Majority opinion In a 7–2 decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court. The opinion, written by
Justice Breyer, made it clear that shackling a defendant during the sentencing portion of a trial does violate the
Fifth,
Sixth,
Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court held that unless the shackling pertains to a specific defendant for specific state interests, the Constitution forbids the shackling of a defendant in the sentencing phase (as well as the guilt phase) of a trial. The
Supreme Court first noted that the law (historically) has prohibited the shackling of a defendant in the guilty-innocent phase of a trial. The court also noted shackling is only allowed when there is a “special need." The court explained that this concept is embedded in the law and that courts have followed this rule throughout history. The court noted that this rule was first written by
William Blackstone in his 18th Century Commentaries on England. Blackstone, a politician, judge and jurist, wrote “it is laid down in our ancient books, that, though under an indictment of the highest nature, a defendant must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evident danger of an escape.” In Holbrook, the court stated that shackling is “prejudicial” and should only be allowed when state interests are involved. Lastly, in Estelle, the court stated that making a defendant go to trial wearing prison attire threatened the “fairness of the fact-finding process” and should only be allowed when “essential state policy” justifies it. By making these conclusions about shackling a defendant, the court ruled “the considerations that militate against the routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of a criminal trial apply with like force to penalty proceedings in capital cases.” This deals with the fact the in these cases, the jury is still deciding between life and death and that this is a decision of equal importance compared to the question of innocence and guilt. The decision of life or death in the sentencing phase is serious which requires reliable sentencing. According to Justice Breyer, the court has “stressed the ‘acute need’ for reliable decision making when the death penalty is at issue.” Breyer said that if that is not the case, the shackling violates
due process as it did in Deck's case. With regard to the shackles biasing the jury, Thomas stated, “shackles may undermine the factfinding process only if seeing a convicted murderer in them is prejudicial.” Thomas writes, "[t]o presume that such a defendant suffers prejudice by appearing in handcuffs at sentencing does not comport with reality." The dissenting justices also suggested there was a possibility that Deck could have tried to harm a witness or a reporter. Thomas argued that the opinion of the majority went against common sense and that the decision paid little attention to courtroom security issues. Later in his opinion, Thomas stated "there was no consensus that supports elevating the rule against shackling to a federal constitutional command." He argued "there is no tradition barring the use of shackles or other restraints at sentencing." He referenced then-recent court rulings which had articulated that the "rule against visible shackled does not apply to sentencing. See, e.g.,
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 350 (Utah 1993);
Duckett v. State, 104 Nev. 6, 11, 752 P.2d 752, 755 (1988) (per curiam);
State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St. 3d 1, 18—19, 776 N. E. 2d 26, 46—47 (2002)" He discussed the three decisions which the majority had cited in their opinion. Thomas stated, "in recent years, more of a consensus regarding the use of shackling has developed, with many courts concluding that shackling is inherently prejudicial. But rather than being firmly grounded in deeply rooted principles, that consensus stems from a series of ill-considered
dicta…the current consensus that the court describes is one of its own making. It depends almost exclusively on the dicta in the Courts' opinions in
Holbrook,
Estelle and
Allen." In Deck's case, Thomas posited that
due process does not "place limits" on shackling because there is a difference between an accused man and a convicted man. Thomas then wrote about the notion of courtroom dignity for the convict (Deck), claiming "the power of the courts to maintain order, however, is not a right personal to the defendant, much less one of constitutional proportions…The concern for courtroom decorum is not a concern about defendants, let alone their right to
due process. It is a concern about society's need for courts to operate effectively." Thomas concludes by writing that the prevailing majority opinion in this case does not benefit the defendant but "risks the lives of courtroom personnel …a risk that due process does not require." == Execution ==