Despite the attempts to counter increasingly heavy ships, ramming tactics were superseded in the last centuries BC by the Macedonians and Romans who were primarily land-based powers. Hand-to-hand fighting with large complements of heavy infantry supported by ship-borne catapults dominated the fighting style during the Roman era, a move that was accompanied by the conversion to heavier ships with larger rowing complements and more men per oar. Though effectively lowering mobility, it meant that less skill was required from individual oarsmen. Fleets thereby became less dependent on rowers with a lifetime of experience at the oar. Success in ramming depended so much on a combination of skill and good fortune that it played a somewhat subordinate part in most ancient sea fights. The
Romans baffled the ramming tactics of the Carthaginians by the invention of the
corvus, or crow, a plank with a spike for hooking onto enemy ships which grappled the prow of the rammer, and provided a gangway for boarders. Despite its advantages, the boarding bridge had a serious drawback: since it could not be used in rough seas, the corvus may have cost the Roman Navy entire fleets in such storms. The Romans did continue their boarding tactics in the naval battles of the Punic Wars, but are also reported as ramming the Carthaginian vessels after the abandonment of the corvus. An older and alternative way for boarding was the use of grappling hooks and planks, also a more flexible system than the corvus. Agrippa introduced a weapon with a function similar to the corvus, the
harpax.
Middle Ages No later than the 7th century AD, ramming tactics had completely disappeared along with the knowledge of the original trireme and its high speed and mobility. The ram was replaced by a long spur in the bow that was designed to break oars and to act as a boarding platform for storming enemy ships. The only remaining examples of ramming tactics was passing references to attempts to collide with ships in order to roll it over on its side. s are rolling over the Rus' vessels and smashing their oars with their spurs; Chronicle of
John Skylitzes, 13th century. The
Byzantine navy, the largest Mediterranean war fleet throughout most of the
Early Middle Ages, employed crescent formations with the flagship in the center and the heavier ships at the horns of the formation, in order to turn the enemy's flanks. Similar tactics are believed to have been employed by the Arab fleets they frequently fought from the 7th century onward. The Byzantines were the first to employ
Greek fire, a highly effective incendiary liquid, as a naval weapon. It could be fired through a metal tube, or
siphon, mounted in the bows, similar to a modern
flame thrower. Greek fire was similar to
napalm and was a key to several major Byzantine victories. By 835, the weapon had spread to the Arabs, who equipped
harraqas, "fireships", with it. .
Madrid Skylitzes manuscript, 11th century. The initial stages in naval battles was an exchanges of missiles, ranging from combustible projectiles to arrows,
caltrops, and javelins. The aim was not to sink ships, but to deplete the ranks of the enemy crews before the boarding commenced, which decided the outcome. Once the enemy strength was judged to have been reduced sufficiently, the fleets closed in, the ships grappled each other, and the marines and upper bank oarsmen boarded the enemy vessel and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Byzantine dromons had
pavesades, racks along the railings, on which marines could hang their shields, providing protection to the deck crew. Larger ships also had wooden castles on either side between the masts, which allowed archers to shoot from an elevated firing position. On Byzantine galleys, the brunt of the fighting was done by heavily armed and armored troops called
hoplites or
kataphraktoi. These would attempt to stab the rowers through the oarports to reduce mobility, and then join the melee. If boarding was not deemed advantageous, the enemy ship could be pushed away with poles. 1407–1408
Roger of Lauria (c. 1245–1305) was a successful medieval naval tactician who fought for the
Aragon navy against French
Angevin fleets in the
War of the Sicilian Vespers. At the
Battle of Malta in July 1283, he lured out Angevin galleys that were beached stern-first by openly challenging them. Attacking them in a strong defensive position head-on would have been very dangerous since it offered good cohesion, allowed rowers to escape ashore and made it possible to reinforce weak positions by transferring infantry along the shore. He also employed skilled crossbowmen and
almogavars, light infantry, that were more nimbler in ship-to-ship actions than heavily armed and armored French soldiers. At the
Battle of the Gulf of Naples in 1284, his forces launched clay cooking pots filled with soap before attacking; when the pots broke against the enemy decks, they became perilously slippery and difficult for heavy infantry to keep their feet on.
Early modern period in 1571 that shows the strict formations of the opposing fleets. Fresco in the Gallery of Maps in
Vatican Museum. Tactics remained essentially the same until In large-scale galley engagements the end of the 16th century. The same basic crescent formation in line abreast that was employed at the
battle of Lepanto in 1571 was used by the Byzantine fleet almost a millennium earlier. The practical maximum size of the front ranks of a galley formation was about 65 ships in the center with another 53–54 ships on the left and right wings.
Cannons and small firearms were introduced around the 14th century, but did not have any immediate effect on tactics. If anything, the forward offensive power of galleys was accentuated by
naval artillery. Early heavy artillery on galleys was not used as a long-range standoff weapon against other gun-armed galleys. The maximum distance at which contemporary cannons were effective, c. 500 m (1600 ft), could be covered by a galley in about two minutes, much faster than the reload time of any artillery piece. Gun crews would therefore hold their fire until the last possible moment, somewhat similar to
infantry tactics in the pre-industrial era of short range firearms. The bow guns would often be loaded with
scatter shot and other anti-personnel ammunition. The effect of an assault with a gun-armed galley could often be dramatic, as exemplified by an account from 1528 where a galley of Genoese commander Antonio Doria. On board the ship of Sicilian Don Hugo de Moncada he witnessed how a single volley from a
basilisk, two demi-cannons and four smaller guns killed 40 men. The estimated average speed of Renaissance-era galleys was fairly low, only 3 to 4 knots, and a mere 2 knots when holding formation. Short bursts of up to 7 knots were possible for about 20 minutes, but only at the risk of exhausting rowers. This made galley actions relatively slow affairs, especially when they involved fleets of 100 vessels or more. The weak points of a galley remained the sides and especially the rear, the command center, and were the preferred targets of any attacker. Unless one side managed to outmaneuver the other, battle would be met with ships crashing into each other head on. Once the fighting began with galleys locking on to one another bow to bow, the fighting would be over the front line ships. Unless one was completely taken over by a boarding party, fresh troops could be fed into the fight from reserve vessels in the rear. In a defensive position with a secure shoreline, galleys could be beached stern first with its guns pointing out to sea. This made for a very strong defensive position, allowed rowers and sailors to escape to safety on land, leaving only soldiers and fighting men to defend against an assault. ==See also==