In a January 1999 report, an
Office of the Secretary of Defense official called for a
Defense Acquisition Board review of the FSCS program. The OSD official criticized the vehicle's proposed $3–5 million unit cost versus the $3.6 million M3A3 Bradley. The report said that while the Army mission need statement specified a lightly armored vehicle, the vehicle specified in the requirements was more like a "medium tank" comparable to the canceled
M8 Armored Gun System. In February, the U.S. Army began working with the UK to revise the requirements of the joint program to resolve the OSD's concerns. The new requirements, which went into effect in March, pacified the OSD. Many requirements were loosened at the OSD's request: for example, the new requirements clarified that the primary armament need not be an autocannon. In October,
U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki laid out his vision for a lighter, more transportable armored force. The Army launched the
Interim Armored Vehicle acquisition program, and began investing in "leap-ahead" technologies for Shinseki's "objective force"
Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles program. In order to help pay for the IAV, the U.S. Army decided to terminate FSCS. In December 1999 the Army said it would end its participation in the joint program after the completion of the advanced technology demonstration (ATD) phase. At the time, the UK was still very much committed to its participation in the project. Congress, believing that continued development of the program was unnecessary given the Army's disinterest, deleted funding for completing the ATD phase. The Pentagon persuaded Congress to restore funding in October 2000. In October 2001, the U.S. and British Army mutually canceled the program. The U.S. hoped to leverage the technologies developed with FSCS in the
Future Combat Systems program. The British were expected to do the same with the
Future Rapid Effect System. == See also ==