First Ivorian Civil War

died in 1993, after 30 years in power. Leadership succession When Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, the end of his thirty-three-year presidency inaugurated a prolonged "crisis of succession", which destabilised Ivorian politics for the remainder of the 1990s. Since the Ivory Coast's independence from France in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny had maintained Ivorian political and economic stability using mechanisms largely dependent on his own personal charisma, networks, and so-called Françafrique connections; the country lacked established mechanisms to regulate democratic competition. As required by the constitution following his death, Houphouët-Boigny was succeeded by Henri Konan Bédié, the President of the National Assembly, who also replaced Houphouët-Boigny at the head of the ruling Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI, ). However, ahead of the 1995 presidential election, opposition politicians began to organise for democratic regime change in open and competitive elections. and who in 1994 split from PDCI to establish his own party, Rally of the Republicans (RDR, ). Both opposition groups boycotted the 1995 election in protest of changes to the electoral code : Bédié's PDCI retained power, but at the cost of harming its popular legitimacy. Ivoirité Ivory Coast has historically received large numbers of immigrants from neighbouring West African countries, especially Burkina Faso, and the flow of immigration was sustained after independence, both due to Ivory Coast's relative prosperity and due to the favourable policies of Houphouët-Boigny's government: for example, between 1960 and 1972, any person born in Ivory Coast could receive Ivorian citizenship, regardless of their parents' nationality. A majority of immigrants were Muslim: the share of Muslims in the Ivorian population increased from approximately six per cent in 1922 to 38.6 per cent in 1998. used Ivoirité to undermine his political rivals. Academic analyses agree that a key root cause of the Ivorian civil war was the spread of nativist and xenophobic discourse, its mobilisation by opportunistic politicians, and the resulting ethnic tensions. Central in this regard was the rise of Ivoirité as an ideology and state policy under President Bédié, and its use to marginalise and exclude immigrants, their descendants, and certain groups of Ivorian citizens. Ethnic tensions, xenophobic sentiment, and related communal disputes in Ivory Coast predated Bédié's rule, but Houphouët-Boigny had been able to accommodate, manage, and suppress them. Under Bédié, however, the rise of Ivoirité politicised such disputes, making origin and religious affiliation "the prime markers of identity" in Ivory Coast. In November 1994, ahead of the 1995 presidential election, Bédié had the National Assembly amend the electoral code to require that presidential candidates should be Ivorian-born with two Ivorian-born parents (where previously only one such parent had been required). This was viewed as a strategic move to avert a leadership challenge from Ouattara, who at that point remained Bédié's rival inside PDCI. Guéï had been fired by Bédié in 1995, reportedly because he declined to deploy the military during pre-election public demonstrations, and, once in office, he said that the new military government would seek to reverse Bédié's changes to the electoral code. In the violence, FPI supporters reportedly targeted not only Guéï's forces but also supporters of Ouattara's RDR, as well as northerners and immigrants who they assumed supported RDR. An attempted coup in January 2001, which Gbagbo blamed on the interference of Burkina Faso, led to renewed attacks on Burkinabé residents by FPI supporters. ==Belligerents==

led the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast and the New Forces. Rebel forces The primary rebel force in the civil war was the New Forces of Ivory Coast (FNCI, ), created in December 2002 as a coalition between the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI, ''Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire), the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO, Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest), and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP, Mouvement pour la justice et la paix). Guillaume Soro led the MPCI, whose insurgency began the war, and he became the general secretary of FNCI.' The International Crisis Group, however, regarded the allegation as plausible: sources in the Burkinabé government reported that arms had been delivered to the rebels by air, and Western intelligence proved that some of the arms used in the rebels' initial attacks had come from the Burkinabé Presidential Guard stocks. However, both International Crisis Group and Western intelligence reports gave less credence to Gbagbo's further accusation that Burkinabé troops had participated directly in the initial attacks. reflecting a partial spillover of the Liberian Civil War, and, according to a March 2003 report by Global Witness, 90% of MJP and MPIGO forces were Liberian or Sierra Leonean mercenaries, many of them ex-members of Charles Taylor's Revolutionary United Front. Government forces President Laurent Gbagbo was supported by loyalists in the state security services and National Armed Forces (FANCI, ''Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire). In addition, he reportedly recruited foreign mercenaries, some of whom had previously been affiliated with the South Africa-based Executive Outcomes, Various civilian militias supported Gbagbo and his political party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI, Front populaire ivoirien'') – the most important among them was the Young Patriots' Pan-African Congress (COJEP, Congrès panafricain des jeunes et des patriotes). In 2005, Human Rights Watch reported that the Ivorian government had also recruited foreign combatants, primarily from Liberia, and including child soldiers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2002 and 2004, the Ivorian government purchased arms from Angola, Belarus, Bulgaria, Israel, Romania, and Ukraine. International forces The French military launched its intervention in Ivory Coast, Opération Licorne, on 22 September 2002, three days after the start of the war, with an initial focus on protecting French and other foreign nationals. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed its own peace force on 18 January 2003. ECOWAS re-hatted its troops and handed over to UNOCI in April 2004, but, for practical and financial reasons, the Security Council allowed the French Operation Licorne to remain in place under its own chain of command. ==Outbreak of civil war==

