Islamic Government

From January 21 to February 8, 1970, while in exile in Iraq in the holy city of Najaf, Khomeini gave a series of 19 lectures on Islamic Government to a group of his students. Notes of the lectures were soon made into a book that appeared under three different titles: • The Islamic Government, • Authority of the Jurist, and • A Letter from Imam Musavi Kashef al-Qita (titled to evade Iranian censorship). The book was smuggled into Iran and widely distributed to supporters of Khomeini before the revolution. Controversy surrounds how much of the book's success came from its persuasiveness, religiosity, etc., and how much from the success of the political movement of the author (Khomeini), who is generally considered to have been the "undisputed" leader of the Iranian revolution. Many observers of the revolution maintain that while the book was distributed to Khomeini's core supporters in Iran, Khomeini and his aides were careful not to publicize the book or the idea of wilayat al-faqih to outsiders, knowing that groups crucial to the revolution's success—secular and Islamic modernist Iranians—were under the impression that the revolution was being fought for democracy, not theocracy. It was only when Khomeini's core supporters had consolidated their hold on power that wilayat al-faqih was made known to the general public and written into the country's new Islamic constitution. The book has been translated into several languages including French, Arabic, Turkish and Urdu. The English translation that is most commonly found, considered to be the "only reliable" translation", and that is approved by the Iranian government, is that of Hamid Algar, an English-born convert to Islam, scholar of Iran and the Middle East, and supporter of Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. It is available online, and can be found in Algar's book Islam and Revolution, and in a stand-alone edition published in Iran by the "Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works", which was also published by Alhoda UK. The one other English language edition of the book, also titled Islamic Government, is a stand-alone edition, translated by the U.S. government's Joint Publications Research Service. Algar considers this translation inferior to his own—being "crude" and "unreliable" and based on the Arabic translation rather than the original Persian—and claims its publication by Manor Books is "vulgar" and "sensational" in its attacks on the Ayatollah Khomeini. (Whether the original language of the Islamic Government lectures was Persian or Arabic is disputed.) ==Contents==

Scope Khomeini and his supporters before the revolution were from Iran, his movement was focused on Iran, and most of his criticisms of non-Islamic government refer to the imperial government of Iran that he sought to overthrow. However, Khomeini made it clear that Islamic government was (eventually) to be universal, not limited to a single Islamic country or even to the Muslim world. Providing justice Khomeini believed that the need for governance of the faqih has "little need of demonstration, and is obvious" to good Muslims. "Anyone" with "some general awareness" of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam would "unhesitatingly give his assent" to the principle of the governance of the faqih "as soon as he encounters it." • to prevent "innovation" (''bid'ah'') in Islamic law and the legislating of "anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments"; • and to destroy "the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands". • suffers from "reckless" spending, and "constant embezzlement", in the case of Iran, forcing it to seek foreign aid or loans from abroad, and in so doing, "bow in submission" before America and Britain; • creates an "unjust economic order" which divides the people "into two groups: oppressors and oppressed"; • does not "truly belong to the people", though it may be made up of elected representatives. While some might think the complexity of the modern world would move the Muslims of 1970 to learn from countries that have modernized ahead of them, and even borrow laws from them, this is not only un-Islamic but also entirely unnecessary. The laws of God (sharia), cover "all human affairs ... There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm." As a result, Islamic government will be much easier to establish than some might think. "The entire system of government and administration, together with necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. ... Everything is ready and waiting." For this reason, Khomeini declines "to go into details" on such things as "how the penal provisions of the law are to be implemented". Required by Islam In addition to the reasons above on why the guardianship of the jurist is superior to secular non-Islamic government, Khomeini also gives much space to doctrinal reasons that (he argues) establish proof that the rule of jurists is required by Islam. No sacred texts of Shia (or Sunni) Islam include a straightforward statement that the Muslim community should be ruled over by Islamic jurists or Islamic scholars. Traditionally, Shia Islam follows a pivotal Shi'i hadith where Muhammad passed down his power to command Muslims to his cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first of twelve descendants of Ali who are the"Imams" Twelve Shi'i Islam. This line of descendants were the legitimate rulers of Islam, though never in a position to actually rule, and the line stopped with the occultation (disappearance) of the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, in 939 CE (see: Muhammad al-Mahdi#Birth and early life according to Twelver Shi'a). While waiting for the reappearance of that Twelfth Imam, Shia