The
Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges the existence of customary international law in Article 38(1)(b), incorporated into the
United Nations Charter by Article 92: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such as disputes that are submitted to it, shall apply ... international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has recognized International Custom as evidence of general practice accepted as law. Thus, general practice demonstrates custom, and not vice versa. In order to prove the existence of customary rule, it is necessary to show that there exists a 'general practice' which conforms to the rule and which is accepted as law. Customary international law "consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of
States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way". It follows that customary international law can be discerned by a "widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (state practice); Acts must occur out of sense of
obligation (); Acts must be taken by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a significant number of States." A marker of customary international law is
consensus among states exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation. The two essential elements of customary international law are
state practice and , as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. In relation to the psychological element that is , the International Court of Justice further held in
North Sea Continental Shelf that "not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it ... The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation." The Court emphasised the need to prove a "sense of legal duty" as distinct from "acts motivated by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition". ==Bilateral vs. multilateral==