Military rebellion: 19 September 2002 The "opening salvo" in the war was a rebellion against Gbagbo's government by Ivorian troops, who on 19 September 2002 executed a well-coordinated simultaneous attack on three Ivorian cities, including the largest city, Abidjan. According to the International Crisis Group, the rebellion involved about 750 troops, but it reportedly originated in a smaller protest of about 200 soldiers, primarily from the north of the country, who objected to their demobilisation by the government, viewing it as ethnically motivated. Guéï was shot dead on the day of the rebellion – according to his family, while having lunch – "in circumstances that lead many to believe the government wanted him eliminated". French intervention: 22 September 2002 of the French 1st Parachute Hussar Regiment in Ivory Coast.|246x246px Ivory Coast's former colonial power, France, was invested in the outcome of the conflict – given its significant business interests in Ivory Coast, and the presence of more than 20,000 French citizens there – but was extremely reluctant to intervene in support of Gbagbo. Nonetheless, on 22 September, France launched Operation Licorne, with an initial mandate focused on protecting and evacuating French nationals and other foreign nationals. Indeed, in the weeks after the rebellion, French and American forces evacuated 2,500 people – mostly foreign nationals – from the Ivory Coast. However, on September 29, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) launched peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana, under the mediation of a high-level contact group comprising representatives from Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Further bilateral talks were held in Lomé, Togo, in October and November, but failed to break a political deadlock: MPCI demanded Gbagbo's removal, fresh elections, and a review of the constitution. In December, the rebels regrouped politically, with MJP and MPGIO joined MPCI as junior partners in a new political coalition, the New Forces of Ivory Coast (FNCI, ''Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire), led by Guillaume Soro of the MPCI.'''' This merger was viewed as a strategic choice to improve the rebels' bargaining position ahead of upcoming peace talks. Thereafter, the New Forces administered its northern territories in ten "comzones", each headed by a zone commander, who was typically a former military officer. ==First round of peace talks==

troops in Odienné. ECOWAS intervention: 18 January 2003 ECOWAS leaders had agreed on 18 December 2002 to deploy an ECOWAS Peace Force for Côte d'Ivoire, comprising 3,200 military personnel. The force was to arrive before the end of December and take over from France in monitoring the ceasefire. The agreement provided for power-sharing through a Government of National Reconciliation: Gbagbo would remain in office, but Seydou Diarra would be appointed as a non-partisan consensus prime minister, with the understanding that Diarra would not run in the next presidential election. The power-sharing government would include representation for all the agreement's signatories: the three major political parties (Bédié's PDCI, Ouattara's RDR, and Gbagbo's FDI), the three major rebel groups in the New Forces (MPCI, MJP, and MPIGO), and four smaller political parties – Movement of the Forces of the Future (''Mouvement des forces de l'avenir''), Ivorian Workers' Party (Parti ivoirien des travailleurs), Citizens' Democratic Union (Union démocratique et citoyenne), and Union for Democracy and Peace in Ivory Coast (''Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'Ivoire''). encouraged a populist uproar over the French presence in Ivory Coast. "Patriotic" response Inside Ivory Coast, however, FPI and government supporters regarded the Linas-Marcoussis Accord with hostility. Opposition came especially from the military, which rejected New Forces control of the interior and defence ministries and the integration of the rebels into the army. Gbagbo's supporters blamed France for coercing him to accept the agreement. Indeed, in "a clear move to distance himself" from the agreement – which he referred to as a "proposal" – Gbagbo had not signed it, but had sent another representative to sign on FPI's behalf. Immediately after the accord was signed, the Young Patriots organised violent anti-French protests, apparently with Gbagbo's backing. A demonstration in Abidjan on 2 February drew 100,000 protesters, who objected to "French occupation" and to the power-sharing deal. The demonstrations continued on a daily basis, and at one point involved an attempt to seize the airport to prevent Diarra from returning to Abidjan to head the new coalition government. Amid attacks on French nationals, businesses, and bases, France carried out another wave of evacuations of French nationals. These protests in early 2003 marked the beginning of a surge in activity by Ivory Coast's so-called "patriotic movement", which continued to depend on mobilisation by the Young Patriots and to receive encouragement from Gbagbo, himself a longstanding nationalist. In the increasingly popular patriotic analysis, the crisis in Ivory Coast was a "war of second independence" from France's neocolonial influence, and international intervention in the crisis consisted in an attack on Ivorian sovereignty, particularly insofar as the Linas-Marcoussis Accord was viewed as recognising the legitimacy of the New Forces rebellion and as imposing constitutional change on Ivory Coast. Gbagbo was portrayed as a nationalist pioneer, persecuting for upsetting the status quo of French hegemony. In the months after Linas-Marcoussis, this narrative was used by Gbagbo to deny the legitimacy of international decisions, in favour of reasserting presidential prerogatives, and to justify his reluctance to implement the peace agreement. == Peace implementation stalled ==

