before 2007, 50,000 civil government employees, as well as employees of other organizations listed in Annex A of Order No. 2, were removed from their positions as a result of de-Ba'athification. Affected occupations The occupations affected by the de-Ba'athification policy include: • All civil servants in any government ministry affiliated with the Ba'ath Party Furthermore, the general elimination of engineers, directors, and technocrats meant that Iraqi government ministries had difficulty in fulfilling their duties to Iraqi citizens. The review also states that 32,000 were given training to replace removed employees, but other sources, such as Rajiv Chandrasekaran's book ''Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone'', describes how Sunni dominated areas were left with only one or two schoolteachers as a result of de-Ba'athification. An al-Jazeera article dated 18 November 2003 discusses the future of the Ba'ath Party, but also questions the validity of likening the Ba'ath Party to the Nazi Party, as well as the dissolution of the Ba'ath Party and the possible impact on Iraqi society. There are however, sources that discuss the positive impact on Iraqi political culture. A report written by a researcher from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a research institute in Washington, D.C., advocates a carefully calculated de-Ba'athification program, particularly in the political and security arenas as a way of laying the foundation for successful regime change. This created a significant gap in participation between Shi'a Arab and Kurdish and Sunni Arab organizations in what became the new public/political sphere. Representation The overall alienation experienced by many Sunni Arabs reflected in their lack of representation in the initial formations of governments because of high affiliation with the Ba'ath Party within the Sunni Arab population. As a consequence many Sunni Arabs chose to boycott the electoral process, protesting what they felt was a policy which excluded and discriminated against Sunni Arabs as a minority group. Sunnis The Sunnis hardly participated in the January 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections, due to a boycott initiated by the major Sunni Arab parties. Juan Cole, a noted U.S. historian and commentator on the Middle East, suggested in August 2005 that the boycott had been partly caused by the punitive policies towards ex-Baathists, and thus towards the Sunni Arabs, conducted by the then current Iraqi Transitional Government dominated by Shiite and Kurdish parties; former Baath Party members couldn't hold high government posts, yet generally hadn't been convicted of any crime as persons. Cole warned that the U.S. needed to combat this commitment to de-Ba'athification of the then-current Iraqi government "if the Sunni Arabs are going to be drawn into the new government". Shi'a As a result of many Sunni Arab political leaders being removed from participation in the future democracy of Iraq, many dissident domestic, and exiled Shi'a political leaders formed many political parties and organizations, and came to be seen as dominant in the government. This was also a generally expected result given the Shi'a in Iraq are a religious majority in Iraq. Kurds Within the Kurdish population, the idea behind de-Ba'athification was generally supported. Beneficiaries In the letter of the Orders, the primary beneficiaries of the de-Ba'athification policy were the Iraqi people. The policy was enacted for their benefit and welfare, recognizing that they had suffered under the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. However, other beneficiaries of these policies included dissidents within Iraq and the exiles that returned to Iraq following the US invasion. Politicians and Dissidents One of the groups that benefited from the de-Ba'athification policy was the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a dissident Iraqi political movement-in-exile, headed by Dr. Ahmad Chalabi. In general, the policy crippled the provision of services in one of two ways: government ministries functioned at less than optimum capacity because of incompetent leadership following the removal of Ba'athist technocrats, or government ministries effectively ceased to function as a result of Ba'athist technocrats removed under de-Ba'athification. Lost productivity Linking de-Ba'athification with lost productivity of the Iraqi economy is difficult because it is hard to separate what can reasonably be attributed as lost productivity from the removal of thousands of Ba'ath party member civil servants from damage to infrastructure from looting and the invasion campaign. However, it is likely that Iraq's economic output was hindered by the de-Ba'athification policy because of the large size of the public sector in Iraq, which was crippled by the de-Ba'athification policy. As a result, many ministries were left understaffed. Lack of basic services There is general agreement among analysts of the de-Ba'athification policy, both critics and proponents, that one of the deleterious effects was the loss of vital public services. The loss of these services comes from the general reality that many Ba'ath Party members were technocrats within government ministries, meaning that they had specific skillsets that allowed them to fulfill necessary government functions