jurists have tended to stick to one of three approaches to the state: cooperating with it, trying to influence policies by becoming active in politics, or most commonly, remaining aloof from it. In contrast, Khomeini insists there are "numerous traditions [hadith] that indicate the scholars of Islam are to exercise rule during the Occultation", said: 'The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch.' While this might sound like ʿAli is simply remonstrating against the judge who had exceeded his authority and sinned, Khomeini reasons that hadith's use of the term judge must refer to a trained jurist (fuqaha), as the "function of a judge belongs to just fuqaha [plural for faqih]" ', and since trained jurists are neither sinful wretches nor prophets, "we deduce from the tradition quoted above that the fuqaha are the legatees"; and since legatees of Muhammad, such as Imams, have the same power to command and rule Muslims as Muhammad did, it is therefore demonstrated that the saying, `The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch,` proves that Islamic jurists are the rightful rulers of Muslims and others. Other examples the follow include: • "Obey those among you who have authority" (Q.4:59) (the "authorities" in the verse referring to religious judges according to Khomeini). • The twelfth Imam had preached that future generations should obey those who knew his teachings, since those people were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God's representative among believers. This must mean that the ulama are not only "the point of reference" for points of Islamic law but also for "contemporary social problems", according to Khomeini. • God had created sharia to guide the Islamic community (ummah), the state to implement sharia, and faqih to understand and implement sharia. Preserving Islam "is more necessary even than prayer and fasting" and (Khomeini argues) without Islamic government, Islam cannot be preserved. It is also the duty of Muslims to "destroy ... all traces" of any other sort of government other than true Islamic governance, because these are "systems of unbelief". Islamic Government The basis of Islamic government is said to be justice, which is defined as following sharia (Islamic law) exclusively. — known as a marja`—as well as having intelligence and administrative ability. While this faqih rules, it might be said that the ruler is actually sharia law itself because, "the law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger [Muhammad] and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity ... " Some Muslims may hesitate to put Islamic jurists on the same level as Muhammad and the Imams, but Khomeini explains while the "spiritual virtues" and "status" of Muhammad and the Imams are considered greater than those of contemporary faqih, their power is not, because Muhammad and the Imam's virtue "does not confer increased governmental powers". Khomeini states that Islamic government "truly belongs to the people", not in the sense of being made up of representatives chosen by the people through a free election, but because it enforces Islamic laws recognized by Muslims as "worthy of obedience'. This will be plenty because khums is a "huge source of income". Islamic Government, says Khomeini, will be just but also unsparing with "troublesome" groups that cause "corruption" in Muslim society, and damage "Islam and the Islamic state," giving the example of Muhammad, who killed the men of the Bani Qurayza tribe and enslaved the women and children after the tribe collaborated with Muhammad's enemies and then refused to convert to Islam. Khomeini says that Islamic government will follow 'Ali, whose seat of command was simply the corner of a mosque, threatened to have his daughter's hand cut off if she did not pay back a loan from the treasury, and who "lived more frugally than the most impoverished of our students". The government will follow in the foot steps of "victorious and triumphant" armies of early Muslims who set "out from the mosque to go into battle" and feared "only God". They will follow the Quranic command: "prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered" (Quran 8:60). In fact, (Khomeini says), "if the form of government willed by Islam were to come into being, none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate". Why has Islamic Government not been established? Western conspiracies If the need for governance of the faqih is obvious to "anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam", why has it not yet been established? Khomeini spends a large part of his book explaining why. The "historical roots" of the opposition are Western unbelievers who want "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands and our human resources. They want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be trapped in their misery ... they and their agents wish to go on living in huge palaces and enjoying lives of abominable luxury. Foreign experts have studied our country and have discovered all our mineral reserves -- gold, copper, petroleum, and so on. They have also made an assessment of our people's intelligence and come to the conclusion that the only barrier blocking their way are Islam and the religious leadership." These Westerners "have known the power of Islam themselves for it once ruled part of Europe, and ... know that true Islam is opposed to their activities." Westerns have set about deceiving Muslims, using their native "agents" to spread the falsehood that "Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition". Planning to promote the vices of fornication, alcohol drinking and charging interest on loans "in the Islamic world", Westerners have led Muslims to believe that "Islam has laid down no