Metaphysics In the philosophy of
causality, an epiphenomenon is any effect of a cause apart from the effect under primary consideration. In situations in which an event of interest is caused by (or, is said to be caused by) an event , which also causes (or, is said to cause) an event , then is an epiphenomenon. The problem of epiphenomena is often a counterexample to theories of causation. For example, take a simplified
Lewisian counterfactual analysis of causation that the meaning of propositions about causal relationships between two events and can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form "if had not occurred then would not have occurred". Suppose that causes and that has an epiphenomenon . We then have that if had not occurred, then would not have occurred, either. But then according to the counterfactual analysis of causation, the proposition that there is a causal dependence of on is true; that is, on this view, caused . Since this is not in line with how we ordinarily speak about causation (we would not say that caused ), a counterfactual analysis seems to be insufficient.
Philosophy of mind and psychology An epiphenomenon can be an effect of primary phenomena, but cannot affect a primary phenomenon. In the
philosophy of mind,
epiphenomenalism is the view that
mental phenomena are epiphenomena in that they can be caused by physical phenomena, but cannot cause physical phenomena. In strong epiphenomenalism, epiphenomena that are mental phenomena can
only be caused by physical phenomena, not by other mental phenomena. In weak epiphenomenalism, epiphenomena that are mental phenomena can be caused by both physical phenomena and other mental phenomena, but mental phenomena cannot be the cause of any physical phenomenon. The
physical world operates independently of the
mental world in epiphenomenalism; the mental world exists as a derivative
parallel world to the physical world, affected by the physical world (and by other epiphenomena in weak epiphenomenalism), but not able to have an effect on the physical world.
Instrumentalist versions of epiphenomenalism allow some mental phenomena to cause physical phenomena, when those mental phenomena can be strictly analyzable as summaries of physical phenomena, preserving causality of the physical world to be strictly analyzable by other physical phenomena.
Medicine In the more general use of the word, a
causal relationship between the phenomena is implied; Pylyshyn defends his claim by explaining that we only see images when we envision the form of an object. While visualizing objects or actions is a frequent process in our mind, it does not occur when we are considering the meaning behind an action or the non-visual properties of an object. There are many concepts we simply cannot envision. Additionally, when envisioning an image, it changes based on our preconceived notions, suggesting that semantic relations precede visual images. Unfortunately, the idea of epiphenomena in propositional theory is largely subjective and not
falsifiable. ==References==