The effective use of depth charges required the combined resources and skills of many individuals during an attack. Sonar, helm, depth charge crews and the movement of other ships had to be carefully coordinated. Aircraft depth charge tactics depended on the aircraft using its speed to rapidly appear from over the horizon and surprising the submarine on the surface (where it spent most of its time) during the day or night (at night using radar to detect the target and a
Leigh light to illuminate it immediately before attacking), then quickly attacking once it had been located, as the submarine would normally
crash dive to escape attack. As the
Battle of the Atlantic wore on, British and
Commonwealth forces became particularly adept at depth charge tactics, and formed some of the first hunter-killer groups to actively seek out and destroy German U-boats. Surface ships usually used ASDIC (
sonar) to detect submerged submarines. However, to deliver its depth charges a ship had to pass over the contact to drop them over the stern; sonar contact would be lost just before attack, rendering the hunter blind at the crucial moment. This gave a skilful submarine commander an opportunity to take evasive action. In 1942 the forward-throwing
"hedgehog" mortar, which fired a spread salvo of bombs with contact fuzes at a "stand-off" distance while still in sonar contact, was introduced, and proved to be effective.
Pacific theater and the May Incident In the
Pacific Theater during
World War II, Japanese depth charge attacks were initially unsuccessful because they were unaware that the latest United States Navy submarines could dive so deep. Unless caught in shallow water, an American submarine could dive below the Japanese depth charge attack. The Japanese had used attack patterns based on the older
United States S-class submarines (1918–1925) that had a
test depth of ; while the WWII
Balao-class submarines (1943) could reach . This changed in June 1943 when
U.S. Congressman Andrew J. May of the
House Military Affairs Committee caused
The May Incident. The congressman, who had just returned from the Pacific theater where he had received confidential intelligence and operational briefings from the US Navy, revealed at a press conference that there were deficiencies in Japanese depth-charge tactics. After various press associations reported the depth issue, the
Japanese Imperial Navy began setting their depth charges to explode at a more effective average depth of . Vice Admiral
Charles A. Lockwood, commander of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific, later estimated that May's ill-advised comments cost the US Navy as many as ten submarines and 800 seamen
killed in action. ==Later developments==