Lowe was one of the leading philosophers of his generation. He researched and published on a vast array of topics including:
metaphysics,
philosophy of mind,
philosophical logic,
philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, and the history of early modern philosophy. The empirical aspect informs and establish what kinds of things
do exist. Thus, to grasp what is actual in the world you must also ascertain was it possible. At the heart of his ontological world is a four-category ontology which consist of objects, kinds, attributes, and modes. Key to his
neo-Aristotelianism is a commitment to essences. He espouses general essences and individual essences. The view follows in the Aristotelian tradition that an essence is ‘what it is’ to be a substance. His work on Locke offers a charitable reading of the philosopher, and defends Locke's relevance to philosophy today.
The four-category ontology Lowe's four-category ontology takes inspiration from
Aristotle's
Categories. His terminology emerges from the distinction that Aristotle made between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ a subject: primary substances, secondary substances, attributes, and modes. Primary substances are neither said of nor are in a subject. Secondary are said of a subject, not being in. His own addition is to label the final two categories, attributes and modes. Attributes are both said of and are in, while modes are not said of a subject, but are in. Attributes and modes are his own additions to Aristotle's language. Rather than ‘being said of’ or ‘being in,’ Lowe introduces two distinctions: substantial and non-substantial; universals and particulars. Thus, there are substantial particulars (objects), substantial universals (kinds), non-substantial universals (attributes), and non-substantial particulars (modes). He argues that the distinction between kinds and modes are similar to the kind of distinction made between sortal and adjectival terms. The former denotes
kinds of object, while the latter denotes
properties of objects. Individual objects are particular instances of kinds, while the modes of individual objects are particular instances of properties. Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) is a type of dualism of persons and their organized bodies, wherein persons though distinct from their organized bodies are bearers of both mental properties and certain physical properties. Lowe defined non-Cartesian substance dualism as: ==Death==