Europe and Africa Russian Front While rebuilding the
Wehrmacht during the 1930s, the German military valued coordination between strike aircraft and ground troops. When they launched their attack on Poland in September 1939,
Stuka fighter-bomber pilots accompanying the
blitzkrieg effectively directed air strikes via radio. During
Operation Barbarossa, in late 1941,
Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen circled over retreating Russian troops in a
Fieseler Storch and called in
Stukas and other German ground attack aircraft on them.
North Africa Forward air controllers were first used by the British
Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno. During the
North African Campaign in 1941 the
British Army and the
Royal Air Force established Forward Air Support Links (FASL), a mobile air support system using ground vehicles. Light reconnaissance aircraft would observe enemy activity and report it by radio to the FASL which was attached at brigade level. The FASL was in communication (a two-way radio link known as a "tentacle") with the Air Support Control (ASC) Headquarters attached to the corps or armoured division which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. They also introduced the system of ground direction of air strikes by what was originally termed a "Mobile Fighter Controller" traveling with the forward troops. The controller rode in the "leading tank or armoured car" and directed a "cab rank" of aircraft above the battlefield. In March 1943, a British air controller was essential at the
Battle of the Mareth Line; he directed 412 strike
sorties, forcing German troops to retreat from their defensive positions with heavy casualties.
Italian campaign By the time the
Italian campaign had reached
Rome, the Allies had established air superiority. They were then able to pre-schedule strikes by fighter-bomber squadrons; however, by the time the aircraft arrived in the strike area, ofttimes the targets, which were usually trucks, had fled. The initial solution to fleeting targets was the British "Rover" system. These were pairings of air controllers and army liaison officers at the front; they were able to switch communications seamlessly from one brigade to another—hence Rover. Incoming strike aircraft arrived with pre-briefed targets, which they would strike 20 minutes after arriving on station only if the Rovers had not directed them to another more pressing target. Rovers might call on artillery to mark targets with smoke shells, or they might direct the fighters to map grid coordinates, or they might resort to a description of prominent terrain features as guidance. However, one drawback for the Rovers was the constant rotation of pilots, who were there for fortnightly stints, leading to a lack of institutional memory. US commanders, impressed by British at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system. Call signs for the Rovers were "Rover Paddy" and "Rover David" for the RAF; the names were those of the fighter pilots who originated the idea. The American version was "Rover Joe". Rover Joe was not an individual, but an
ad hoc unit consisting of a pilot as forward air controller, a ground forward air controller, and fifteen enlisted men, including communications specialists and other ranks. The unit could move right along with the ground forces it supported. It soon became apparent that air strikes could be used even beyond the range of marking artillery, and that better target marking methods were needed. This led to the
Horsefly FACs. There are two accounts of the origin of the Horsefly FACs; both may be true, as they are not contradictory. • One version tells of an anonymous
L-5 Sentinel pilot who mentioned the FAC concept to Tactical Air Controller Captain William Davidson. Davidson then bucked it up the line to his seniors in Tactical Air Command. Regardless of inspiration, the first Horsefly FACs were launched on 28 June 1944. The scrounged L-5s had been equipped with SCR-522 VHF radios, and were flown by volunteer fighter-bomber pilots. Fighter-bomber squadrons were instructed that FAC missions had priority in targeting. The Horseflies operated at an altitude of 3,000 to 4,000 feet, ranging above small arms fire, roving up to 20 miles inside German lines, and marking targets with smoke bombs. To aid the strike pilots in seeing the tiny liaison craft, the upper wing surfaces were painted with one of four bright colors. Call signs were keyed to these colors: Horsefly Red, Green, Yellow, or Blue. When the German ground troops realized that the silvery-bottomed Horseflies were deadly, they concentrated fire on them. The counter to that was to paint the Horseflies the same khaki as ordinary artillery spotters. The Germans then became leery of firing on any of the khaki observation aircraft. The Horseflies were obviously susceptible to enemy air attack and ground fire; they also added radio traffic to an already overburdened network. However, their effectiveness outweighed their disadvantages. Fighter bombers were on call from "Cab Ranks", orbiting points close to the forward edge of the battle area. Although already briefed for a target, the fighter-bombers would first await a call to strike an immediately pressing target. From these Cab Ranks, the FACs could very quickly call on air support for any targets of opportunity or threats to the troops in their area, with uncalled upon aircraft striking their briefed target. These ground FACs operated from
White Scout Cars or
M3 half tracks (and later tanks) equipped with a wide range of radio sets for both ground to air and ground to ground communications. Airborne FACs were supplied from the
air observation post squadrons (pilots and observers generally came from the Army) of the RAF operating
Auster IV.
The Pacific Theater and Southern Asia South Pacific in 1945 In November 1942, units of the Australian and United States Armies were fighting the Japanese in the
Battle of Buna-Gona,
New Guinea.
Number 4 Squadron of the
Royal Australian Air Force was an army cooperation squadron flying support for the ground effort, in outdated two-seater
CAC Wirraway trainers. They sometimes used the second seat to carry an observer. The local terrain was jungled; ground troops had difficulty in observing the enemy or in staying linked with one another. Therefore, the Wirraway pilots, with their superior observation, began directing artillery fire onto the Japanese from the air via radio, as well as carrying out their own strafing and bombing. One pilot, Pilot Officer J. Archer, even shot down a Japanese Zero, for the only known aerial victory by an Australian FAC.
Aleutian Islands Campaign American aerial attackers in the
Aleutian Islands had to contend with fog and low-lying cloud cover, as well as heavy Japanese defensive ground fire. The situation led to the use of forward air control. On 16 May 1943, General
Eugene M. Landrum ordered his air chief of staff, Colonel
William O. Eareckson to coordinate air strikes with ground operations for the invasion of
Attu. Eareckson borrowed an
OS2U Kingfisher from the
USS Casco (AVP-12). Using the seaplane's low speed and maneuverability to his advantage, Eareckson flew reconnaissance missions to spot Japanese positions. He would then spiral up through the clouds to rendezvous with strike aircraft and either lead the strike into the targets or describe the target location to the fighter-bombers. Ground fire not only hit the Kingfisher; it sometimes punctured the plane's single float. Eareckson would land in shallow water, beach the plane, and plug the bullet holes with rubber plugs before resuming his mission.
Burma Pathfinders in the European Theater flew advance missions to mark targets for strategic bombing raids; however, they were not providing close air support to troops. The Pathfinders in the Pacific campaign operated slightly differently than their European pathfinder counterparts and pioneered a number of military "firsts". To comply with Roosevelt's proposed air support for British
long range penetration operations in Burma, the
United States Army Air Forces created the 5318th Air Unit to support the
Chindits. In March 1944, they were designated the
1st Air Commando Group by USAF General
Hap Arnold. Arnold chose Colonel
John R. Alison and Colonel
Philip Cochran as to command the Air Commando Group. When Wingate's
Chindits launched
Operation Thursday, each of its columns had a forward air controller to direct support from
Mitchell and
Mustang aircraft. In an imaginative move prompted by Colonel Cochran's assurance that he could transport both troops and supplies by glider, In three months, 600 sorties by
Dakota transport aircraft transferred 9,000 troops, 1,300 pack animals and 245 tons of supplies to landing zones across Burma. When the Burma road was reopened in January 1945 the Air Commandos were inactivated in preparation for the invasion of mainland Japan. ==Postwar forward air control==