Syrian attack At around 13:00, four Soviet-built
MI-8 helicopters lifted off near
Damascus and flew west into Lebanon, where they circled until forty-five minutes into the Syrian shelling of the Golan. They then headed southeast toward the Israeli outpost. The Israelis detected the helicopters at about 15:00, when the team at the upper ski lift reported them and fired at them until they flew out of sight. The Syrians began shelling the outpost at 14:00. All the Israeli soldiers in the outpost concentrated in the central hall of the bunker. The platoon officer and the mortar sergeant climbed up to the observation point but had to come back down due to the heavy shelling. Three of the helicopters arrived from the west. Two of them landed about thirty paratroopers on Hill 2072, south of the lower ski lift. Most of the Syrian force deployed above the curve south of the upper ski lift to block access to the outpost. A few of them advanced toward the outpost to provide cover. A third helicopter with sixteen paratroopers, who were supposed to block the "tank curve", crashed (a rotor-blade hit the slope They were organized in eight platoon-sized forces. At around 15:15, when the first two forces arrived near the outpost, Syrian artillery opened fire and the covering force directed small-arms fire at the outpost. Meanwhile, the fourth helicopter approached and landed sixteen more commandos. Some of them joined the charge at the outpost while the rest formed a second covering force. When the shelling subsided small-arms fire could be heard from the central hall. Zidover, Funk, and four other Golani soldiers came out to the fighting platform through the upper western opening. They saw dozens of Syrian soldiers advancing on the road toward the outpost gate and a covering force lying on the embankment outside the outpost fence. The Syrians charged into the outpost courtyard and some managed to penetrate the upper western opening into the top storey, throwing fragmentation and stun grenades and firing into the work rooms. Their entrance was hesitant and slow, and included calls in Hebrew and Arabic to the Israeli soldiers to surrender. Some went down the staircase leading to the central hall and threw grenades into it. They reached the hall but did not enter the rooms or the connecting tunnels. They may have used a smoke generator operated by a small engine. The hall filled with smoke dust and the sounds of explosions, which induced panic among the Israeli non-combatant soldiers. Many of them were choking and believed the Syrians were using gas. Some tried to take cover in the tunnels, but some were in a state of shock and remained frozen in the rooms near the central hall. Between 16:00 and 17:00, some of the soldiers returned fire from various corners of the central hall in the direction of the staircase and prevented the Syrians from coming down. The outpost commander tried to concentrate the men from the different tunnels and rooms into a single tunnel. At this point, the outpost lost its connection with the outside world.
Wadi Si'on At around 16:50, the men in the "Hedva" observation post, located near the Lebanese village of
Shebaa, were ordered to move back to Masada via the lower ski lift, with their
armored personnel carrier (APC). At about 17:00, the APC, along with an 81mm mortar half-track approached Wadi Si'on, (where the "Tali" observation point was located); both positions came under heavy fire from the ridge above them. The APC was hit by an
RPG and stopped in the middle of the road. Three Israeli soldiers were killed instantly, the rest were wounded and took cover. The "Tali" commander, exposed in his half-track, was hit by a bullet in the back, but the driver started the vehicle and sped off toward the lower ski lift. The attacking Syrians were probably the blocking force from the 87th Reconnaissance Battalion, which was supposed to take up positions in the "tank curve" that night, but strayed into the area above the road from the lower ski lift and Shebaa Farms. The Syrians maintained a constant fire and left without coming down to the road. At nightfall, at around 17:35, after the Syrians left, the "Hedva" observation post reported the encounter to the 902nd Battalion company headquarters at Shebaa Farms and asked for assistance. Company headquarters reported to the 820th Brigade headquarters at
Nafakh. Putting together a rescue force, which included a doctor, a paramedic and five infantrymen, took an hour. The force, advancing in two APCs, moved slowly and carefully with its lights off. At about 18:30, it arrived at the location, treated the wounded and evacuated them. From that moment until the end of the war, no IDF troops entered the territory between Shebaa farms and the Hermon mountainside. During the night and the next day, ten of them made their way back to the Israeli lines. A soldier from the IAF unit in the outpost accidentally entered a 183rd Syrian Battalion position, deployed on high point 1614. He was caught and executed the next day.
