. On these sites a combined 41 facilities were present containing "1,300 tons of chemical precursors and agents and 1,230 unfilled munitions". According to U.S. chemical weapons nonproliferation expert Amy Smithson, declared sites are believed to include: • four production facilities near Safira, Khan Abu Shamat,
Homs, and
Hama • six storage facilities near Safira,
Homs,
Hama,
Furqlus,
Latakia, and Palmyra • a research and development site in
Damascus.
Preparations and preliminary inspections Within 24 hours of having received an "initial declaration" document from Syria, the OPCW started a review of the inventory. The OPCW stated that it would use on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the disclosure by Syria. It would also "assist in putting into place arrangements to keep the warfare materials and the relevant facilities secure until their destruction". Specifically, under OPCW supervision Syrian military personnel had begun "destroying munitions such as missile warheads and aerial bombs and disabling mobile and static mixing and filling units". In a letter to the Security Council, Ban set out the mission's three phases: establish an initial presence and verify Syria's stockpiles declaration; oversee chemical weapons destruction; and verify destruction of all chemical arms related materials and programs.
Implementation challenges UN Secretary-General Ban in early October publicly recognized many of the challenges of the weapons destruction effort, in particular, the dangerous nature of chemical arms destruction during a civil war, especially in urban areas such as Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. "Heavy artillery, airstrikes, mortar barrages and the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas are commonplace and battle lines shift quickly," he wrote. In order to do so, they will need to cross battle lines between governments and rebel forces. OPCW director-general Ahmet Uzumcu stated in early October that completing the destruction process by the mid-2014 deadline will depend on whether temporary cease-fires can be arranged between opposition and government forces. Also exceptionally challenging will be the movement and destruction of deadly agents such as sarin, VX nerve agents, and mustard agent during the civil war. In February 2014, Syria stated that rebels had attempted to attack two convoys transporting chemical weapons. Li Hong, secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, stated that both the turbulent civil war and the financial cost of chemical weapons disposal will be a heavy burden on the Syrian government, and called it "unrealistic" to expect Syrian chemical weapons to be eliminated by 2014. Expert opinions were summarized in
Foreign Policy magazine as follows: "Taking control of [Syria]'s enormous stores of [chemical] munitions would be difficult to do in the midst of a brutal civil war. Dozens of new facilities for destroying the weapons would have to be built from scratch or brought into the country from the U.S., and completing the job would potentially take a decade or more." In October 2013, Amy Smithson of the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies stated that the government appeared to be cooperating, but cautioned that the Syrian government had a "very sorry track record" on working with nuclear inspectors and that it is easier to hide chemical weapons than a nuclear program. In April 2014, disarmament experts such as Ralf Trapp characterized the pace of the operation as impressively quick. With 92.5% of the arsenal removed or destroyed, Trapp noted that many people had not expected such speed to be achievable given the ongoing civil war.
Later activity In late October 2013, the OPCW said it expected the 1 November deadline for destruction of CW production, mixing, and munition-filling capability to be met. It was reported on 23 October that it had visited 18 of 23 declared sites. It was reported that low tech, quick and cheap' methods were being used, such as filling equipment with concrete, smashing it, sometimes using heavy vehicles". The OPCW "said the Syrian government had provided complete co-operation with the 27 weapons inspectors in the country". A statement from the OPCW read: "The OPCW is satisfied it has verified, and seen destroyed, all declared critical production, mixing, filling equipment from all 23 sites." By early November the search of disclosed sites was nearly over. On 7 November, the OPCW said that one of the two unvisited sites had been officially verified as "dismantled and abandoned", based in part on images that the Syrian government shot using a "tamperproof" GPS-enabled camera provided by the OPCW. Later, in January 2014, U.S. Ambassador
Robert Mikulak worried that the October destruction was incomplete and "reversible" and claimed that it did not, in fact, meet requirements. On 15 November, the OPCW approved a plan to transport Syria's chemical weapons to a location outside its territory by 5 February 2014, where the weapons would then be destroyed. Acceptance of shipments of the 1,000 tons of chemical agents for destruction have been refused by most countries approached by the OPCW. , Belgium and France were still considering whether to agree to such shipments. The Norwegian government hired in the Norwegian registered
RoRo cargo ship for the mission. Denmark will participate with the Danish frigate
HDMS Esbern Snare and the Danish government has hired in the civilian cargo ship Ark Futura for the mission. The United States destroyed the highest-priority chemicals, which were scheduled for removal from Syria by 31 December, using a U.S. Army
Field Deployable Hydrolysis System. The United Kingdom gave the United States £2.5 million of specialist equipment and training to enable the highest-priority chemicals to be processed more quickly. In addition around 150 tonnes of priority two chemicals, toxic material similar to industrial chemical agents, were transported to the UK with the help of the British
Royal Navy and destroyed there. The remaining stock of priority two chemicals not going to Britain were destroyed by commercial companies. The first shipment of components for chemical weapons were removed from Syria by a Norwegian/Danish flotilla on 7 January 2014. The 31 December deadline for complete removal of priority chemicals had been missed; on 7 January,
The New York Times assessed the delay was due to the difficulty of overland transport of chemical weapons in the middle of a civil war. A second shipment was removed around 27 January; that same day, the U.N. Secretary General,
Ban Ki-moon, expressed concern over the worsening delays and assessed that Syria already has the resources required to transport the weapons promptly despite the ongoing civil war. On 2 July, the Danish ship
Ark Futura arrived in the Italian
port of Gioia Tauro, carrying the chemical weapons, which were then loaded onto the U.S. ship
Cape Ray. The Cape Ray was equipped with two Field Deployable Hydrolysis Systems capable of neutralizing the poisonous substances and converting them into industrial waste. On 19 July 2014, around 250 protesters gathered at the Souda base to protest the elimination of the chemical weapons in the nearby region of the Mediterranean Sea.
