Welfare exclusion and documented denials Aadhaar-based biometric authentication for welfare distribution has been linked to documented exclusions and deaths. Research by economists including
Reetika Khera of
IIT Delhi has found significant exclusion of genuine beneficiaries. Key findings include: • Between 2013-2021, 4.39crore (43.9million) ration cards were deleted nationally • A 2020
J-PAL study found 88% of cancelled ration cards in
Jharkhand belonged to genuine beneficiaries, not fraudulent "ghost" entries • The Right to Food Campaign documented 57 starvation deaths in nine Indian states from 2015 onwards, with at least 19 directly linked to Aadhaar-related denial • Of 42 hunger-related deaths documented between 2017-2019, 25 were linked to Aadhaar issues Documented cases include Santoshi Kumari (11, Jharkhand, 2017), Arjun Hembram (11, Odisha, 2023), and others. • 6-12% fingerprint authentication failure rates among manual labourers, construction workers, and farmers • Fingerprints degrade due to age, manual labour, and certain medical conditions • Elderly people have degraded fingerprints; children's biometrics are unstable • In 2023, UIDAI acknowledged 54+ hours of service downtime due to OTP delays and server issues A 2018 analysis estimated that "two to five per cent of the Indian population would be excluded" due to biometric failures alone. • Facial authentication success rate: 69.11% (nearly 1 in 3 fail) • Fingerprint authentication success rate: 76.27% • OTP had 90%+ success rate but was deemed "unreliable" by authorities • The system was tested on only 15-20 people before statewide rollout to 600,000+ pensioners in
Jaipur district alone Despite 30% failure rates, UIDAI reported 50million+ facial authentication transactions monthly since 2023. • Food rations under
Public Distribution System • Pension disbursement • Bank account access (
KYC requirements) •
LPG subsidies • Government employment wages (
MGNREGA) • Healthcare access (ABDM) • Vehicle toll payment (
FASTag - mandatory by law)
Privacy and surveillance The centralised nature of India Stack creates surveillance infrastructure concerns: • Centralised biometric database of 1.4billion people • Authentication logs enabling tracking of citizens' access to services • Cross-linking of identity, financial, health, and location data • Limited independent oversight and RTI exemptions The
Supreme Court of India ruled privacy a
fundamental right in August 2017 (
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India). In September 2018, the court upheld Aadhaar's constitutional validity but struck down Section 57 allowing private sector use. The government subsequently amended laws through ordinances to restore private sector access.
Open source claims While described as "open APIs," India Stack does not follow
free and open-source software principles: • UIDAI is exempt from
RTI for certain categories of information • Only UIDAI can sue for Aadhaar-related issues; individuals cannot sue UIDAI under Section 47 • Aadhaar deactivations occur without prior notice • A 2022
CAG report found UIDAI takes no responsibility for deficient biometric capture • No public auditing of authentication success/failure rates across welfare programs
Digital divide The
COVID-19 vaccination rollout via
CoWIN highlighted digital divide issues: • CoWIN required smartphone, internet access, and digital literacy • 200-280million Indians (33-45% of 18-44 age group) had no or poor internet access • 25% of India's population had no smartphone • No offline registration option initially • Supreme Court (May 2021) noted "CoWIN not accessible to persons with disabilities" == Court cases ==