None of the words used in these sections are defined elsewhere in the Act, but they have been defined by case law.
Wound For this purpose, a
wound is an
injury that breaks the continuity of the
skin. There must be a division of the whole skin and not merely a division of the
cuticle or upper layer. A single drop of blood is sufficient, but it must fall outside the body: see
JJC (a minor) v. Eisenhower (1984) 78
Cr App R 48. In this case, a pellet gun was fired at the victim. The bullet ruptured blood vessels above his eye, causing his eye to fill with fluid. Lord Justice
Robert Goff said the rupturing of blood vessels is an internal wound; only the breaking of whole skin would warrant a wounding charge. A bruise or internal rupturing of blood vessels is not a wound, and neither is a broken bone. Wounding does not imply the use of a weapon; a kick may be wounding.
Grievous bodily harm means "really serious bodily harm":
DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, HL;
R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, HL;
R v Brown (A) [1994] 1 AC 212, HL;
R v Brown and Stratton [1998]
Crim LR 485, CA. It encompasses a range of injuries:
R v Woodland (2007) 48 MVR 360. However,
R v Saunders [1985] Crim LR 230, [1985] LS Gaz R 1005, allows "serious injury" as a sufficient
direction to the jury. It is for the judge to decide whether the word "really" needs to be used in their direction to the jury:
R v Janjua and Choudhury [1999] 1 Cr App R 91, The Times, 8 May 1998, CA (in this case, as a knife with a blade at least inches long had been used, it was not possible that something less than really serious harm was intended).
Inflict and cause In
R v Martin, shortly before the conclusion of a performance at a theatre, the defendant put out the lights on a staircase which a large number of persons had to descend in order to leave the theatre, and he also obstructed the exit by placing an iron bar across a doorway which they had in leaving to pass, and upon the lights being thus extinguished, a large proportion of the audience were seized by panic and rushed in fright down the staircase forcing those in front against the iron bar; he "inflicted" injuries which resulted by reason of the pressure and struggling of the crowd thus created on the staircase. David Ormerod said that the effect of the decision in
R v Gibbins and Proctor appears to be that the offence of causing grievous bodily harm under section 18 can be committed by an omission. In
R v Mandair, Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC said, with the agreement of the majority of the House of Lords, "In my opinion ... the word 'cause' is wider or at least not narrower than the word 'inflict. In
R v Burstow, R v Ireland, it was held that an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 can be committed where no physical violence is applied directly or indirectly to the body of the victim. Lord Hope of Craighead said "the word 'inflict' implies that the consequence of the act is something which the victim is likely to find unpleasant or harmful." He said that, in the context of a criminal act, the words "cause" and "inflict" may be taken to be interchangeable. Lord Steyn described the actions of Burstow as follows: "During an eight-month period in 1995 covered by the indictment he continued his campaign of harassment. He made some silent telephone calls to her. He also made abusive calls to her. He distributed offensive cards in the street where she lived. He was frequently, and unnecessarily, at her home and place of work. He surreptitiously took photographs of the victim and her family. He sent her a note which was intended to be menacing, and was so understood." Neither offence requires that a
common assault be committed.
1983 to 1997 In
R v Wilson, R v Jenkins, Lord Roskill said:
Before 1983 In
R v Clarence (1888), it appeared that at a time when the prisoner knew, but his wife did not know, that he was suffering from
gonorrhoea, he had "connection" with her; that the result was that the disease was communicated to her, and that had she been aware of the prisoner's condition she would not have submitted to the intercourse. Clarence's conviction under section 20 was quashed by the
Court for Crown Cases Reserved by a majority of 9 to 4.
Wills,
A. L. Smith, and
Stephen JJ specifically said that they thought the disease had not been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20.
Mathew J said that he agreed with Stephen. Stephen said that he had been informed that
Grantham J agreed with him.
Huddleston B said that he thoroughly agreed with Stephen.
