Millis had been GM-UAW arbitrator for only a few months when he was asked to be the chairman of the National Labor Relations Board.
Appointment For more than two years, the NLRB had been under severe political pressure, and its chairman,
J. Warren Madden, was seen as a political liability. The Board had issued three decisions (
Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 NLRB 930 (1938);
Inland Steel, 9 NLRB No. 73 (1938); and
Republic Steel, 9 NLRB No. 33 (1938)) in 1938 which drew widespread condemnation from businesses and certain members of Congress. The Board won (
In re Labor Board, 304 U.S. 486 (1938)) and then lost (
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939)) cases before the Supreme Court regarding its internal decision-making processes. And in three cases in 1939 (
National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939);
National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); and
National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939)) the Supreme Court emasculated the Board's attempts to expansively use Section 10(g) of the NLRA to promote collective bargaining and labor peace. Media and public opinion turned strongly against what was perceived as an overreaching NLRB, and President Roosevelt announced the formation of a commission to study the Board's operations. By March 1939, 11 bills had been filed in Congress to amend the NLRA. The
House of Representatives voted to create a
special committee, the
Special Committee to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board (popularly known as the "Smith Committee" after its chairman, conservative
Democratic Representative
Howard W. Smith), in July 1939. The Smith Committee was substantially biased against labor unions and the NLRB, received testimony from hundreds of witnesses, conducted a nationwide survey regarding the impact of the NLRB, and questioned NLRB officials at length about the agencies alleged anti-business and anti-
American Federation of Labor/pro-
Congress of Industrial Organizations biases.
Nathan Witt, the Board's Secretary (and highest-ranking career official), was also under fire from the Smith Committee for his
communist sympathies. NLRB Chairman J. Warren Maddden's term on the Board expired on August 27, 1940. After the election, Roosevelt personally contacted Millis and asked him to be NLRB Chairman. Millis' appointment had an immediate effect. Witt resigned immediately.
Thomas I. Emerson, chief of NLRB's Review Division, resigned the next day—the same day that Millis was sworn in as NLRB Chairman.
Changes instituted at the Board Millis implemented significant administrative changes at the NLRB. His goal was to get the NLRB out of the limelight in wake of Smith Committee investigation. He deliberately made the NLRB more dependent on Congress and the executive branch for its survival. Millis allied with Leiserson against Edwin S. Smith, and made extensive changes in NLRB administration, doctrine, personnel and operations. Smith strongly criticized these changes, but Millis replied that Smith had refused to discuss these changes or participate in Board decisions making them and had thus lost his right to criticize. Millis stripped the office of Secretary of all its power and never filled the position, set up an Administrative Division to supervise the 22 regional offices, initiated a study of the Board's administrative procedures, and genuinely delegated power to the regional offices. He appointed Robert Watts as the agency's new chief counsel, removed casehandling and regional office communication from the jurisdiction of the Office of the Secretary, created a Field Division, delegated large amounts of authority to field offices, and generally implemented the recommendations of a 1939 internal staff report (which had been stalled by Chairman Madden because it would have taken authority out of Witt's hands). He also adopted most of the recommendations William Leiserson had made regarding how the Board made its decisions, which included basing decisions on trial examiner's report, authorizing NLRB review attorneys to review each report, drafting decisions for review ahead of time, authorizing review attorneys to revise the draft before a final decision was issued, altering the trial examiner's report to emphasize findings of fact and to support points of law, and holding Board conferences when there were differences of opinion over decisions. Madden and Witt had adopted a highly centralized Board structure so that (generally speaking) only the cases most favorable to the Board made it to the courts. The centralized structure meant that only the strongest cases made it to the Board itself, where the Board could apply all its economic and legal powers to crafting the best decision possible. This strategy had enabled to Board to defend itself very well before the Supreme Court, so that the Court upheld the NLRA when few expected it to do so. But Madden and Witt had held on to the centralized strategy too long, and made political enemies in the process. Millis dismantled Madden's centralized process which had been used to win court litigation, and substituted a decentralized process in which the Board was less a decision-maker and more a provider of services to the regions. Millis' alliance with Leiserson also overturned a number of the NLRB's more radical precedents and established a more moderate labor policy. Where the Madden Board had issued wide-ranging decisions approving multi-plant locals in
Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast, 7 NLRB 1002 (1938) and
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 10 NLRB 1470 (1939) (decisions that favored
industrial unions like the CIO), Millis worked with Leiserson to overturn these precedents in
Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast, 32 NLRB 668 (1941) and
Libbey-Owens Ford, 31 NLRB 243 (1942). The Millis-led Board also issued a number of decision that turned the bar on representation petitions during the term of the contract into a tool for ensuring the security of incumbent unions. Although the Madden Board had held in
A. Sartorious, 10 NLRB 403 (1938), that
strikebreakers were not eligible to participate in union organizing elections, the Millis Board voted in
In Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32, NLRB 163 (1941) to overturn that precedent. The Madden Board had held in
Inland Steel, 9 NLRB 783 (1938) that a company was responsible for actions of its foremen, but the Millis Board overturned this decision in
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 32 NLRB 1056 (1941). These and other critical decisions by the Millis Board were strongly approved of by Secretary of Labor Perkins and President Roosevelt. Not all changes at the NLRB deepened Millis' control of the Board. When Edwin S. Smith's term expired in August 1941, Millis wrote to Roosevelt and suggested
William Hammatt Davis (Deputy Administrator of the NRA), attorney (and later Senator)
Wayne Morse, Professor
George W. Taylor, and economist
Edwin E. Witte as Smith's replacement. Reilly won Roosevelt's approval. Reilly, however, was very conservative and adopted a
legalistic approach to labor law, and Millis and many others at the NLRB considered him a
reactionary. Reilly believed Millis was too much influenced by Chief Trial Examiner Frank Bloom (a
left-wing lawyer) and Oscar Smith, head of Field Division. Millis thought Reilly's legalism interfered with "realistic" labor relations, and that he was too willing to impose his conservative views on national labor relations policy just as Madden and Smith had imposed their liberal views. The NWLB was given the authority to "finally determine" any labor dispute which threatened to interrupt war production, and to stabilize union wages and benefits during the war. and did not understand that press attention could help him win battles with the NWLB. Whenever a union threatened to strike, the legislation required NLRB (in part) to generate a strike ballot outlining all the collective bargaining proposals and counter-proposals, wait 30 days, and then hold a strike vote. The War Labor Disputes Act proved very burdensome. The NLRB processed 2,000 WLDA cases from 1943 to the end of 1945, of which 500 were strike votes. The act's strike vote procedures did little to stop strikes, however: 203 of the 232 strike votes taken in 1944 led to strike, and Millis feared unions were using the referendums to whip up pro-strike feelings among their members. Millis formed a voting alliance with Houston some time in late 1944. Millis feared this would resurrect the vague "legality of objective" test which the Board had rejected long ago. His successor was
Paul M. Herzog. ==Retirement and death==