HMS Sheffield (D80)

The first of the Type 42 class, Sheffield, was initially fitted with the odd-looking "Mickey Mouse" ears on her funnel tops which were in fact exhaust deflectors – "Loxton bends" – for the Rolls-Royce Olympus TM3B gas turbines, to guide the high-temperature exhaust efflux sidewards and minimise damage to overhead aerials. As this provided a prominent target for then-new infrared homing missiles, only Sheffield and the next two in the class, the Argentinian Hércules and Santísima Trinidad, had these 'ears'. Sheffield was the only one of her class to not be fitted with STWS II triple anti-submarine torpedo tubes. == Construction ==

Ordered in 1968 Sheffield was laid down on 15 January 1970 and built by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering at Barrow-in-Furness. An explosion during construction killed two dockyard workers and damaged a section of hull which was replaced with a section from an identical ship, , being built for the Argentine Navy. and was estimated to have cost £23,200,000 to build. As the first of her class of Royal Navy destroyers, Sheffield spent her first years trying out the new systems and the Sea Dart missile system, particularly as the intended Sea Dart trials ship, , suffered serious fires and problems with its steam systems restricting its use in the late 1970s. It was not until 1980 that Sheffield became effective, with Sea Dart and partial installation of electronic warfare Abbey Hill systems. Following a refit in the early 1980s, significant design issues with the ship's Type 909 radar (which was responsible for control and targeting of the Sea Dart missiles) were identified. The ship lacked an electronic countermeasures (ECM) jammer. == Service history ==

In June 1981 she participated in Exercise Roebuck, following which she fired five Sea Dart missiles. Following participation in Exercise Ocean Safari she sailed in November 1981 to undertake patrols in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. She was undergoing maintenance at Mombasa when Captain James Salt took over command on 26 January 1982. Both Salt (whose most recent service had been in submarines) and his second in command (who had been an anti-submarine helicopter observer) had little or no relevant experience in surface ships and little experience in air defence. In March 1982 the ship transited north through the Suez Canal to participate in Exercise Spring Train, which was held in the Atlantic Ocean. Sheffield reached Ascension Island on 14 April, accompanied by , , , to be later joined by . They joined other vessels of the Task Force 317 and commenced operations in the Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands on 1 May 1982. Within the task force, the threat from the Type 209 submarine was seen as a higher priority than the threat from the air. Following the sinking of , Captain Salt had ordered the ship to change course every 90 seconds to counter any potential Argentine submarine threat. Sinking Argentinian attack . Sheffield was first detected by an Argentine Naval Aviation Lockheed SP-2H Neptune (2-P-112) patrol aircraft at 07:50 on 4 May 1982. The Neptune kept the British ships under surveillance, verifying Sheffields position again at 08:14 and 08:43. Two Argentine Navy Super Étendards, both armed with AM39 Exocets, took off from Río Grande naval air base at 09:45 and met with an Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules tanker to refuel at 10:00. The two aircraft were 3-A-202, piloted by mission commander Capitán de Fragata (Lieutenant Commander) Augusto Bedacarratz, and 3-A-203, piloted by Teniente (Lieutenant) Armando Mayora. In the two weeks leading up to the attack, Argentinian pilots had been practising tactics against their own ships, including Type 42 destroyers of the same class as Sheffield, and therefore knew the radar horizon, detection distances, and reaction times of the ship radar, as well as the optimal procedure to programme the Exocet missile for a successful attack profile. The technique they used is known colloquially as "Pecking the Lobes", in reference to the aircraft probing the side lobes of the emitting radar using the radar warning receiver. The aircraft could avoid detection by avoiding the main lobe of the emitting radar. At 10:35, the Neptune climbed to and detected one large and two medium-sized contacts. A few minutes later, the Neptune updated the Super Étendards with the positions. Flying at very low altitude, at approximately 10:50 both Super Étendards climbed to to verify these contacts, but failed to locate them and returned to low altitude. They later climbed again and after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens. Both pilots loaded the coordinates into their weapons systems, returned to low level, and after last minute checks, each launched an AM39 Exocet missile at 11:04 while away from their targets. The Super Étendards did not need to refuel again from the KC-130, which had been waiting, and landed at Río Grande at 12:04. Supporting the mission were an Argentine Air Force Learjet 35 as a decoy and two IAI Daggers as the KC-130 escorts. Prior to the attack, Sheffields radar operators had been experiencing difficulty distinguishing Mirage and Super Étendard aircraft, and the destroyer may have lacked effective IFF or radar jamming. Despite intelligence briefings that identified an Exocet attack by Super Étendards as possible, Sheffield had assessed the Exocet threat as overrated for the previous two days, and disregarded another as a false alarm. As the Type 965 could not detect low-flying aircraft, the two incoming enemy aircraft were not detected flying at . The two planes were detected at a distance of only by the UAA1, a radar warning receiver. This was then confirmed by the 965M long range aircraft warning radar of Glasgow when the aircraft popped up to above sea-level for a radar check at . The Glasgow immediately went to action stations, and communicated the warning codeword 'Handbrake' by UHF and HF to all task force ships. The radar contacts were also seen by Invincible, which directed Sea Harriers on combat patrol to investigate, but they detected nothing. The AAWC on Invincible declared the radar contacts as false and left the Air Warning at yellow, instead of raising it to red. The Exocet that struck Sheffield hit her on the starboard side at deck level 2, travelling through the junior ratings' scullery and breaching the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room/Forward Engine Room bulkhead above the waterline, creating a hole in the hull roughly by . Contemporary accounts suggested that the missile failed to explode, despite disabling the ship's electrical distribution systems and breaching the pressurised sea water fire main. The damage to the fire system severely hampered any firefighting response and eventually doomed the ship to be consumed by the fire. At the time of the hit, the captain was off duty in his cabin after having previously visited the operations room, while Sheffields anti-air warfare officer (AAWO) was in the wardroom chatting to the stewards, and his assistant was in the heads. Over the next six days from 4 May 1982, as the ship drifted, five inspections were made to see if any equipment was worth salvaging. Orders were issued to shore up the hole in Sheffields starboard side and tow the ship to South Georgia. Loss of life Of the 281 crew members, 20 (mainly on duty in the galley area and computer room) died in the attack with another 26–63 were injured, mostly from burns, smoke inhalation or shock. Only one body was recovered. The survivors were taken to Ascension Island on the tanker British Esk. under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986. ==Board of inquiry==

