There are two possible semantics for higher-order logic. In the
standard or
full semantics, quantifiers over higher-type objects range over
all possible objects of that type. For example, a quantifier over sets of individuals ranges over the entire
powerset of the set of individuals. Thus, in standard semantics, once the set of individuals is specified, this is enough to specify all the quantifiers. HOL with standard semantics is more expressive than first-order logic. For example, HOL admits
categorical axiomatizations of the
natural numbers, and of the
real numbers, which are impossible with first-order logic. However, by a result of
Kurt Gödel, HOL with standard semantics does not admit an
effective,
sound, and
complete proof calculus. The model-theoretic properties of HOL with standard semantics are also more complex than those of first-order logic. For example, the
Löwenheim number of
second-order logic is already larger than the first
measurable cardinal, if such a cardinal exists. The Löwenheim number of first-order logic, in contrast, is
ℵ0, the smallest infinite cardinal. In
Henkin semantics, a separate domain is included in each interpretation for each higher-order type. Thus, for example, quantifiers over sets of individuals may range over only a subset of the
powerset of the set of individuals. HOL with these semantics is equivalent to
many-sorted first-order logic, rather than being stronger than first-order logic. In particular, HOL with Henkin semantics has all the model-theoretic properties of first-order logic, and has a complete, sound, effective proof system inherited from first-order logic. == Properties ==