Battle of Issus The tactic was used in
Antiquity, as the maneuver's origins used
light cavalry, ubiquitous in the ancient world. The tactic also worked with the heavy
cataphracts of the
Eastern world. It appeared in a number of battles fought by the ancient Greeks and Romans. In addition to being used in many of
Alexander the Great's battles, it was also used during the
Second Punic War during the
Battle of Cannae and the
Battle of Zama.
Battle of Pharsalus In 48 BC,
Pompey the Great attempted to use it against
Julius Caesar at the
Battle of Pharsalus, in what was to be the decisive battle of the
Great Roman Civil War. Caesar countered this by ambushing Pompey's "hammer" element with a hidden fourth line of infantry; Pompey's infantry was to be the anvil while his cavalry 'hammer' encircled Caesar's right flank. There was significant distance between the two armies, according to Caesar. As the infantry of Caesar advanced, Pompey ordered his men not to charge, but to wait until Caesar's legions came into close quarters; Pompey's adviser
Gaius Triarius believed that Caesar's infantry would be fatigued and fall into disorder if they were forced to cover twice the expected distance of a battle march. Also, stationary troops were expected to be able to defend better against
pila throws. Seeing that Pompey's army was not advancing, Caesar's infantry under
Mark Antony and
Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus started the advance. As Caesar's men neared throwing distance, without orders, they stopped to rest and regroup before continuing the charge; Pompey's right and centre line held as the two armies collided. Caesar countered this by positioning the reserves of his 4th line to intercept the attacking cavalry. As Pompey's infantry fought,
Labienus ordered the Pompeian cavalry on his left flank to attack Caesar's cavalry; as expected they successfully pushed back Caesar's cavalry. Caesar then revealed his hidden fourth line of infantry and surprised Pompey's cavalry charge; Caesar's men were ordered to leap up and use their
pila to thrust at Pompey's cavalry instead of throwing them. Pompey's cavalry panicked and suffered hundreds of casualties, as Caesar's cavalry came about and charged after them. After failing to reform, the rest of the Pompey's cavalry retreated to the hills, leaving the left wing of Pompey's legions exposed to the hidden troops as Caesar's cavalry wheeled around their flank. Caesar then ordered in his third line, containing his most battle-hardened veterans, to attack. This broke Pompey's left wing troops, who fled the battlefield. After routing Pompey's cavalry, Caesar threw in his last line of reserves. Pompey lost the will to fight as he watched both cavalry and legions under his command break formation and flee from battle, and he retreated to his camp, leaving the rest of his troops at the centre and right flank to their own devices. He ordered the garrisoned auxiliaries to defend the camp as he escaped. As the rest of Pompey's army were left confused, Caesar urged his men to end the day by routing the rest of Pompey's troops and capturing the Pompeian camp. They complied with his wishes; after finishing off the remains of Pompey's men, they furiously attacked the camp walls. The Thracians and the other auxiliaries who were left in the Pompeian camp, in total seven cohorts, defended bravely, but were not able to fend off the assault. ==Early modern era to World War I==