Accra II talks: 7–8 March 2003 In a pattern that would be maintained in subsequent years, the signature of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord was followed by significant delays in its implementation, requiring the reopening of peace talks – though the Linas-Marcoussis Accord remained the basic framework within which all such talks took place between 2003 and 2006. The same week, French intelligence services in Paris arrested 10 people, including Ibrahim Coulibaly, who they said had been plotting to assassinate Gbagbo and destabilise the peace. Moreover, the political conflict raged on. Gbagbo also had not fulfilled his promise to revise electoral eligibility requirements. By the end of 2003, disarmament had not been implemented – in contravention of a 1 October deadline – and military authority in the country remained bifurcated under a de facto north-south partition, while inter-ethnic violence continued in the west, particularly between local Guéré and Yacouba. On 4 March, opposition party PDCI suspended its participation in the reconciliation government, accusing FPI ministers of taking unilateral decisions. In May, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded an inquiry into the march and aftermath, finding that: at least 120 people were killed, 274 wounded and 20 disappeared. These figures are by no means final... It is equally clear that many of the killings on these two days did not take place in the street but in the dwellings of would-be demonstrators or even innocent civilians targeted by the security forces simply because of their name, origin or community group. It was a well-known fact that police officers or other security officials or parallel forces would harass, try to rob, or search and arrest without warrants people in Abidjan even in the days preceding 25 March. However, these activities had greatly intensified since 23 March and contributed to the explosive environment. Credible accounts received by the Commission indicate that these actions too had been planned and directed by the security forces and later executed in cooperation and collusion with the parallel forces.In protest against the violence, the New Forces and Ouattara's RDR announced their withdrawal from the reconciliation government. In May, Gbagbo publicly lambasted the opposition for suspending their participation; shortly afterwards, it was announced that he had sacked (permanently) three opposition ministers: PDCI's Patrick Achi, the New Forces' Youssouff Soumahoro, and Soro, the leader of the New Forces. Soro called the move "tantamount to a coup d'état against the peace accords", and said that it would be impossible to establish peace in Ivory Coast until Gbagbo was removed from office. Accra III talks: July 2004 Peace talks resumed in July 2004 in Accra in an attempt to revitalise the peace process. An agreement signed upon the conclusion of the talks once again committed the parties to implement the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, this time "with specific deadlines and benchmarks for progress". A sustained assault on the press followed, with newspapers partial to the north being banned and two presses destroyed; dissenting radio stations were silenced. == Resurgence of violence ==

was head of the Ivorian Armed Forces for the duration of the war. On 4 November, Gbagbo's forces violated the prevailing ceasefire, as the military launched air attacks against rebel positions in Bouaké and Korhogo. or two Ivorian Sukhoi Su-25 bombed an Operation Licorne base in Bouaké, killing nine French soldiers and an American aid worker and injuring 31 others, the heaviest casualties suffered by a French operation since the 1983 Beirut barrack bombings. France rejected the Ivorian claim that the bombing had been accidental, and French President Jacques Chirac ordered the retaliatory destruction of both Ivorian Sukhoi Su-25 and five MI-24 ground attack helicopters – the entirety of the Ivorian air force's fleet. The clashes strengthened the pro-Gbagbo "patriotic" narrative that the conflict involved a "second war of independence" from France. In 2021, a Paris court issued life sentences to two Ivorian officers and one Belarusian mercenary, who in absentia had been found guilty of carrying out the air raid. ==Revived peace talks==

