Bristol Justices At first instance, the prosecution submitted that the defendant had displayed the knife and ticket in the window with the objective of attracting a buyer, and that that constituted an offer of sale sufficient to create a criminal liability under section 1(1) of the Act. For the defence, Mr Obby Simakampa submitted that the display was not sufficient to constitute an offer. The judges at
first instance found that displaying the knife was merely an invitation to treat, not an offer, and thus no liability arose. The prosecution appealed.
Divisional Court The
Divisional court dismissed the appeal.
Lord Parker CJ stated there was no offence because there was no "offer for sale". Although the display of a knife in a window might appear to "lay people" to be an offer inviting people to buy it, and that it would be "nonsense to say that [it] was not offering it for sale", whether an item is offered for the purpose of the
statute in question must be construed in the context of the general law of the country. This, he said, clearly established that merely displaying an item constituted an invitation to treat. He also read the statute on an exclusive construction (
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius), noting that other
legislation prohibiting the sale of weapons referred to "offering
or exposing for sale" (emphasis added). The lack of the words
exposing for sale in the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 suggested that only a true offer would be prohibited by the Act. ==Significance==