The aftermath of Kiev After the
Battle of Kiev, the German Army High Command (
OKH) ordered the
Army Group Center to redeploy its forces for the
attack on Moscow. As a result, the
2nd Panzer Group turned north toward
Bryansk and
Kursk. In its place,
Army Group South, led by
Walther von Reichenau's
6th Army and
Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel's
17th Army, took command of the
Panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the main offensive formation of Army Group South,
Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist's
1st Panzer Group, received orders to move south toward
Rostov-on-Don and the Caucasian oil fields in accordance with
Führer Directive No. 35. While the 1st Panzer Group secured the German victory at the Battle of Melitopol, the burden of processing the 600,000 Soviet
prisoners of war from Kiev fell to the 6th and 17th Armies, resulting in a three-week regrouping period for those two armies. To stabilize its southern flank, Stavka (the Soviet High Command) poured reinforcements into the area between Kursk and Rostov at the expense of its forces in front of
Moscow. The
Southwestern Front, decimated during the Battle of Kiev, was rebuilt under the command of Marshal
Semyon Timoshenko, known as one of the
Red Army's most capable commanders. The
6th,
21st,
38th and
40th Armies were reconstituted almost from scratch.
Approaching Kharkov During the Battle of Moscow, the Germans found it crucial to protect their flanks, and they applied these lessons in their march towards Kharkov. On 6 October, von Reichenau led an advance through
Sumy and
Okhtyrka towards
Belgorod and Kharkov. At the same time, the 17th Army launched an offensive from
Poltava toward
Lozova and
Izyum to protect the long flank of the
1st Panzer Army (formerly the 1st Panzer Group). This offensive resulted in the Soviet 6th Army (commanded by
Rodion Malinovsky) and the 38th Army (commanded by
Viktor Tsiganov) being pushed back in disarray. As the Battle of Moscow approached, the Soviet Red Army suffered major defeats at
Vyazma and Bryansk, resulting in 700,000 casualties. The meager reserves available were urgently needed to defend the Soviet capital, leaving the Southwestern Front vulnerable. With no reinforcements to fill the gap, the Soviets were forced to retreat to
Voronezh to prevent the collapse of their southern flank. The German Army's primary objectives before winter were to seize Leningrad, Moscow, and the approaches to the Caucasian oil fields. Kharkov, though a secondary objective, was of vital importance. In addition to protecting the flanks of their motorized spearheads, the Germans valued Kharkov for its industrial importance and its role as a critical rail junction. Capturing the city would push the Soviet armies of the Southwest and
Southern Fronts back toward Voronezh and
Stalingrad, cutting off their main transportation hubs. By the second week of October, however, the German offensive was hampered by the
Rasputitsa mud season and logistical challenges in the area between the
Dnieper River and the front lines. All road bridges had collapsed, and the threat of ice posed a challenge to pontoon replacements. To ensure the capture of Kharkov, Hitler diverted resources from the 17th Army to support the 6th Army. This weakened the 17th Army's efforts to protect the flank of the 1st Panzer Army and contributed to the German defeat at the
Battle of Rostov. After 17 October, night frosts improved road conditions, but the autumn-equipped Germans were hampered by snow and cold, partially because they had prepared under the expectation that the entire
Barbarossa invasion could be completed before winter. ==Course of the battle==