(seated left) and US President
Dwight Eisenhower at the signing of the Columbia River Treaty, 1961 There was initial controversy over the Columbia River Treaty when British Columbia refused to give consent to ratify it on the grounds that while the province would be committed to building the three major dams within its borders, it would have no assurance of a purchaser for the Canadian Entitlement which was surplus to the province's needs at the time. The final ratification came in 1964 when a consortium of 37 public and four private utilities in the United States agreed to pay C$274.8 million to purchase the Canadian Entitlement for a period of 30 years from the scheduled completion date of each of the Canadian projects. British Columbia used the funds, along with the U.S. payment of C$69.6 million for U.S. flood control benefits, to construct the Canadian dams. In recent years, the treaty has garnered significant attention, not because of what it contains, but because of what it is lacking. A reflection of the times in which it was negotiated, the treaty's emphasis is on hydroelectricity and flood control. The "Assured Operating Plans" that determine the Canadian Entitlement amounts and establish a base operation for Canadian Treaty storage, include little direct treatment of other interests that have grown in importance over the years, such as fish protection, irrigation and other environmental concerns. However, the treaty permits the Entities to incorporate a broad range of interests into the "Detailed Operating Plans" that are agreed to immediately prior to the operating year, and which modify the "Assured Operating Plans" to produce results more advantageous to both countries. For more than 20 years, the "Detailed Operating Plans" have included a growing number of fish-friendly operations designed to address environmental concerns on both sides of the border. BC Premier
W. A. C. Bennett was a major player in negotiating the treaty and, according to U.S. Senator
Clarence Dill, was a tough bargainer. The U.S. paid C$275 million, which accrued to C$458 million after interest. But Bennett's successor
Dave Barrett was skeptical about the deal; he observed that the three dams and associated power lines ultimately cost three times that figure, in addition to other costs. With the construction of the
Duncan Dam 39 properties were bought and 30 people moved, subsequently at
Mica Dam 25 properties including trap lines and other economic resourceful lands were bought. Since Arrow Lake had the largest number of people needing to be relocated it generated the most controversy and varying of opinions. People who worked on the dam felt a sense of pride and purpose for being able to provide for their families on a long term basis. However, due to the exclusion of local hearings for the treaty and the outcome of the Arrow Dam many residents felt powerless in the provinces decision to flood the area. In response, the Columbia Basin Trust was established, in part, to address the long term socio-economic impacts in British Columbia that resulted from this flooding. J.W Wilson who took part in the settlement agreement for BC Hydro noticed that while they looked at the physical value of the resident's houses they were unable to include the losses that went along with living self-sufficiently, which was a lifestyle that would not be possible in a city or urban area. The kind of wealth that went unnoticed consisted of agriculture, livestock, tourism and lumber. Paying minimal taxes also enabled a self-sufficient lifestyle with little cost. However, BC Hydro built new communities for those living from
Nakusp to Edgewood, as part of the compensation process. These communities came with BC Hydro electricity, running water, telephone services, a school, a church, a park and stores. Finally, building the dam did provide work for many families, and supplied electricity to remote communities that were once out of reach of BC's transmission grid, and dependent on gas and diesel generators. Despite receiving physical reimbursement, Wilson argues that the emotional loss of peoples homes and familiar landscape could not be compensated, and increased the physical and psychological stress of relocating their homes and communities. The emotional loss was especially difficult for the
First Nations people living around these areas. The
Sinixt people who occupied the Columbia River Valley for thousands of years, lost sacred burial grounds, an extremely devastating experience for their community. Furthermore, the Sinixt were labeled as officially extinct by the Canadian government in 1953 despite many Sinixt people still being alive. It is questionable the timing of labeling these people extinct, with the quick follow up of signing the Columbia River Treat a few years after. With that in mind
Indian Affairs of Canada had to power to possibly influence the signing of the dams in particular the Libby and Wardner Dam and potential cost of replacement as well as "rehabilitating Indians". However, due to the push to assimilate First Nations people into a cash-based economy, and no reserves being physically affected by the dams, Indian Affairs had minimal participation and influence. It was expected that either additional costs would have been avoided or additional benefits gained by the cooperation between BC/Canada and the U.S. Direct benefits came in the form of better flood protection, increased power generation at both new and existing facilities, assured winter flows (for power) and the Canadian Entitlement power currently owed to BC by the U.S. (valued at approximately $300 million annually). Furthermore, many later developments in BC were made possible by the CRT because of water regulation provided by upstream storage. It has become obvious, in retrospect, that the 30-year sale of the
Canadian Entitlement was underestimated at the time of the treaty signing.
