In the
Chong decision, the Court of Final Appeal laid down an important principle of its approach to
interpretation of the Basic Law. In
Chong, the Court of Final Appeal held that 26 June 1999 NPCSC interpretation was only binding on BL 24(2)(3), and had no bearing on how to interpret BL 24(2)(1), the provision at issue in
Chong. Thus, the court stated that it would interpret BL 24(2)(1) through the
common law approach to interpretation. A literal reading of the law supported the contention that Chong Fung Yuen was entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong.
Basic Law Committee member
Elsie Leung would later criticise the court for its approach to interpreting the Basic Law. Po Jen Yap of the
University of Hong Kong also criticised the CFA for effectively treating the NPCSC interpretation as having a judicial rather than statutory character, as though it were a ruling by a higher court, and in his opinion misusing this characterisation to treat the preamble of the interpretation as a mere
obiter dictum. Conversely, the Court of Final Appeal was criticised from another direction by Ling Bing of the
Chinese University of Hong Kong, who felt that the court's statement that "the power of the Standing Committee extends to every provision in the Basic Law and is not limited to the excluded provisions referred to in art. 158(3)"
overstated the NPCSC's BL 158 authority to interpret the Basic Law. Thomas E. Kellogg of
Yale Law School sees this as an attempt to avoid political controversy, which aided in preserving the so-called "two-part referral test" established in
Ng. That test, in the absence of any statutorily-specified mechanism to determine when the court should request interpretation from the NPCSC, established a high bar for such requests. He also praised the
Chong decision for "aggressively protect[ing] the rights of the litigants involved". Yang Xiaonan analysed the CFA's reluctance to rely on extrinsic materials in
Chong in terms of balance of power between the NPCSC and the CFA, as well as fairness to judicial review applicants: some documents which may aid in ascertaining the authentic intentions of the Basic Law's drafters are likely to be confidential and thus accessible only to the NPCSC, not to the CFA or to applicants. Excessive reliance on extrinsic materials could thus harm the authority and autonomy of the CFA. The CFA also stated, even where extrinsic materials may be considered in interpreting the Basic Law, courts should limit themselves to pre-enactment materials; Yang made analogies between the CFA's approach and the
originalist approach to U.S. constitutional interpretation. He went on to analyse the CFA's actions in terms of the political climate in Hong Kong at the time: by emphasising the literalist tradition of common law, the CFA promoted predictability, a core value of the
rule of law. As he stated, "if the CFA establishes advanced, mature and coherent methodologies, this may increase public support for the courts". Public support for Hong Kong courts puts pressure on the NPCSC, which as a political body rather than a judicial one takes into account the costs and ramifications of using its power of interpretation to overrule the CFA, including the possibility of damaging public confidence in the rule of law in Hong Kong. == References ==