Scope of competition law Because the logic of competition is most appropriate for private enterprise, the core of EU competition regulation targets profit making corporations. This said, regulation necessarily extends further and in the
TFEU, both articles 101 and 102 use the ambiguous concept of "undertaking" to delimit competition law's reach. This uncomfortable English word, which is essentially a literal translation of the German word "Unternehmen", was discussed in
Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH. The
European Court of Justice described "undertaking" to mean any person (natural or legal) "engaged in an economic activity", which potentially included state run enterprises in cases where they pursued economic activities like a private business. This included a state run employment agency, where it attempted to make money but was not in a position to meet demand. By contrast, in
FENIN v Commission, public services which were run on the basis of "solidarity" for a "social purpose" were said to be outside the scope of competition law. Self-employed people, who are in business on their own account, will be classed as undertakings, but employees are wholly excluded. Following the same principle that was laid down by the US
Clayton Act 1914, they are by their "very nature the opposite of the independent exercise of an economic or commercial activity". This means that trade unions cannot be regarded as subject to competition law, because their central objective is to remedy the
inequality of bargaining power that exists in dealing with employers who are generally organised in a corporate form. •
FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden (2014) C-413/13 •
Viho Europe BV v Commission (1996) C-73/95 P [1996] ECR I-5457 •
Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1996] ECR 234 •
Javico International and Javico AG v Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA [1998] ECR I-1983 •
Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (2002) C-309/99, [2002] ECR I-1577 •
Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, C 519/04 P
Mergers and acquisitions According to Article 102 TFEU, the
European Commission has the power to regulate behaviour of large firms it claims to be abusing their dominant position or
market power, as well as, preventing firms from gaining the position within the
market structure that enables them to behave abusively in the first place. Mergers that have a "community dimension" are governed by the Merger Regulation (EC) No.139/2004, all "concentrations" between undertakings are subject to approval by the
European Commission. A true merger, under to competition law, is where two separate entities merger into an entirely new entity, or where one entity acquires all, or a majority of, the
shares of another entity, and is able to have control over that entity. Notable examples could include Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merging to form Novartis, as well as Dow Chemical and DuPont merging to form DowDuPont. Mergers can take a place on a number of basis. For example, a horizontal merger is where a merger takes place between two competitors in the same product and geographical markets and at same level of the production. A vertical merger is where mergers between firms that operate between firms that operate at different levels of the market. A conglomerate merger is merger between two strategically unrelated firms. Under the original EUMR, according to Article 2(3), for a merger to be declared compatible with the common market, it must not create or strengthen a dominant position where it could affect competition, thus the central provision under EU law ask whether a concentration would if it went ahead would "significantly impede effective competition…". Under Article 3(1), a concentration means a "change of control on a lasting basis results from (a) the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings… (b) the acquisition…if direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings". In the original EUMR, dominance played a key role in deciding whether competition law had been infringed. However, in France v. Commission, it was established by the European Court of Justice, that EUMR also apply to collective dominance, this is also where the concept of collective dominance was established. According to Genccor Ltd v. Commission, the
Court of First Instance stated the purpose of merger control is "…to avoid the establishment of market structures which may create or strengthen a dominant position and not need to control directly possible abuses of dominant positions". Meaning that the purpose for oversight over economic concentration by the states are to prevent abuses of dominant position by undertakings. Regulations of mergers and acquisition is meant to prevent this problem, before the creation of a dominant firm through mergers and/or acquisitions. In recent years, mergers have increased in their complexity, size and geographical reach, as seen in the merger between Pfizer and Warner-Lambert. According to Merger Regulation No.139/2004, for these regulations to apply, a merger must have a "community dimension", meaning the merger must have a noticeable impact within the EU, therefore the undertakings in question must have a certain degree of business within the EU common market. However, in Genccor Ltd v. Commission, the
Court of First Instance(now the
General Court) stated that it does not matter where the merger takes place, as long as it has an impact within the community, the regulations will apply. Through "economics links", a new market can become more conductive to
collusion. A transparent a market has a more concentrated structure, meaning firms can co-ordinate their behaviour with relative ease, firms can deploy deterrents and shield themselves form a reaction by their competitors and consumers. The entry of new firms to the market, and any barriers that they might encounter should be considered. In Airtours plc v. Commission, although the commission's decision here was annulled by the
CFI, the case raised uncertainties, as it identifies a non-collusive oligopoly gap in EUMR. Due to the uncertainty raised by the decision in Airtours v. Commission, it is suggested that an alternative approach to the problem raised in the case would be to ask whether the merger in question would "substantially lessen Competition" (SLC). According to the Roller De La Mano article, the new test does not insist on dominance being necessary or sufficient, arguing that under the old law, there was underenforcement, a merger can have serious anti-competitive effect even without dominance. However, there exist certain exemptions under Article 2 EUMR, where anti-competitive conduct may be sanctioned, in the name of "technical and economic progress, as well as the "failing firm" defence. Although the
European Commission is less concerned with mergers taking place vertically, it has taken an interest in the effects of conglomerate mergers.
