Testing missile|alt=Gray jet fighter aircraft fires a white missile. On 30 August 1982, the original engine-change-only F-5G (serial 82-0062, c/n GG1001, registered N4416T) made its
maiden flight piloted by Russ Scott. During the 40-minute flight, the prototype climbed to and reached Mach 1.04. GG1001 demonstrated outstanding reliability; by the end of April 1983 240 flights had been accumulated, including evaluation flights with 10 potential customer nations. The second prototype (serial number 82-0063, registered N3986B, c/n GI1001), featuring the complete avionics suite, made its first flight on 26 August 1983. The F-20 flew 1,500 flights prior to its termination; although these were exclusively flown in ideal conditions. According to the Rand Corporation, "Northrop did not take a prototype approach with the F-20… The first F-20 was intended to be a production quality aircraft…" During the test program, the F-20 fired the AIM-9 Sidewinder and, in February 1985 the AIM-7 Sparrow. In air-to-ground testing, it fired the AGM-65 Maverick, 2.75 in (70 mm) folding fin aerial rockets, dropped Mk. 82 bombs, and fired rounds from a 30 mm (1.18 in) gun pod (GPU-5/A, four-barrel
GAU-13/A) in addition to the two internal 20 mm (.79 in) M39 cannon. One of the F-20's flight characteristics was the ability to fly at only at 35° AoA (angle of attack), while the F-16 was limited to 30°; acceleration from Mach 0.9 to 1.2 in 29 seconds (at 9,150 m); climb to 12,200 m (or 40,000 ft) in 2.3 minutes (including 55 sec for the start and 22 for the INS set-up). Northrop signed a
Memorandum of Agreement with the USAF in May 1983 that made the USAF responsible for certifying the F-20's performance, air worthiness and fixed-price program. Aerospace legend
Chuck Yeager, employed as a spokesperson for Northrop, touted the aircraft as "magnificent" and was featured in advertising. In November 1982, Bahrain became the first customer. South Korea also explored local production of the F-20, and in support improvements were implemented. These included avionics upgrades, an expanded fuel tank, and the use of fibreglass composites. The changes were so extensive that a fourth prototype was built to test them. By 1983, Northrop was involved in a number of simultaneous negotiations for the F-20, and its prospects appeared positive. On 10 October 1984, GG1001 crashed in South Korea on a demonstration flight, killing Northrop pilot
Darrell Cornell. An investigation cleared the F-20 of mechanical or design faults; it concluded Cornell had blacked out due to excessive
g-forces. GI1001 crashed in May 1985 at
Goose Bay, Labrador, killing Northrop pilot Dave Barnes. Again the crash was blamed on
G-LOC; Barnes had been practicing his aerobatic routine for the
Paris Air Show.
Battle for sales promotional film reel. In December 1981, President Reagan, reacting to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, signed a major economic and military aid package for Pakistan that included 40 F-16As. However, other U.S. allies saw this as a potential break in the FX policy, and began requesting only "the very best." Such approval was increasingly granted starting in 1982. In May, Venezuela, who had long examined the FX project, agreed to buy 18 F-16As and six F-16Bs, replacing a fleet of
Mirage III interceptors and
Mirage 5 ground-attack aircraft. Sweden decided to develop their own design, the
JAS 39 Gripen. In September 1983, Turkey announced plans to buy 132 F-16Cs and 28 F-16Ds to replace their Lockheed F-104G/S Starfighter and Northrop F-5A/B. Greece, stung by its long-time rival receiving the F-16, purchased 34 F-16C and six F-16Ds in November 1984, giving a firm pledge of secrecy. Then, late in 1983, the U.S. government made a financial commitment to help Israel develop its own new fighter, the
IAI Lavi. Northrop objected to this, as the Lavi would be a potential competitor to the F-20 in the export market; while Northrop had to privately fund the F-20, the government was directly subsidizing a foreign competitor. Congressional support for Israel overruled Northrop's complaints along with complaints from other branches of the government. While other companies marketed directly to foreign air forces, the F-20 could only be marketed by the State Department as part of the FX program. Under this policy umbrella, Northrop had to submit every piece of marketing material to government review, which could take months. The State Department had no interest in selling the FX; from its perspective it was one aircraft among many, leading to a lackadaisical approach, and led to complaints from Northrop that the government was not promoting the F-20 enough.
