State of the Luftwaffe fighter arm Through 1943, the U.S.
Eighth Air Force (8AF) and German
Luftwaffe entered a period of rapid evolution as both forces attempted to gain an advantage. Having lost too many fighters to the bombers' defensive guns, the Germans invested in a series of heavy weapons that allowed them to attack from outside the American machine guns' effective range. The addition of the
MK 108, and even heavier
Bordkanone autoloading weapons in BK 37| and BK 5 cannon| calibres on their
Zerstörer heavy fighters, and the adoption in spring 1943 of the
Werfer-Granate 21 unguided rockets, gave the German single and twin-engined defensive fighters a degree of firepower never seen previously by Allied fliers. Meanwhile, single-engine aircraft like
specially equipped Fw 190As added armor to protect their pilots from Allied bombers' defensive fire, allowing them to approach to distances where their heavy weapons could be used with some chance of hitting the bombers. All of this added greatly to the weight being carried by both the single and twin-engine fighters, seriously affecting their performance. In early 1944, the 8AF re-opened its bombing campaign with the
Big Week offensive in conjunction with the RAF, to force a decisive battle with Luftwaffe by attacking German aircraft production and so achieve Allied air superiority over Europe. The bombers returned to the skies with the long-range
North American P-51 Mustang escort fighters progressively replacing
Republic P-47 Thunderbolts and
Lockheed P-38 Lightnings. Unencumbered with the heavy weapons needed to down a bomber, the Mustangs (and longer-ranged versions of other aircraft) were able to fend off the
Luftwaffe with relative ease. The
Luftwaffe responded by changing tactics, forming in front of the bombers and making a single pass through the formations, giving the defense little time to react. Major General
Jimmy Doolittle, commander of 8AF, had changed policy in January 1944; rather than forcing escorts to stay with the bomber formations, they were free to fly ahead of the bomber formations and roam freely over Germany to attack the Luftwaffe's defensive fighters wherever they could be found. This change in tactics resulted in a sudden increase in the rate of irreplaceable losses to the Luftwaffe day fighter force, as their heavily laden aircraft were "bounced" long before reaching the bombers. Within weeks, many of their aces were dead, along with hundreds of other pilots, and the training program could not replace their casualties quickly enough. The Luftwaffe were able to put up little fight during the summer of 1944, allowing the
Allied landings in France to go almost unopposed from the air. With few planes coming up to fight, Allied fighters were let loose on the German airbases, railways and truck traffic. Logistics soon became a serious problem for the Luftwaffe, as maintaining aircraft in fighting condition became almost impossible. Getting enough fuel was even more difficult because of a devastating
campaign against German petroleum industry targets.
Origins Addressing this posed a considerable problem for the Luftwaffe. Two camps quickly developed, both demanding the immediate introduction of large numbers of jet fighter aircraft. One group, led by General
Adolf Galland, the
Inspector of Fighters, reasoned that superior numbers had to be countered with superior technology, and demanded that all possible effort be put into increasing the production of the jet powered
Messerschmitt Me 262 in its A-1a fighter version, even if that meant reducing production of other aircraft in the meantime. Instead, they suggested that a new design be built – one so inexpensive that if a machine was damaged or worn out, it could simply be discarded and replaced with a fresh plane straight off the assembly line. Thus was born the concept of the "throwaway fighter". Galland and several other Luftwaffe senior officers expressed their vehement opposition to this
light fighter concept, while head of the Luftwaffe
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Armaments Minister
Albert Speer fully supported the idea. Göring and Speer got their way; accordingly, a contract
tender to supply a single-engine jet fighter that was suited for cheap and rapid mass production was established under the name
Volksjäger ("People's Fighter").
Volksjäger The official RLM
Volksjäger design competition parameters specified a single-seat fighter, powered by a single
BMW 003 turbojet, a slightly lower-thrust engine not in demand for either the Me 262 or the
Arado Ar 234 jet bomber, already in service. The specification stipulated various performance requirements, including a maximum weight of , Provisions for armour plating in areas such as the fuel tanks and around the pilot were also to be made, however, manufacturers were also asked to provide detail on the aircraft's performance both with and without armour installed. The armament was specified as either a pair of
MG 151/20 cannon with 100 rounds each, or two 30 mm MK 108 cannon with 50 rounds each. Furthermore, the
Volksjäger needed to be easy to fly. After the war,
Ernst Heinkel said, "[The] unrealistic notion that this plane should be a 'people's fighter,' in which the
Hitler Youth, after a short training regimen with clipped-wing two-seater gliders like the
DFS Stummel-Habicht, could fly for the defense of Germany, displayed the unbalanced fanaticism of those days." The clipped-wingspan DFS Habicht models had varying wingspans of both or , and were used to prepare more experienced
Luftwaffe pilots for the dangerous
Me 163B Komet rocket fighter – the same sort of training approach would also be used for the Hitler Youth aviators chosen to fly the
Volksjäger. On 8 September 1944, the requirement was issued to industry; bidders were required to submit their basic designs within ten days while quantity production of the aircraft was to commence by 1 January 1945. Because the winner of the new lightweight fighter design competition would be building huge numbers of the planes, nearly every German aircraft manufacturer expressed interest in the project, such as
Blohm & Voss, and
Focke-Wulf, whose
Focke-Wulf Volksjäger 1 design contender, likewise meant for BMW 003 turbojet power bore a resemblance to their slightly later
Ta 183 Huckebein jet fighter design. However, Heinkel had already been working on a series of "paper projects" for light twin-engine fighters over the last year under the designation
P.1073, with most design work being completed by Professor Benz, and had gone so far as to build and test several models and conduct some
wind tunnel testing. As Heinkel had a head start on its design, some officials believed that the outcome was a largely foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, many companies opted to produce responses; some of these competing designs were technically superior (in particular to the
Blohm & Voss P 211 proposal). Messerschmitt did not submit any design, the company's founder,
Willy Messerschmitt, dismissed the
Volksjäger concept to be a delusional failure. During October 1944, the competition's results were announced, only three weeks following the requirement being issued; to little surprise, Heinkel's submission was selected for production. In order to confuse Allied intelligence, the RLM chose to reuse the 8-162 airframe designation (formerly that of a
Messerschmitt Bf 162 fast bomber); Heinkel had reportedly requested another designation,
He 500, for the aircraft. ==Design==