Delays (blue hull, centre) and
MV Taiko (red hull, far right) are escorted by
KDM Esbern Snare of the
Royal Danish Navy (far left), of the
Royal Navy (bottom), and
KNM Helge Ingstad of the
Royal Norwegian Navy (top) By 30 January 2014, only about four percent of the priority chemicals had been removed. Syria continued to blame security issues; U.S. officials disagreed and accused the government of deliberately causing or prolonging the delay. The U.S. blamed Syria's Assad government for intentionally delaying efforts to remove chemical arms from the country for destruction, suggesting that the goal of liquidating the arsenal by midyear is in jeopardy. Stating that Assad was, in effect, slow-walking the chemicals in order to obtain more security equipment, U.S. Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak said that "Syria has demanded armored jackets for shipping containers, electronic countermeasures, and detectors for improvised explosive devices." He said the demands are "without merit" and "display a 'bargaining mentality' rather than a security mentality". Around 21 February, Syria proposed a hundred-day plan for removal of the chemicals. British official Philip Hall criticized the plan as "not adequate". At the time, the US had stated destruction of the chemicals, once off-site, would take 90 days; given that timeframe, Syria's proposed May removal deadline would not leave enough time for all munitions to be destroyed to meet the end-of-June deadline for complete destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. Around 4 March, Syria agreed to a 60-day timetable for removal of the stockpile. By 4 March 2014, almost a third of the stockpile had been removed or destroyed. Syria missed a 15 March deadline for destroying its 12 chemical weapons production facilities. Syria proposed to instead render the facilities inoperable by sealing their entrances; the U.S. and its allies opposed this proposal and insisted on destruction. On 27 April, Syria missed its revised 60-day deadline for complete removal of its full chemical weapons arsenal. As at 23 May, Syria had removed or destroyed 92.5% of its declared chemical stockpile. On 23 June, the head of OPCW,
Ahmet Üzümcü, announced in
The Hague that the last of Syria's declared chemical weapons had been shipped out of the country for destruction. The last 8% of the chemical stockpile was loaded onto ships at
Latakia. The most toxic chemicals, including sarin precursors and sulphur mustard, were destroyed by 18 August aboard the US naval vessel
MV Cape Ray. The remaining were destroyed in the US, UK and Finland. On 4 January 2015, the OPCW stated that destruction was completed. Despite American criticisms of the delays, the OPCW in July 2014 described Syria's cooperation as "satisfactory".
Problems with cargo In a news article published in Norway's biggest newspaper
Verdens Gang in December 2015, it was revealed that the operation had been far more dramatic then expected and reported. There were rocket attacks against Latakia while "Taiko" was docked. There were explosions and strikes around the docks and there were incidents where boats that could be intent on possible suicide attacks would come too close to the ships and had to be warned off. The commander of the Norwegian frigate requested that the moorings on the freighter "Taiko" were rigged with explosive charges every time she went to land in Syria so the lines could be remotely severed very quickly in an emergency allowing the ship to get to safer waters as soon as possible if any threat occurred. From the start, the shipments of containers that were transported to the cargo ships were in bad shape and some leaked potentially lethal material and gases. The containers were characterized by having been filled up hastily in a war zone before they were transported to the pier and handed to the Norwegian forces. When almost half of the cargo gave signs of leakage, an emergency meeting was held onboard Taiko with representatives from OPCW, UN, USA, Norway, Denmark, Syria and Finland. The Norwegian soldiers were ordered to deal with the situation. However no country would accept a docking of the ship with the material leaking on board, and Norwegian personnel and ships had to sail back to Syria and deal with such containers and in some cases move the material to different containers. ==Violations==