Congressional investigation Starting in March 1984, Congress chaired a series of hearings into FX.
William Schneider, Jr., the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, testified that FX policy might not result in any sales, in spite of any government support. He stated that the sales of arms such as FX was primarily a matter of foreign policy, secondarily a commercial venture.
Thomas V. Jones, Northrop's CEO, argued that there was little point independently developing aircraft if companies were reliant on the government to sell them. He suggested the FX policy be dropped, and F-20 allowed to be sold by the vendor. He observed that over four years the US had sold 100 fighters to 29 countries, none were FX. He also compared France's aircraft exports, showing a market for a low-cost fighter existed. In the Committee's concluding remarks, the State Department and DOD were accused of rhetoric, and lacking support, on FX.
Aggressor and Air National Guard roles identity number "340."|alt=Dark-blue jet aircraft taxiing on ramp, carrying an external fuel tank under belly. A possibility for a U.S. purchase opened in 1984, for a small number of "aggressor aircraft" for
dissimilar air combat training. In November 1984, Congress directed the Air Force and Navy to study the use of a single aircraft type to fill similar aggressor roles for both services. In January 1985 the Navy announced they had selected a specially configured version of the F-16. It was rumored that the aircraft was sold at a loss to keep Northrop's F-20 out of the market. Another chance for the F-20 was as an upgrade for the
Air National Guard (ANG). Northrop claimed that the F-20's fast scramble time made it a natural fit for this role, its lower cost would allow the ANG to operate larger aircraft numbers, and that it supported the AIM-7 while the F-16 did not. However, the Air Force's requirements had priorities favoring the F-16 for the role; if the ANG flew the F-16, they would further lower unit costs, maintain commonality between the ANG and Regular Air Force, and better equip ANG units to perform front line combat roles. The
Congressional Budget Office had also disputed Northrop's lower cost claim in their own research. On 31 October 1986, the Air Force announced that the F-16C had been selected, which had been upgraded to support the AIM-7. As several nations had suggested they would accept the F-20 on the condition that it was inducted into the USAF, the selection was a heavy blow to Northrop.
Cancellation After six years with no buyers, in late 1986 Northrop canceled the $1.2 billion project. Northrop was reluctant to protest perceived favoritism of the F-16 in fear of losing support for the
Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bomber project. Ongoing negotiations with the
Royal Moroccan Air Force for 20 F-20s were canceled; Later on, a bribery scandal would emerge from the attempts to market the F-20 to South Korea, leading to several Northrop managers resigning and the reprimanding of chief executive
Thomas V. Jones, who retired in 1989. In the late 1980s, local production of the F-20 was discussed with India. A move was also made in the 1980s to market the aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force with a license production manufacture of the aircraft. It was evaluated by a Pakistani contingent in the United States, with the F-20 being flown by Abbas Mirza, a senior Pakistani Air Force fighter pilot. Of the components of the F-20, the radar would end up being the most successful; Taiwan selected it for the Ching-kuo, South Korea also adopted it for the
KAI T-50 Golden Eagle trainer aircraft. As sales prospects were not apparent early on, GE sold their radar division, which was eventually acquired by
Lockheed Martin. Aviation author Steve Pace wrote of the F-20 as "one of the best fighters that never went into production." While discussing military procurement, Thomas McNaugher stated that competition between the F-20 and the F-16 served to lower prices and generate "massive savings" for the U.S. government. Writing prior to cancellation, Ralph Nader and William Taylor noted that the F-20 had been commonly described as "the first privately funded U.S. combat aircraft in recent history." Mazher A. Hameed commented in 1986 that the F-20 was a "logical choice" for the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia; however, it had "scant chance of being selected" due to political factors, as well as competition from other candidates such as the Mirage 2000 and
Panavia Tornado ADV. ==Aircraft disposition==