W. A. C. Bennett's administration has often been criticized for being short-sighted in initial negotiations, but it was difficult to accurately value these agreements at the time. In 1960, Columbia River power produced half a million tons of aluminum for the U.S. By 1974, treaty power had increased this production threefold, hurting BC's own aluminum production, effectively exporting thousands of jobs in this industry. Before the introduction of dams on the river, the changes in water level rose and fell predictably with the seasons and a nine-meter displacement existed between the spring snowmelt highs and fall lows. After the dams were built, the river flows changed and in some areas the previous maximum and minimum water levels were altered by several tens of meters. High spring–summer flows were reduced, and fall–winter flows were increased to satisfy United States power demands. After the damming, the water during high floods began to cover much of the valley's arable land—and when it was drawn down to produce power it carried away fertile soil, leaving agricultural land useless. Additionally, it is estimated that the habitat of 8,000 deer, 600 elk, 1,500 moose, 2,000 black bears, and 70,000 ducks and geese was flooded due to the creation of the reservoirs. Upstream change is obvious as water levels rise and submerge nesting grounds and migration routes for water fowl. Nutrient-rich sediment, that would previously have flowed downstream, becomes trapped in the reservoirs above dams, resulting in changes in water properties and temperatures on either side of the barrier. When silt settles to the bottom of the river or reservoir it covers rocks, ruins spawning grounds and eliminates all hiding place for smaller fish to escape from predators. Alteration in water quality, such as acidity or gas saturation, may not be visually dramatic, but can be deadly to certain types of aquatic life. All dams on the Columbia River downstream of Chief Joseph have fish ladders installed, from Wells to Bonneville Dam. Migration downriver is also problematic after dams are built. Pre-dam currents on the Columbia efficiently carried fry to the ocean, but the introduction of dams and reservoirs changed the flow of the river, forcing the young fish to exert much more energy to swim through slack waters. In addition, many fish are killed by the dam turbines as they try to swim further downstream. It is unclear exactly how many fish are killed in the turbines, but old estimates range between 8 and 12% per dam. If a fish hatches high upstream they will have to swim through multiple dams, leading to possible cumulative losses of over 50 to 80% of the migrating fry. Efforts to make turbines safer for fish to pass through have significantly reduced fish loses to near pre-dam levels. While hatcheries appear to be quite successful for some species of fish, their efforts to increase fish populations will not be effective until up and downstream migration is improved. There is no one solution to improving the salmon and trout populations on the Columbia as it is the cumulative effects of the dams, slack-water reservoirs, loss of habitat, pollution and overfishing that are killing the fish. From 1965 to 1969, 27,312 acres were logged along the Columbia River to remove timber from the new flood plain. The slashing of vegetation along the shoreline weakened soil stability and made the land susceptible to wind erosion, creating sandstorms. Conversely, in wet periods, the cleared areas turned into vast mud flats. In the late 1940s, the BC Fish and Wildlife Branch began studying the impacts the dams were having on the area's animal inhabitants. Their findings resulted in a small sum being designated for further research and harm mitigation. Since Rainbow and Bull Trout feed on Kokanee, it was essential Kokanee stock remained strong. The area is a seasonal home to many unique bird species, such as Tundra Swans, Greater White-Fronted Geese and many birds of prey.
United States Unlike the Columbia's Canadian reach, the U.S. portion of the river had already been heavily developed by the time the treaty entered into force. Because the U.S. role in the agreement was largely to supply power-generating capacity, and that capacity was already in place, it was not obligated to construct any new dams. While in the Upper Columbia, treaty dams meant the filling of large reservoirs, submerging large tracts of land, on the Lower Columbia no new dams had to be built. The local effects of dam construction were limited to those of the
Libby Dam in Montana. The U.S. was authorized to build this optional dam on the Kootenay River, a tributary of the Columbia. Lake Koocanusa, Libby Dam's reservoir, extends some distance into Canada. Because this project involved a transboundary reservoir, it was slow to move from planning to construction. By 1966, when construction began, the environmental movement had begun to have some political currency. Environmental impact assessments found that this dam would be deleterious to a variety of large game animals, including big-horned sheep and elk. While the Libby Dam opened the possibilities of downstream irrigation, scientists determined that it would also destroy valuable wetland ecosystems and alter the river hydrology throughout the area of its extent, in the reservoir and far downstream. Under pressure from environmental activist groups, the Army Corps of Engineers developed a mitigation plan that represents a major departure from the previous treaty dams. This plan addressed concerns about fish by building hatcheries, acquired land to serve as grazing areas for animals whose normal ranges were submerged, and implemented a
technological fix as part of the dam project that enabled control of the temperature of water released from the dam. The local environmental impact of the Libby Dam was to flood 40,000 acres (around 162 square kilometers), altering downstream and upstream ecosystems. This was the greatest direct environmental effect of the treaty in the United States. While the Libby Dam and Lake Koocanusa were the most visible results of the treaty in the U.S., there were long-ranging environmental implications of the new management regime. The increased storage capacity in the Upper Columbia dams afforded river managers a much greater degree of control over the river's hydrograph. Peak flows could now be more dramatically reduced, and low flows bolstered by controlled releases from storage. Peak power demands tend to occur in midwinter and midsummer, so river managers calibrate releases to coincide with periods of high demand. This is a dramatic change from the snowmelt-driven summer peak flows of the river prior to its development. ==See also==