The critique concerning the ICTR can be divided into claims pertaining to its creation, the fairness of its prosecution (who was accused), trial fairness (who was sentenced), the fairness of the procedures (did the parties have equal rights and equal opportunities to bring their evidence and arguments) and the court’s efficiency (how much time and resources did the court use to achieve its aims). The legal doubts about the UN Security Council having the power to create a court which have been levelled against the ICTY’s creation are also valid regarding the ICTR. Like the ICTY, the ICTR had jurisdictional blind spots: because its timely jurisdiction was limited to the year 1994, it could not prosecute later events, such as the violent dissolution of the Kibeho refugee camp or the crimes committed against the civilian population in
Zaire (later the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) by Hutu militias, the RPA, and Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels. Formally, the territorial jurisdiction extended to Rwanda’s neighbors, but the roles of Uganda and Zaire in the conflict were never investigated by the ICTR. Neither did it investigate failures, shortcomings or possible crimes by politicians from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US who were engaged in negotiations with the Rwandan government before the genocide, in the Arusha peace process, and in reactions to the ongoing genocide after April 1994. Opposite to the ICTY, the ICTR did not have to work in a strongly polarized ethnic environment. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had taken over the power in Rwanda and the Hutu militias (and the majority of the Hutu population) had fled to neighboring countries, the perspective of the victims (the Tutsi inside the country, or “Tutsi de l’interieur”) and the liberators (the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which included Tutsi but also many of the Hutu opponents to president Habyarimana and members of democratic Hutu parties) prevailed and strongly influenced how ICTR staff interpreted the conflict. Attempts by indictees and their lawyers to influence the ICTR were mostly unsuccessful, albeit more belligerent and radical than politically motivated defense strategies at the ICTY. The ICTR was heavily dependent on access to witnesses from Rwanda and the cooperation with the Rwandan government for access to documents because the UN Security Council had established the ICTR’s main seat in Arusha rather than in Rwanda. There also was competition between the Rwandan government and the ICTR Office of the Prosecution over access to suspects in third countries which often led to tensions. According to opinion polls, the Rwandan population was not very impressed by the ICTR’s efforts, because suspects had rather comfortable conditions in Arusha and did not face capital punishment; and because the trials there lasted much longer than the relatively swift and harsh trials Rwanda organized for many of lower ranking perpetrators. Some of the more prominent ones were even publicly executed in Kigali. A widely shared and very basic bias allegation against the ICTR consists in its failure to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army, the armed wing of the RPA. In the light of human rights organizations’ reports, the RPA had committed war crimes against the civilian population during its campaign in 1993 and after entering the country at the beginning of the genocide. There had been looting of private property and exactions against villagers but also revenge killings, among them the murder of several high-ranking catholic clerics in
Kabgayi in 1994. The latter was subject of a domestic trial against RPA soldiers and officers, while the exactions from 1993 and early 1994 were not investigated. There is also a lasting controversy if the ICTR prosecution should have investigated and tried the assassination of president Habyarimana. The assault on his aircraft was later investigated by the French judiciary and there are several (mutually contradictory) reports about the assassination and its authors (which also included the French crew members as victims giving the French judiciary a legal basis for investigations), blaming either Hutu nationalist radicals who wanted to get rid of the president or the
RPF. For a long time (until the 2010s) neither prosecution nor chambers regarded it as the ICTR’s job to prosecute contempt of court and false testimonies committed by witnesses. Their hesitance created incentives for the creation and expansion of perjurer networks and the creation of false evidence by either people, who wanted to see an accused sentenced (if he or she came from an enemy group) or acquitted (if he or she stemmed from their own ethnic background). Chambers regarded the prosecution of false testimony in court as being outside their core mandate and made contradictory decisions about who should prevent false testimony (the prosecution or the chambers) and how. Instead of initiating sanctions against perjurers, judges were eager to “explain false testimony away” as examples of cultural exceptions or trauma. After pressure from Rwanda, the UK and the US, Del Ponte lost her position at the ICTR but was allowed to remain ICTY chief prosecutor. The Office of the Prosecutor never returned to the investigation concerning the downing of Habyarimana’s Falcon and the secret investigations. == See also ==