Drexel's legacy as an advisor to both startup companies and
fallen angels remains an industry model today. Michael Milken, one of the few senior executives who was a holdover from the old Drexel, got most of the credit by almost single-handedly creating a junk bond market. However, another key architect in this strategy was
Fred Joseph. Shortly after buying the old Drexel, Burnham found out that Joseph, chief operating officer of
Shearson Hamill, wanted to get back into the nuts and bolts of investment banking and hired him as co-head of corporate finance. Joseph, the son of a
Boston taxicab driver, promised Burnham that in 10 years, he would make Drexel Burnham as powerful as
Goldman Sachs. it was Joseph who succeeded Linton as president in 1984, adding the post of CEO in 1985. Drexel, however, was more aggressive in its business practices than most. When it entered the
mergers and acquisitions field in the early 1980s, it did not shy away from backing
hostile takeovers—long a taboo among the established firms. Its specialty was the "
highly confident letter", in which it promised it could get the necessary financing for a hostile takeover. Although it had no legal status, by this time Drexel (i.e., Milken) had a reputation for making markets for any bonds it underwrote. This made a Drexel "highly confident letter" as good as cash to many of the
corporate raiders of the 1980s. Among the deals it financed during this time were
T. Boone Pickens' failed runs at
Gulf Oil and
Unocal,
Carl Icahn's bid for
Phillips 66,
Ted Turner's buyout of
MGM/UA, and
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts successful bid for
RJR Nabisco. Organizationally, the firm was considered the definition of a
meritocracy. Divisions received bonuses based on their individual performance rather than the performance of the firm as a whole. This often led to acrimony between individual departments, who sometimes acted like independent companies rather than small parts of a larger one. Also, several employees formed limited partnerships that allowed them to invest alongside Milken. These partnerships often made more money than the firm itself did on a particular deal. For instance, many of the partnerships ended up with more
warrants than the firm itself held in particular deals. The firm had its most profitable
fiscal year in 1986, netting $545.5 million—at the time, the most profitable year ever for a Wall Street firm, and equivalent to $ billion in . In 1987, Milken was paid
executive compensation of $550 million for the year. ==Downfall==