effectively. A particular instance of de-Ba'athification crippling the ability of a ministry to function was the case of the Ministry of Finance. Many mid-level ministry employees were fired because of connections to the Ba'ath Party, which left the ministry grossly understaffed. Government competency Government competency was greatly diminished by the de-Ba'athification process because many skilled individuals within the basic ministries of government were removed from their posts. As a result, many basic services either were not available, or did not function properly as a result of the removal of skilled, knowledgeable individuals. As such, many Iraqis removed under the de-Ba'athification program expressed frustration that they were being targeted for membership when it was a de facto requirement for career advance, and had little to do with their personal ideologies or political positions. Unemployment Unemployment reached as high as 27% as a result of the military dissolution according to some figures. It is not entirely clear that the totality of unemployment is purely a result of de-Ba'athification, as some unemployment resulted from combat-damaged infrastructure. However, the public sector clearly suffered a great deal as a result of de-Ba'athification and the disbanding of the Iraqi military and affiliated entities with conservative job-loss estimates in the thousands. Damage estimates as a result of the looting, a great deal of which occurred prior to the de-Ba'athification Order but was likely exacerbated by the unemployment spike created by de-Ba'athification, were placed at approximately $400 million. In Charles Ferguson's book No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent into Chaos, he notes that during the 2003–2004 period the number of crimes committed greatly exceeded the crippled Interior Ministry's police force and CPA authorities abilities to prevent crime, conduct investigations, and establish general order in Iraq. Unrest As a result of being fired, many Iraqi soldiers and Ba'ath Party members protested outside their former places of employment or in squares where they would be visible to Coalition Forces and the CPA. With the unemployment rate exacerbated by de-Ba'athification, the unrest of previously employed civil servants and military personnel contributed to the overall decay of the security situation in Iraq. Sectarian relations In Anthony Shadid's book Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War, he describes several Iraqis who exhibit a high degree of tolerance for the different religions within Iraq. Some of his interlocutors highlighted intermarriage among Iraqis as evidence for the minimal weight placed on sectarian divisions. One of the main concerns regarding the de-Ba'athification strategy was that it would both create new sectarian tensions in Iraq, and exacerbate pre-invasion tensions. To the extent that this occurred, many in Iraq expressed some amount of concern over the potential for sectarian divisions to shape Iraqi social and political life. As a result of de-Ba'athification and other government structuring policies, sectarian divisions increased, with the result of Sunni Arabs, prominently represented in the Ba'ath Party, feeling increasingly isolated from Iraqi political and social life. Security impact The security impact of the de-Ba'athification policy and the Order No. 2 disbanding the military were devastating in terms of their security impact. One of the most senior military officials in the United States, Admiral Mike Mullen states that the de-Ba'athification policy coupled with the disbanding of the Iraqi military created security problems, and unnecessary sectarian tension. The Admiral stated that the Iraqi military could have been used to help secure the country more quickly, but instead its disbandment contributed to the overall decay in security. Growth of insurgency Most sources regarding the Iraq War generally agree that CPA policies, such as de-Ba'athification and CPA Order Number 2 disbanding the Iraqi military and other security apparatuses exacerbated or created the insurgency in Iraq. Supporting this view is Rajiv Chandrasekaran's conversation with a former soldier in the Iraqi Army: : Chandrasekaran: "What happened to everyone there? Did they join the new army?" : Soldier: "They're all insurgents now. Bremer lost his chance." This quote also reveals that the insurgency was not only a means of expressing anger at a Coalition occupation of Iraq, but also motivated by economic and employment necessities. With thousands of ostracized Ba'ath Party members and hundreds of thousands of soldiers rendered unemployed, joining the insurgency could provide a means to a monthly income to provide for one's family "in a land bereft of jobs". One of the other reasons for the growth of a specifically Sunni insurgency was the fact that they felt alienated by the de-Ba'athfication policy and saw the insurgency as a means of retaliation. ==Repeal and transfer of authority==