Abuse of dominance Article 102 is aimed at preventing undertakings that have a dominant market position from abusing that position to the detriment of consumers. It provides that, "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. This can mean (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts." The provision aims to protect competition and promote consumer welfare by preventing firms from abusing dominant market positions. This objective has been emphasized by EU institutions and officials on numerous occasions – for example, it was stated as such during the judgement in
Deutsche Telekom v Commission, whilst the former Commissioner for Competition,
Neelie Kroes, also specified in 2005 that: "First, it is competition, and not competitors, that is to be protected. Second, ultimately the aim is to avoid consumer harm". Additionally, the European Commission published its
Guidance on Article [102] Enforcement Priorities, which details the body's aims when applying Article 102, reiterating that the ultimate goal is the protection of the competitive process and the concomitant consumer benefits that are derived from it. Notwithstanding the objectives stated above, Article 102 is quite controversial and has been much scrutinized. In large part, this stems from the fact that the provision applies only where dominance is present; meaning a firm that is not in a dominant market position could legitimately pursue competitive practices – such as bundling – that would otherwise constitute abuse if committed by a dominant firm. That is not to suggest that it is unlawful for a firm to hold a dominant position; rather, it is the
abuse of that position that is the concern of Article 102 – as was stated in
Michelin v Commission a dominant firm has a "special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition". Under EU law, very large market shares raise a presumption that a firm is dominant, which may be rebuttable. If a firm has a dominant position, because it has beyond a 39.7% market share, then there is "a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competition on the common market" Same as with collusive conduct, market shares are determined with reference to the particular market in which the firm and product in question is sold. With regard to abuse, it is possible to identify three different forms that the EU Commission and Courts have recognized. Firstly, there are
exploitative abuses, whereby a dominant firm abuses its market position to exploit consumers – for example by reducing output and increasing the price of its goods or services. Secondly, there are
exclusionary abuses, involving behavior by a dominant firm which is aimed at, or has the effect of, preventing the development of competition by excluding competitors. Finally, there exists a possible third category of
single market abuse, which concerns behavior that is harmful to the principles of the single market more broadly, such as the impeding of parallel imports or limiting of intra-brand competition. Although there is no rigid demarcation between these three types, Article 102 has most frequently been applied to forms of conduct falling under the heading of exclusionary abuse. Generally, this is because exploitative abuses are perceived to be less invidious than exclusionary abuses because the former can easily be remedied by competitors provided there are no barriers to market entry, whilst the latter require more authoritative intervention. Indeed, the commission's
Guidance explicitly recognizes the distinction between the different types of abusive conduct and states that the Guidance is limited to examples of exclusionary abuse. As such, much of the jurisprudence of Article 102 concerns behavior which can be categorized as exclusionary. The Article does not contain an explicit definition of what amounts to abusive conduct and the courts have made clear that the types of abusive conduct in which a dominant firm may engage is not closed. However, it is possible to discern a general meaning of the term from the jurisprudence of the EU courts. In
Hoffman-La Roche, it was specified that dominant firms must refrain from 'methods different from those which condition normal competition'. This notion of 'normal' competition has developed into the idea of 'competition on the merits', The Commission provides examples of normal, positive, competitive behavior as offering lower prices, better quality products and a wider choice of new and improved goods and services. From this, it can be inferred that behavior that is abnormal – or not 'on the merits' – and therefore amounting to abuse, includes such infractions as margin squeezing, refusals to supply and the misleading of patent authorities. Some examples of the types of conduct held by the EU Courts to constitute abuse include: • Exclusive dealing agreements, whereby a customer is required to purchase all or most of a particular type of good or service from a dominant supplier and is prevented from buying from others. • Granting of exclusivity rebates, purported loyalty schemes that are equivalent in effect to exclusive dealing agreements. • Tying one product to the sale of another, thereby restricting
consumer choice. • Bundling, similar to tying, whereby a supplier will only supply its products in a bundle with one or more other products. • Margin squeezing: whereby a dominant firm holding patented rights refuses to license those rights to others. • Refusing to supply a competitor with a good or service, often in a bid to drive them out of the market. • Predatory pricing, where a dominant firm deliberately reduces prices to loss-making levels to force competitors out of the market. • Price discrimination, arbitrarily charging some market participants higher prices that are unconnected to the actual costs of supplying the goods or services. • leveraging a dominant position by way of self-preferencing, although the terminology and exact scope of the abuse is still being determined. Whilst there are no statutory defences under Article 102, the Court of Justice has stressed that a dominant firm may seek to justify behaviour that would otherwise constitute abuse, either by arguing that the behaviour is objectively justifiable or by showing that any resulting negative consequences are outweighed by the greater efficiencies it promotes. In order for behaviour to be objectively justifiable, the conduct in question must be proportionate and would have to be based on factors external to the dominant undertaking's control, such as health or safety considerations. To substantiate a claim on efficiency grounds, the commission's
Guidance states that four cumulative conditions must be satisfied: • The efficiencies would have to be realised, or be likely to be realised, as a result of the conduct; • The conduct would have to be indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies; • The efficiencies would have to outweigh any negative effects on competition and consumer welfare; And • The conduct must not eliminate all effective competition. If an abuse of dominance is established, the commission has the power, pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003, to impose a fine and to order the dominant undertaking to cease and desist from the unlawful conduct in question. Additionally, though yet to be imposed, Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 permits the commission, where proportionate and necessary, to order the divestiture of an undertaking's assets.
Examples of mergers prevented by the European Commission The EU test is the tool by which the European Commission judges the validity of a merger. If a company attains a significant strengthening of its dominant position in the market due to the merger, the European Commission is allowed to prevent the merger between the two firms. • In 2001, the EU blocked the proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell, although it has already been cleared by the American authorities. The reasoning of the European Commission was that the merger would significantly impede the competition in the aerospace industry and therefore the European Commission intervened. • Another merger prevented by the Commission was the merger between the Dutch package delivery company TNT and the American counterpart UPS. The European Commission was worried that the takeover would leave the continent with only two dominant players: UPS and DHL. • Most recently, the proposed takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair would have strengthened Ryanair's position in the Irish market and has therefore been blocked by the European Commission.
Oligopolies ==Cartels and collusion==