Counterattack At 18:07, NC accepted the suggestion raised by the Golani Brigade commander, Colonel Amir Drori, to try to reach the outpost. While the eleven Israeli soldiers were trying to make their escape, a Golani force – made up of Drori's command half-track, the 51st Battalion command post with companies A and B in fifteen more half-tracks, the 69th Reconnaissance Company in eight other half-tracks and the brigade's battalion collecting station in an ambulance – was on its way to the Hermon. The force left
Rosh Pina at 07:01 and reached
Neve Ativ at 04:01, but NC ordered Drori to stop, fearing a Syrian breakthrough in the Hadar-Masada sector and ordered him to deploy for a block around bunkers 103, 104 and 105, with the 13th Battalion subordinated to the brigade. Unaware of the situation throughout the Golan, Drori objected, assuming it was best to strike as early as possible and deny the Syrians time to organize. He was denied, and the force started moving back via the Sa'ar Bridge toward Masada. At 04:21, Drori was ordered to organize for a block, and at 05:19 his troops were deployed in their sector.
Capture At around 06:00 on October 7, the two wounded soldiers that were captured were questioned and taken to a ravine outside the outpost. At around 09:00, the Israeli soldiers in the northeastern tunnels heard shots in the courtyard. The Syrians may have fired Israeli weapons captured at the upper ski lift, and some of the Israeli soldiers thought it was their rescuers firing. Four soldiers hiding in the communication bunker heard the shots and came out through a position blown up by the Syrians that morning. Noticing soldiers with olive-colored uniforms,
Uzis and an IDF helmet, a radio technician came out and yelled "Golani, Golani, don't shoot!", before his eyes had adapted to the sunlight when he noticed they were Syrians. He and the others ran back in and the Syrians chased them, throwing smoke grenades. Not knowing where the other Israelis were hiding, the Syrians called on them to surrender through the generator gratings and pointed flashlights inside, saying that whoever did not come out would be killed. The Israelis contemplated surrender, but the Golani platoon sergeant refused, opting instead to try to break out through the northeastern position. At around 11:00, he led them through the tunnel connecting the generators to the position. He came out onto the roof first, followed by a Golani soldier, an AMAN soldier and a radio operator. They were spotted on the roof, near the main entrance of the anti-aircraft hill north of the outpost. Perhaps as a response to the Syrian calls to surrender, the sergeant opened fire and threw two grenades at the Syrians. The three Israelis were killed soon after. The others who got out lay in a trench, the Syrians firing at them but missing. When they concluded they had no chance, they surrendered. The radio technician, who waved a piece of white cloth, was killed. The Syrians held their fire, ordered the Israelis down to the courtyard and told them to lay down their weapons and helmets. At about 11:30, two Syrians entered the doctor's room on the top storey and captured him along with two Golani soldiers who were with him, one of them badly wounded. In the late afternoon, the twenty-six captured Israelis were disarmed and their hands tied with telephone wire; they were then led, tied in pairs, toward the Syrian outpost. They were escorted by about thirty Syrian soldiers from the 82nd Battalion. A badly wounded Golani soldier who fell behind was killed, his body left behind. From the Syrian outpost, the prisoners were transferred by trucks to a special forces training base at
Qaboun, near Damascus, where they stayed for four days. Five Israeli soldiers remained in the outpost: a quartermaster hiding in the emergency bunker and four soldiers hiding in the war room bunker. They found some rations in the nearby maintenance bunker and a plastic water tank, which sustained them until October 12. Using a transistor radio, they heard that the
Israeli settlers in the Golan had returned to their homes and so decided to keep hiding until the IDF recaptured the outpost. In the first three days, the Syrians raked the outpost with gunfire and grenades each morning and each night. When the outpost became relatively quiet, the Israelis tried on more than one occasion to get out, but returned after hearing the Syrian guards in the central hall. At around 11:00 on Friday, October 12, Syrian soldiers entered the tunnels to look for food and caught the Israelis, including the quartermaster, by accident. The prisoners were transferred, through the Syrian outpost, to Qaboun. On October 15, all thirty one prisoners were taken to an olive grove and photographed by journalists; they were transferred to a prison the next day. ==Aftermath==