Harvest now, decrypt later

The term “harvest now, decrypt later” encompasses various surveillance or espionage operations in which ciphertext or encrypted communications are collected today with the view that they may one day be decrypted, given sufficient advances in computing power or cryptanalysis. The abbreviation HNDL is sometimes used in technical and policy documents. The “Y2Q” (or “Q-Day”) label draws an analogy to the Y2K date-change issue, emphasising a potential future point at which current cryptography may collapse. The strategy is particularly relevant for data with long confidentiality lifetimes, such as diplomatic communications, personal health records, critical infrastructure logs, or intellectual property. == Mitigation strategies ==

The primary defense against HNDL attacks is the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which utilizes algorithms believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. However, because PQC protects the data payload digitally, rather than the transmission itself, the encrypted data can still be harvested and stored. A complementary approach involves physical layer security (also known as optical layer encryption or photonic shielding). Unlike algorithmic encryption, this method modifies the optical waveform itself—often by burying the signal within optical noise or using spectral phase encoding—to render the transmission unrecordable by standard receivers. By preventing the attacker from capturing a valid signal in the first place, this approach aims to eliminate the "harvest" phase of the threat. Commercial implementations of harvest-proof optical encryption have been developed by firms such as CyberRidge to secure long-haul fiber networks. Field trials have demonstrated 100 Gbps throughput over legacy DWDM networks using this method. == See also ==