In April 2005, German Ambassador to Israel
Rudolf Dreßler stated that "the secure existence of Israel is in Germany’s national interest and is therefore an element of our reason of state". Chancellor
Angela Merkel formally articulated this in 2006 by declaring
Israel’s right to exist as a German national interest. According to Israel’s ambassador at the time, this declaration marked a shift away from German neutrality in the Middle East. Merkel later reiterated this stance in a 2007
UN speech and again in her 2008
Knesset address, where she stated: "The secure existence of Israel is in Germany’s national interest and is therefore an element of our reason of state" calling it "fundamental and non-negotiable", in light of Iranian threats. Critics, including former Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, described Merkel’s position as “emotionally comprehensible, yet foolish view which could have serious consequences". Germany's Staatsräson is reflected in its arms cooperation with Israel, its efforts to maintain regional stability, and its opposition to Iran's nuclear ambitions. In 2022, only 27% of Germans supported the notion of a special responsibility towards Israel. Following the
October 7 attacks in 2023, Chancellor
Olaf Scholz reaffirmed the principle, stating, “Israel’s security is German
Staatsräson” notably omitting Merkel’s earlier qualifier that it is only "a part" of it. He added, “In this moment, there can only be one place for Germany: the place by Israel’s side". Domestically, the invocation of
Staatsräson has also been cited in the context of banning protests and organizations critical of the Israeli government. Furthermore, the federal state of
Saxony-Anhalt introduced a requirement for prospective German citizens to sign a written commitment to Israel’s right to exist and to condemn any actions directed against that existence—explicitly linking the requirement to German
Staatsräson. In this context,
Staatsräson is increasingly seen as performative. As Bue Rübner argues in
The German Chauvinism, some Germans seek to resolve inherited guilt through ritualised expressions of moral righteousness centred on support for Israel, increasingly equated with anti-antisemitism. This, he suggests, has fostered a culture of performative anti-fascism, where virtue is signalled through language policing and alignment with state narratives, rather than meaningful engagement with justice, pluralism, or anti-racism. Observers point to a pattern of elevating voices aligned with German and European ideas of nationhood, while marginalising more universalist, cosmopolitan, or emancipatory Jewish identities.
Censorship The German government's commitment to Israel as part of its
Staatsräson has increasingly influenced domestic policy, including restrictions on pro-Palestinian expression. These measures have raised concerns about civil liberties, academic freedom, and the narrowing of democratic space within Germany, especially as they relate to German-Israeli relations. A key precedent was set in 2019, when the Bundestag passed a non-binding resolution declaring the
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement antisemitic. Critics argue this has constrained legitimate discourse around German-Israeli relations and Israeli policy. These include Jewish journalist
Masha Gessen, Jewish-Israeli philosopher
Omri Boehm, and author
Adania Shibli. Following campaigns against Middle East scholar Muriel Asseburg, similar cancellations occurred. Jewish and Palestinian students, artists, and scholars describe a climate of fear and self-censorship. New legislation in Berlin proposed expelling students for political expression, further raising concerns about academic freedom in relation to Germany’s support for Israel. Civil society organizations and Jewish intellectuals have issued open letters condemning what they describe as disproportionate and politically motivated responses that threaten basic civil rights. ==Trade==