Lord Coleridge CJ said that he agreed with all or almost all of what Wills and Stephen said.
Hawkins J specifically said that he thought it had been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20. Wills J said (footnotes have been included in the body of the text, indicated by "(1)"): Stephen J said: A. L. Smith J said "it appears to me that this offence cannot be committed unless an assault has in fact been committed, and indeed this has been so held". Hawkins J said that he thought that the contention that bodily harm cannot be legally said to be "inflicted" unless it has been brought about by some act amounting to an assault was untenable.
Maliciously In
R v Mowatt,
Lord Diplock said: Therefore, the defendant must at least be reckless as to whether some harm, albeit not necessarily serious harm, is likely to be caused (see
R v Savage, DPP v Parmenter), but a mere intention to frighten is not enough (see
R v Sullivan). In
R v Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46,
CA, the appellant was tried on charges of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm. The victim said that the appellant and a companion were drunk. He said that while he was in a street that was eight feet wide and had a narrow pavement, the appellant drove a car through that street at twenty-five to thirty miles an hour, mounted the pavement and injured him. The appellant denied that he was the driver of the car in a written statement to the police and said he could add nothing to that statement in an unsworn statement from the dock. However, during his closing speech,
counsel for the defence suggested that all the appellant intended to do was frighten the victim and no more. The jury were directed that if there was an intention to frighten, and injury took place as a result, the appellant was guilty of an offence under section 20. The appellant was acquitted of the offence under section 18, but convicted of offences under section 20. The Court of Appeal held that an intention to frighten was not enough to constitute the necessary
mens rea for section 20, and that the direction to the contrary effect was a misdirection. However, they dismissed the appellant's appeal. They said that a properly directed jury could not in the circumstances have come to any other conclusion than that the appellant must have been aware that what he was doing was likely to cause physical injury to the victim. In practice, malice in the case of these offences means no more than foresight of the risk of bodily harm:
R v Barnes [2005] 1 Cr App R 30.
Specific intent Section 18 has two separate
mens rea requirements and is therefore an offence of specific rather than basic intent. In
R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741, the
Court of Appeal confirmed that references to mere foresight or recklessness that harm was likely to result are sufficient for the element "unlawfully and maliciously inflict/cause" for the basic intent in both sections 18 and 20 but insufficient for the specific element. The intention either to cause or to resist arrest must be proved subjectively, say, in the charge "malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm". The Crown Prosecution Service says that the following factors may be evidence of intention:
Alternative verdicts Sections 20 and 47 are offences of basic intent and can be an alternative charge to section 18, and/or section 47 is a
lesser included offence.
Consent Consent is only an allowed defence to either section if there is considered to be a good reason. This may include medical operations, sport,
tattooing (even if carried out by someone who is not trained), and, occasionally, "
horseplay".
Body modification, other than "tattooing, piercing or other body adornment", cannot be consented to.
R v Brown (Anthony) however ruled that
sadomasochistic sexual acts are not a good reason to allow a defence of consent. This decision was approved in s.71
Domestic Abuse Act 2021. This comes with the exception where (a) The Serious Harm consists of, or is a result of the infection of the victim with a sexually transmitted infection, and (b) that V consented to the sexual activity in the knowledge or belief that the defendant had the sexually transmitted infection. The relevant case to this exception is
R v Dica in which it was held that infection with an STD consists of grievous bodily harm when one is aware they possess the disease and is reckless as to its transmission. Both parties must be aware of the disease for infection to be consensual.
Attempt According to the CPS, in relation to the offence of
attempted GBH, "It is not possible to attempt [a Section 20] offence because in order to attempt it, the consequence (wounding or GBH) must be intended, which is an offence contrary to section 18 instead." Causing death, even accidentally, in the course of attempting a section 18 offence is
murder, not manslaughter. Attempted murder nonetheless requires the specific intent to kill. ==Mode of trial==