(zone de confiance) created in Ivory Coast, as of spring 2007. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1572 on 15 November, imposing an immediate arms embargo on Ivory Coast, though the effectiveness of the embargo is debatable.''' and the parties met in Pretoria again in June 2005 to review and reaffirm the agreement. In early October, the AU's Peace and Security Council conceded that Gbagbo could remain in office for up to 12 months further. the UN Security Council followed suit. On 21 October, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1633, which called for the establishment of an international ministerial working group and mediation group – mandated to draw up a road map for holding elections – and demanded the appointment, by consensus, of a new prime minister in Ivory Coast. Following a delay, both directives were implemented, with Charles Konan Banny appointed the new prime minister in December 2005. The New York Times reported that four people had died in the clashes. In early November 2006, the UN Security Council agreed to delay elections further, extending Gbagbo and Banny's terms for another "new and final" transition period of one year. Resolution 1721, lobbied for by France, similarly, in October 2005, the team's qualification for the 2006 FIFA World Cup sparked days of public celebration in Abidjan, Ouagadougou talks: 2006–2007 Shortly after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1721, Gbagbo announced that he was preparing his own "new framework" to resolve the crisis, reflecting that, "Confronted by the failure of external solutions, it is time for Ivorians to assume total ownership of the peace process". and formed a cabinet that retained many of the ministers who had served under his predecessor. On 18 June, the central government began its administrative redeployment in northern areas formerly held by rebels, with the first new prefect installed in Bouaké. Despite a fatal rocket attack on Soro's airplane on 30 June, the reconciliation process continued with the large "Peace Flame" disarmament ceremony on 30 July, in which the two leaders set fire to a pile of weapons, symbolising the end of the conflict. The ceremony also involved Gbagbo's first visit, since 2002, to the former rebel stronghold of Bouaké. On 27 November, Gbagbo and Soro met with Compaoré in Ouagadougou to discuss the implementation of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and set a deadline for elections. In late December, they met again, this time in Tiébissou to preside over the beginning of a nation-wide disarmament process, scheduled to unfold over three months as troops from both sides left the front and returned to barracks. When the buffer zone was fully dismantled in July 2008, it was replaced by a "green line" of international peacekeepers, split across seventeen observation points, who would gradually be replaced by joint Ivorian patrols including both New Forces and government troops. Disarmament and demobilisation encountered several hurdles. Opposition politicians Ouattara and Bédié expressed opposition to the sequencing of disarmament, suggesting that elections should take place first,' while there were occasional riots by contingents of ex-rebels who demanded payment (or augmentation) of the demobilisation payments they had been promised by the new government. France, Japan, and the United States announced in May 2009 that they would make funds available to cover the election costs and the costs of the disarmament payments.' Preparations for the presidential election began in 2007, with Sagem, a French company, hired to administer the voters' roll; but, in October 2008, the New Forces suggested postponing the election for no more than a year, in order to provide more time for voter registration. In early November 2008, several Ivorian parties – including Gbagbo, Soro, Bédié, and Ouattara – met in Ouagadougou and agreed to postpone; the UN Security Council called for elections to be held no later than mid-2009. Despite an announcement in May 2009 that the election would be held on November 29, it did not take place until October 2010. == Impact ==

According to 2009 estimates by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, in its deadliest years between 2002 and 2004, the war had between 933 and 1,689 casualties, with a best guess of 1,265 casualties. UNOCI suffered 36 casualties during the war: fifteen in 2005, thirteen in 2006, and eight in 2007. According to the UN Refugee Agency, approximately 750,000 people were forcibly displaced between 2002 and 2007, including 50,000 refugees who fled primarily to Liberia, Guinea, and Mali. ==Aftermath: Return to war==

Ivory Coast held its first presidential elections since 2000 in October 2010, but a dispute over the result led to renewed political crisis and to the beginning of the Second Ivorian Civil War. Soro did not run in the election, nor did the New Forces endorse a candidate. both Gbagbo and Ouattara claimed victory and took the presidential oath of office. Hundreds of people were killed in the violence that followed, and hundreds of thousands were displaced.''' UN Security Council Resolution 1962 extended UNOCI's mandate and called on all parties to recognise Ouattara as Ivory Coast's rightful president.'''''' The second civil war ended with Gbagbo's defeat and arrest in April 2011, but, despite its brevity, had a higher death toll than the first: a 2012 national commission of inquiry recorded 3,248 fatalities. == See also ==