In response to the loss of the ship, a Ministry of Defence (MOD) Board of Inquiry was convened in on 7 June 1982. They reported their findings on 28 June 1982. The board's report severely criticized the ship's fire-fighting equipment, training and procedures identifying that the critical factors leading to loss of Sheffield were: • Failure to respond to HMS Glasgows detection and communication of two approaching Super Etendards by immediately going to action stations, activating the Sea Dart and launching chaff decoys; In 2017, a complete copy of the report was issued, revealing information that according to The Guardian had been "suppressed" from the summary of the board's findings in the 2006 release. The Guardian explained the missing information as being due to the British Government's attempts to sell off the remaining Type 42 destroyers at the same time. In the "uncensored" report, multiple issues that left the ship unprepared for the attack were identified, including findings of negligence against two officers, who according to The Guardian "escaped court martial and did not face disciplinary action, apparently in order to avoid undermining the euphoria that gripped much of the UK at the end of the war". Among other findings, the "uncensored" report showed that the ship was not sufficiently prepared to ward off an attack, during the attack the anti-air warfare officer was not in the operations room, while his assistant had gone to the toilet. The anti-air warfare officer did not believe Sheffield was within the range of attack of the Argentinian Air Force. The sinking of the Type 21 frigates and , both of which had aluminium alloy superstructures, probably also had an effect on this belief, though these cases are again incorrect and the presence of aluminium alloy had nothing to do with their loss. The fires in Sheffield and other ships damaged by fire caused a later shift by the Royal Navy from the nylon and synthetic fabrics then worn by British sailors. The synthetics had a tendency to melt onto the skin, causing more severe burns than if the crew had been wearing non-synthetic clothing. ==See also==