The CPA administered process of de-Ba'athification came to an end on 30 June 2004 with the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. In many ways however, the wording of the policy was such that it continued to be in effect after the CPA was dissolved. The only real difference was that it was administered by the Interim Government's Independent Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council, rather than a council under the CPA. Transfer of authority from Coalition Provisional Authority to Iraqi Interim Government Although most of the authority for enforcing the de-Ba'athification policy had been delegated to the Higher National De-Ba'athification Council, which was created by the Iraqi Governing Council by 4 November 2003 per Memorandum No. 7, CPA Order No. 100 was an important delegating order. The language within the Order is mixed. Within the preamble of the Order, it is made clear that according to the Transitional Administrative Law all promulgations from the CPA remain in effect unless rescinded by "legislation duly enacted". However, on the same page, the Order also states that in recognition of transferring sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government, "require technical amendment and/or rescission to properly reflect the full transfer of governing authority..." The Order provides for the rescission and amendments of some decrees of the CPA, but also provides for the full sovereignty of these laws under the Iraqi Interim Government, and subsequent governments, such that any decrees deemed to reflect the will of the Iraqi people may be retained. According to the Order, most de-Ba'athification Orders were rescinded, such as Order Nos. 4 and 5, but the crucial Order Nos. 1 and 2 remain. Thus, de-Ba'athification is to remain in effect, unless removed by force of legislation from a duly elected Iraqi governing body. As a result of the language of Order No. 100, fully sovereignty over the de-Ba'athification policy was transferred from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government and subsequent governments. ==Revised de-Ba'athification==

Gradual process of reintegrating Ba'athists Despite the maintenance of the general de-Ba'athification policy, a recognition of the overly broad strength of the initial policy occurred in late 2003 (4 November 2003). This change in understanding was reflected in Memorandum No. 7. However, it was not until 2004, that the policy of reintegrating Ba'athists was given a priority. According to stories from the period in question, the focus on changing the policy occurred as the difficulties faced in the reconstruction mounted. The legislation, entitled the Accountability and Justice Act reflects the US desire to see competent individuals return to the folds of government, and also providing less incentive for Sunni Arabs to feel ostracized and sympathetic to insurgency. The Accountability and Justice Act of 2008 reforms the practice of de-Baathification, making the de-Baathification Commission permanent and extending de-Baathification to the judiciary, while reinstating jobs and pensions to low-ranking members of the ousted Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region. After Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi refused to sign, the controversial law was passed by a majority vote by the Presidency Council. Criticism Iraqi diplomat Feisal al-Istrabadi, lead drafter of the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law, criticized the overreach of Paul Bremer's De-Ba'athification policy, which "captured a large number of people who were innocent of any wrongdoing by any objective measure and were deprived of the ability to earn a living and support their families," thereby feeding the insurgency. Furthermore, though the majority of Ba'ath members were Shia, it was the Sunnis who were disproportionately removed from offices, to the extent that the latter called it "de-Sunnification". al-Istrabadi considered the 2008 Accountability and Justice Act's revised policy a positive step toward reconciliation, depending on how the law would be applied. Despite trends toward easing the restrictions on individuals removed as a result of de-Ba'athification, in regard to parliamentary elections, Sunni Arab candidates continue to feel threatened by the continuing de-Ba'athification under various de-Ba'athification Commissions or the newly created Justice and Accountability Commission. Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service notes that during the 2010 parliamentary elections, it was believed that the Justice and Accountability Council was used to bar Sunni Arab candidates as a way to ensure that the Council of Representatives would remain controlled by Shi'a political coalitions. Evidence for this accusation is the reversal of the initial ruling by appeals courts that individuals initially disqualified could run, and their Ba'athist ties could be dealt with after the election. Finally, an additional 55 candidates primarily from Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Movement (composed of Shi'a and Sunni candidates) were disqualified the night before the election. ==Post-Assad era in Syria==

In Syria, the birthplace of the Ba'ath Party, the Assad family's more than half-century of rule has also come to an end after a bloody civil war. However, unlike Iraq, the Syrian transitional government has retained some of the Ba'athist era administrative officials to quell potential unrest. The removal of the Assadist influence has led to clashes between the remnants of the Ba'athist regime and the new Syrian government. This has also led to the spread of Anti-Shiism against the Alawite Shia community in western Syria. ==See also==