Unusual for an active-duty officer, McMaster scolded the
U.S. government for its "arrogance, weakness, lying in pursuit of self-interest [and] abdication of responsibility to the American people." Retired Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard said that the book is built around examining and interpreting four key Washington decisions that were of major influence on the American involvement in
Indochina: :#the August 1964
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution :#the February 1965 decision to conduct
air strikes against North Vietnam :#the March 1965 decision to introduce
American ground troops into South Vietnam :#the July 1965 decisions to introduce substantial American forces while not mobilizing reserve forces A review in
The New York Times by military historian
Ronald H. Spector praised many aspects of the book, but criticized the author's emphasis on the shortcomings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the outcome of the war, as opposed to the strengths of North Vietnamese military strategy and tactics. Spector also notes that McMaster, like earlier authors, presented a picture of Lyndon B. Johnson as a President chiefly concerned about keeping Vietnam from becoming a political issue, and with his portrayal of Johnson's advisers as men possessing a distinctive combination of arrogance, deviousness and disdain for expertise different from their own. ==Influence==