Gao Gang Affair

Mao had a series of private conversations with Gao in late 1952 or early 1953 where it is believed he expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with Liu and Zhou, apparently remarking that they were too cautious in their attitude towards the pace of socialist transformation in China. Implementation of the new tax system was among the issues leading to this dissatisfaction. In one conversation, Mao asked Gao if Gao was "willing to head the cabinet if Enlai no longer served as premier" and Gao responded, "Maybe Lin Biao should be considered." Immediately after his conference with Rao, Gao toured the southern and eastern provinces in order to discuss his views with other military leaders, primarily Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, and Zhu De. During these visits, Gao continued to discuss the Politburo candidate list prepared by An. Peng Dehuai, who was known to have some antipathy against Gao's main target Liu Shaoqi, also expressed some support, but like Lin he did nothing in particular to aid Gao. When Gao approached Luo Ronghuan, Luo demanded to know Mao's exact thoughts. He was doubtful whether Mao had actually endorsed such suggestions and told Gao that their discussion on a matter of such significance was inappropriate. == Negative party reactions and death ==

When Gao expressed his thoughts to Li Xiannian, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, they were all concerned that his attempts were a threat to party unity. Chen and Li informed Zhou Enlai first about Gao's activities and then spoke to Mao. Deng also approached Mao directly about Gao's approach. Mao instructed Chen Yun to visit the places where Gao had toured and to tell the leaders Gao had spoken with, "Don't be fooled by Gao." At the conference, Mao's position was clear: he condemned Gao for forming "an anti-Party alliance". Round table meetings following the Plenum included stronger criticism of Gao. Criticism of Gao increased after his attempted suicide. Zhou contradicted Gao's belief that the military should play a preeminent role in Chinese politics, condemned Gao's attempts to spread "rumors" about Liu and other leaders, and concluded that Gao's intention was to sow discord and to usurp power within the party and the state. Zhou also condemned Gao's dissolute lifestyle. Gao faced additional criticisms from within the Party, including false claims. Gao was placed under house arrest to receive reeducation. While on house arrest in August 1954, Gao killed himself with sleeping pills. In 1955, Gao was formally expelled from the Party. Gao's ally, Rao, was also expelled from the CCP, and was jailed until his death in 1975. == Analysis ==

Gao's assumption that Mao would support the elimination of Zhou and Liu, despite Mao's dissatisfaction with them, was mistaken. At the time, Mao was still relatively tolerant of differing opinions, but was confident that both Liu and Zhou would align their views with Mao if pressed. Mao was satisfied with the "unity" that had been achieved by the Yan'an Rectification Movement, and had no intention of altering the basic party structure that had been established at the 1945 Party Congress. Mao disagreed with Gao's own opinion of his role in the revolution (which Mao thought was inflated), and clearly believed that the party should retain a clear command over the state and the military. If Gao's views of the importance of the army in the revolution had prevailed, they would have contradicted Mao's interpretation of the party's history and would have threatened Mao's preeminent position of leadership. Another factor that has often been explored, and probably had great importance at the time, is the Soviet connection. Gao's actions were certainly not seen as a Soviet-backed move against the Chinese Communists, but it is certain that Gao's connections with the Soviets made people suspicious of him. Because Sino-Soviet relations were tense but close (the party endorsed Soviet methods of economic planning but wanted to make sure that the Soviets did not gain increased influence over China) the impression, however slight, that Gao's attempts to gain power might have had links to his friendship with the Soviets would have been viewed with alarm. This can be seen in Zhou Enlai's public comments against Gao at the February 1954 meetings where he charged him with having "mixed up right and wrong in Soviet relations". According to the account Nikita Khrushchev provides in his memoirs, Gao was the Soviet leadership's primary source of information about "the mood in the Chinese Party" and Stalin, apparently driven by the desire to win Mao's trust, handed some of the diplomatic cables from Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Panyushkin over to Mao. In Khrushchev's opinion, the "betrayal" by Stalin was key to Gao Gang's subsequent fate. Gao's death not only brought closure to the affair but also made sure that he was duly remembered in a dishonorable fashion as a traitor to the party. Some sources refer to the fall of Gao Gang, along with Rao Shushi, as a prime example of Mao's use of 'Character Assassination' to defeat surrounding political officials in the CCP hierarchy. Academic Chen Jian writes that although Mao was unsatisfied with Gao and sought to teach him a serious lesson, Mao did not intend to destroy Gao, who shared many of his politics and was a capable figure in the Party. Chen contends that Mao had sought to "freeze" Gao for a while and release him later, crediting Mao's subsequent statements that Mao had considered sending Gao back to Shaanbei with his Party membership and place on the Central Committee intact and that he "fe[lt] very sorry" for not acting before Gao's death. == References ==