Early work As part of a sweeping review of post-war requirements, on 20 June 1945 the Army Ground Forces Equipment review listed the requirement for "High velocity guided missiles… capable of… destroying missiles of the V-2 type, should be developed at the earliest practicable date." In July of that year, the
US Army Signal Corps started basic research into two radar systems for ABM use. In January 1946 the Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces (AGF) established a requirement for a study program on the V-2 problem. In early February, the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, the "Stillwell Board" run by
Joseph Stilwell, restated the antimissile requirement in its report on a Proposed National Program for Guided Missiles. By 1 April Secretary of War
Robert P. Patterson had signed off on the program, and at the end of May the Stilwell Board published a requirement for an antimissile with a 100,000 yard range. In March 1946 the Air Forces started
Project Thumper (also known as MX-795) to consider the problem of defending against ballistic missiles like the V-2, using the "collision intercept" method.
General Electric won the contract for Thumper, which is the first known ABM effort. Thumper was followed in April by a similar contract awarded to the
Michigan Aeronautical Research Center (MARC) under the name
Project Wizard (MX-794). A funding crisis in 1947 caused both projects to see reduced interest, and in the summer they were turned into long-term studies, with General Electric receiving $500,000 a year and the MARC $1,000,000 a year. The Army Air Force and Ordnance Department had earlier split up programs based on whether they were "airplane like" or "rocket like", but Thumper and Wizard broke this rule and were developed under the AAF. Both projects moved to the Air Force when that force was created out of the Army Air Force in 1948. The Air Force cancelled Thumper in 1949, citing the overlap with the more advanced Wizard, and re-directed remaining funds to their
GAPA anti-aircraft project. Wizard continued largely as a technology study with no actual hardware development.
Project Plato Throughout this period the Army remained concerned about ballistic missile attack, as well as the need for some form of defensive system. In an 8 February 1950 memo to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army admitted that there "was no guided missile or other device in sight for protection against enemy supersonic guided missiles" and that the problem was "the extreme technical difficult in meeting or overtaking a missile travelling at supersonic speed.". In light of this, an existing Signal Corp radar project and other development was defunded. The Army continued to press for such a system and launched numerous research projects to develop working solutions. In addition to the radar work at the Signal Corps, in 1950 they started a study to see if the
Bomarc missile might fill the role. Initial specifications for a mobile "Anti-Missile Missile" system for defense against
ballistic missile attack were defined in 1951; This was followed by a September 1952 contract with the
Aerophysics Development Corporation of
Curtiss-Wright to study the overall system, and a November 1952 contract with the Signal Corps to once again consider the radar problem. On 20 October 1952 when an Army G-4 meeting reiterated the need for such a system and initiated Project Plato to coordinate the various studies. When the Aerophysics report was returned on 15 May 1953 it gave them further impetus to research the radar systems, considered to the real problem, and sent out another contract to Bendix Aircraft in June 1953 to consider this. Their report returned in 1955 with the conclusion that the radar was possible. Studies by
Sylvania Electric Products in 1953 and the
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory in 1954 led to the conclusion, in May 1956, that such a project was feasible; in February 1959, before construction had begun on the prototype SAM-A-19 missiles, the project was canceled; the
Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile would be adopted as an interim ABM. , the official histories of Project Plato were still classified.
Cancellation As the Plato missile was designed to fly at speeds of Mach 6 to 8, a relatively unknown area, most of the Plato work after 1956 was concerned with aerodynamic and thermodynamic studies. Plato studies continued until February 1959, when very little progress had been made. Reports early that year demonstrated a rapid buildup of short- and medium-range missiles and rockets in the
Warsaw Pact forces. Although first identified as a threat over a decade earlier, it took considerable time for the expected problem to actually evolve. In spite of this long delay the Army was nowhere near ready to deploy the Plato system. In something of a panic, the Army canceled Plato in favor of upgrades to the existing Hawk and Hercules missiles. This would be a stop-gap measure only, a true solution to the TBM problem was still needed. ==FABMDS==