Three basic properties of equilibrium in general have been proposed by
Huw Dixon. These are: • Equilibrium property P1: The behavior of agents is consistent. • Equilibrium property P2: No agent has an incentive to change its behavior. • Equilibrium property P3: Equilibrium is the outcome of some dynamic process (stability).
Example: competitive equilibrium In a
competitive equilibrium, supply equals demand. Property P1 is satisfied, because at the equilibrium price the amount supplied is equal to the amount demanded. Property P2 is also satisfied. Demand is chosen to maximize utility given the market price: no one on the demand side has any incentive to demand more or less at the prevailing price. Likewise supply is determined by firms maximizing their profits at the market price: no firm will want to supply any more or less at the equilibrium price. Hence, agents on neither the demand side nor the supply side will have any incentive to alter their actions. To see whether Property P3 is satisfied, consider what happens when the price is above the equilibrium. In this case there is an excess supply, with the quantity supplied exceeding that demanded. This will tend to put downward pressure on the price to make it return to equilibrium. Likewise where the price is below the equilibrium point (also known as the "sweet spot") there is a shortage in supply leading to an increase in prices back to equilibrium. Not all equilibria are "stable" in the sense of equilibrium property P3. It is possible to have competitive equilibria that are unstable. However, if an equilibrium is unstable, it raises the question of reaching it. Even if it satisfies properties P1 and P2, the absence of P3 means that the market can only be in the unstable equilibrium if it starts off there. In most simple microeconomic stories of supply and demand a
static equilibrium is observed in a market; however, economic equilibrium can be also
dynamic. Equilibrium may also be economy-wide or
general, as opposed to the
partial equilibrium of a single market. Equilibrium can change if there is a change in demand or supply conditions. For example, an increase in supply will disrupt the equilibrium, leading to lower prices. Eventually, a new equilibrium will be attained in most markets. Then, there will be no change in price or the amount of output bought and sold — until there is an
exogenous shift in supply or demand (such as changes in
technology or
tastes). That is, there are no
endogenous forces leading to the price or the quantity.
Example: monopolist equilibrium In a monopoly, marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC). The equilibrium quantity is obtained from where MR and MC intersect and the equilibrium price can be found on the demand curve where MR = MC. Property P1 is not satisfied because the amount demand and the amount supplied at the equilibrium price are not equal. Property P2 is not satisfied. Because the monopolist's profit-maximizing quantity is different from the socially-maximizing quantity, consumers have an incentive to demand more at the equilibrium price. However, at the market price, monopolists maximize their profits so they have no incentive to change their price. Therefore, agents on the demand side have an incentive to alter their actions while the agents on the supply side do not have any incentive to alter their actions. In order to determine if Property P3 is satisfied, the same situations used to determine P3 in a competitive equilibrium can be used. When there is an excess in supply, monopolists will realize that the equilibrium is not at the profit-maximizing quantity and will put upward pressure on the price to make it return to equilibrium. This is the same case when the price is above the equilibrium and the shortage in supply leads the monopolist to decrease the supply to return to the profit-maximizing quantity. Therefore the equilibrium is the result of stability.
Example: Nash equilibrium The Nash equilibrium is widely used in economics as the main alternative to competitive equilibrium. It is used whenever there is a strategic element to the behavior of agents and the "price taking" assumption of competitive equilibrium is inappropriate. The first use of the Nash equilibrium was in the
Cournot duopoly as developed by
Antoine Augustin Cournot in his 1838 book. Both firms produce a homogenous product: given the total amount supplied by the two firms, the (single) industry price is determined using the demand curve. This determines the revenues of each firm (the industry price times the quantity supplied by the firm). The profit of each firm is then this revenue minus the cost of producing the output. Clearly, there is a
strategic interdependence between the two firms. If one firm varies its output, this will in turn affect the market price and so the revenue and profits of the other firm. We can define the payoff function which gives the profit of each firm as a function of the two outputs chosen by the firms. Cournot assumed that each firm chooses its own output to maximize its profits given the output of the other firm. The Nash equilibrium occurs when both firms are producing the outputs which maximize their own profit given the output of the other firm. In terms of the equilibrium properties, we can see that P2 is satisfied: in a Nash equilibrium, neither firm has an incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium given the output of the other firm. P1 is satisfied since the payoff function ensures that the market price is consistent with the outputs supplied and that each firms profits equal revenue minus cost at this output. Is the equilibrium stable as required by P3? Cournot himself argued that it was stable using the stability concept implied by
best response dynamics. The reaction function for each firm gives the output which maximizes profits (best response) in terms of output for a firm in terms of a given output of the other firm. In the standard Cournot model this is downward sloping: if the other firm produces a higher output, the best response involves producing less. Best response dynamics involves firms starting from some arbitrary position and then adjusting output to their best-response to the previous output of the other firm. So long as the reaction functions have a slope of less than -1, this will converge to the Nash equilibrium. However, this stability story is open to much criticism. As Dixon argues: "
The crucial weakness is that, at each step, the firms behave myopically: they choose their output to maximize their current profits given the output of the other firm, but ignore the fact that the process specifies that the other firm will adjust its output...". There are other concepts of stability that have been put forward for the Nash equilibrium,
evolutionary stability for example. ==Market clearing prices==