During Gorampa's time, the Sakya school had to contend with the rise of new Tibetan Buddhist traditions which were growing rapidly, mainly the
Gelug school of
Tsongkhapa (1357–1419) and the
Jonang school of
Dolpopa (1292–1361). Both of these schools presented unique presentations of the
madhymaka philosophy, which differed significantly from the classic Sakya interpretation of madhyamaka. The Sakyas had also lost political hegemony in Tibet at the time. As the
tibetologist José Cabezón writes, "the time was therefore ripe for a committed Sa skya pa intellectual to step up and offer a defense of the classical Sa skya tradition as a whole." One of Gorampa's most important and popular works is
Distinguishing the Views (), in which he argues for the classic Sakya view of
madhyamaka, which he termed “the Middle Way qua freedom from extremes” (
mtha’ bral dbu ma). Like all madhyamikas, Gorampa and other Sakya teachers classified themselves as presenting a madhyamaka view which was "Free from Proliferation" () and he used this name as a moniker for his interpretation of madhyamaka. According to Cabezón, Gorampa's
polemics attempt to argue that his interpretation of madhyamaka "is the true middle way between two extremist views prevalent in his day: the eternalistic view of the
Jo nang pas, and the nihilistic view of the
Dga’ ldan pas." Gorampa considers this view to be the orthodox Sakya school view and traces it back to
Ngok Loden Sherab and
Patsab Nyima Drak.
Gorampa's madhyamaka According to Gorampa, all phenomena are empty of inherent existence (
svabhava) but this is not the only feature of the ultimate truth (i.e.
emptiness). The ultimate truth is also the absence of the four extremes (existence, nonexistence, both and neither), without any qualification. Thus, for Gorampa, conventional truths are also an object of negation because "they are not found at all when subjected to ultimate rational analysis". Hence, Gorampa's madhyamaka negates
existence itself without qualifications. This is different than the view of Tsongkhapa, where the object of negation is just
svabhava. As such, according to Cabezón, Gorampa holds that "the fourfold negation found in the tetralemma or
catuskoti—not x, not non-x, not both, and not neither—is to be taken literally as a repudiation of, for example, existence, nonexistence, both, and neither without the need for qualification. Hence, contra Tsong kha pa, existence itself is an object of negation for him, there being no need to add the qualifier “ultimate” (as in “ultimate existence”) to make this negation palatable." As
Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe write:By “false appearance,” Gorampa means anything that appears to our mind. Therefore, all conventional phenomena are false appearances. Appearances, he claims, are conceptually produced. So, when conceptual reification ceases, appearance also ceases. Insight into reality puts an end to conceptual reification and so to appearance. As Gorampa states, the first priority of madhyamikas should be “the negation of the reality of appearances; thus the unreality of appearances is the principal thing to be established.” Furthermore, the object of negation consists of an objective aspect (
yul), comprising all conventional truths and a subjective aspect (
yul can), comprising all cognitions (with the exception of
ārya's meditative equipoise). For Gorampa, all conventional knowledge is dualistic, being based on a false distinction between subject and object. Therefore, for Gorampa, madhyamaka analyzes all supposedly real phenomena and concludes through that analysis "that those things do not exist and so that so-called conventional reality is entirely nonexistent." Gorampa writes:Suppose someone replied: If that were the case, even conventional truths would have to be the object of negation from the perspective of the ultimate rational analysis. Precisely, absolutely. This is because they are not found at all when subjected to ultimate rational analysis.And,Those who seek to achieve awakening must negate reality...seekers of the awakening of the Mahāyāna must negate the fabrication (
spros pa) of all four extremes. Thus, in Gorampa's system "there simply is no truth in conventional truth; to be conventionally real is to be completely unreal. To see things as they are is to see nothing at all."
Critique of Dolpopa and shentong Gorampa criticized the
shentong view of
Dölpopa Shérap Gyeltsen (1292–1361), following Rongton and Rendawa, and argued that it is incompatible with any of the sutra traditions or Buddhist philosophical schools and thus "it cannot but fall outside of the [bounds of the] Buddhist tradition." Thus, for Gorampa, the
Jonang philosophy is “a system that, while having strong affinities to the Cittamatra, never manages to reach the Middle Way." Gorampa accuses Tsongkhapa of holding an interpretation of madhyamaka which amounts to
nihilism. This is why for Gorampa, everything (including conceptual emptiness) is to be negated by madhyamaka dialectic. As Cabezón explains:For Tsong kha pa, the problem of ignorance lies in the fact that the mind improperly reifies objects, imputing real or inherent existence to things that lack it. For Go rams pa, the chief problem lies in the fact that the mind operates through a dichotomizing filter that continuously splits the world into dualities (existent/nonexistent, permanent/impermanent, and so forth). Put another way, for Tsong kha pa the problem lies with the false quality that the mind attributes to objects, whereas for Go rams pa it lies with the very proliferative character of the conceptual mind itself, an aspect of mental functioning that cannot be entirely eliminated through the selective negation of a specific quality (true existence), requiring instead the use of a method (the complete negation of all extremes) that brings dualistic thinking to a halt. Gorampa also criticizes Tsongkhapa's view of conventional truth on numerous points (including those related to Tsongkhapa's "Eight Difficult Points") such as: • for accepting the destruction of things to be a real entity (
zhig pa dngos po ba) • for his theory of perception across the different realms of existence, which explains how different types of beings (humans, hungry ghosts, gods, etc.) perceive the same object differently by arguing that "a vessel full of liquid must be said to contain actual water, actual pus and blood, actual nectar and so forth." • Gorampa claims that Tsongkhapa reifies the “mere I,” into a real entity that is left over when the self is analyzed • Gorampa disagrees with Tsongkhapa that sravakas and pratyekabuddhas understand the ultimate truth as the freedom from proliferations • Gorampa critiques Tsongkhapa's rejection of the
foundation consciousness (
kun gzhi) and of
self-reflexive cognition (rang rig) Gorampa also does not agree with Tsonghkapa that the
prasangika and svatantrika methods produce different results nor that the prasangika is a "higher" view. Gorampa also critiques the svatantrika approach as having too much reliance on logic, because in his view the component parts of syllogistic logic are not applicable in the realm of the ultimate. But this critique is constrained to the methodology, and he believed both approaches reach the same ultimate realization. In his polemical passages against Tsongkhapa, Gorampa states that Tsongkhapa's supposed conversations with
Manjusri bodhisattva were actually encounters with a
demon: Gorampa's critiques of Tsongkhapa were very influential and it was seen as a major critique of the Gelug tradition by Gelug scholars. Gorampa's critiques were addressed by some of the Gelug school's most important thinkers such as
Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen (Rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan c. 1469– 1544/46) and
Jamyang Shepe Dorje Ngawang Tsondrü (’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson ’grus c. 1648–1722). == Works ==