laws" against these practices. Ignorance has reached such a state that when "Islam commands its followers to engage in warfare or defense in order to make men submit to laws that are beneficial for them and kills a few corrupt people", naive people ask why such violence is necessary. British and Jews This imperialist attack on Islam is not some ad hoc tactic to assist the imperial pursuit of power or profit, but an elaborate, 300-year-long plan. "The British imperialists penetrated the countries of the East more than 300 years ago. Being knowledgeable about all aspects of these countries, they drew up elaborate plans for assuming control of them." In addition to the British there are the Jews: "From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present. We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world." Clerical enemies The imperialist war against Islam has even penetrated, (in Khomeini's view), the seminaries where the scholars of Islam are trained. There, Khomeini notes, "If someone wishes to speak about Islamic government and the establishment of the Islamic government, he must observe the principles of taqiyya, [i.e. dissimulation, the permission to lie when one's life is in danger or in defence of Islam], and count upon the opposition of those who have sold themselves to imperialism". As for those clerics who serve the government, "they do not need to be beaten much," but "our youths must strip them of their turbans." ==Influences==

Traditional Islamic Khomeini himself claims Mirza Hasan Shirazi (1815-1895), Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, Kashif al-Ghita, An older influence is Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, and his book, The Principles of the People of the Virtuous City, (al-madina[t] al-fadila, which has been called "a Muslim version of Plato's Republic"). Another influence is said to be Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, a cleric and author of books on developing Islamic alternatives to capitalism and socialism, whom Khomeini met in Najaf. Non-traditional and non-Islamic Other observers credit the "Islamic Left," specifically Ali Shariati, as the origin of important concepts of Khomeini's Waliyat al-faqih, particularly the abolition of monarchy and the idea that an "economic order" has divided the people "into two groups: oppressors and oppressed." The Confederation of Iranian Students in Exile and the famous pamphlet Gharbzadegi by the ex-Tudeh writer Jalal Al-e-Ahmad are also thought to have influenced Khomeini. This is in spite of the fact that Khomeini loathed Marxism in general, and Shariati harshly criticized the traditional Shia clergy for (allegedly) standing in the way of the revolutionary potential of the Shi'a masses. Khomeini reference to governments based on constitutions, divided into three branches, and containing planning agencies, also belie a strict adherence to precedents set by the rule of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali, 1400 years ago. Scholar Vali Nasr believes the ideal of an Islamic government ruled by the ulama "relied heavily" on Greek philosopher Plato's book The Republic, and its vision of "a specially educated `guardian` class led by a `philosopher-king`". == Reception==

Doctrinal Velayat-e Faqih has been praised (by American academic Hamid Dabashi) as a "masterful construction of a relentless argument, supported by the most sacred canonical sources of Shi'i Islam ..." The response from high-level Shi'a religious scholars to Velayat-e Faqih was far less positive. Of the dozen Shia Grand Ayatollahs alive at the time of the Iranian Revolution, only one besides Khomeini — Hussein-Ali Montazeri — approved of Khomeini's concept. (He would later disavow it entirely in 1988.) When Khomeini died in 1989, the Assembly of Experts of Iran felt compelled to amend the constitution to remove the requirement that his successor as Supreme Leader be one of jurists who surpass "all others in knowledge" of Islamic law and justice {{NoteTag|The cleric the regime chose to be Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was not only not a marja' but was not an ayatollah. Another prominent Shi'i cleric who went on record about the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih was the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon -- "widely seen as the 'godfather'" of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, and one of only three Shia Maraji of Lebanon before he died in 2010. Despite having initially supported the Iranian Revolution, Fadlallah criticized what he saw as the absolute power the Iranian clergy ruled with, and called for a system of checks and balances that would prevent the scholars from becoming dictators. Khomeini cited two earlier clerical authorities — Mulla Ahmad Naraqi and Shaikh Muhammad Hussain Naini (mentioned above) — as holding similar views to himself on the importance of the ulama holding political power, but neither made "it the central theme of their political theory as Khomeini does," although they may have hinted "at this in their writings", In a religion where innovation (''bid'ah'') is a menace to be constantly on guard for, Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian writes that Khomeini's ideas "broke sharply" from Shi'i traditions. Discussion/debate had gone on and off for "eleven centuries" over what approach Shi'a should take towards the state—aloofness or some kind of cooperation varying from grudging compliance to obedience. But until the appearance of Khomeini's book, "no Shi'i writer ever explicitly contended that monarchies per se were illegitimate or that the senior clergy had the authority to control the state." Khomeini himself had adopted the traditional Shia attitude of refraining from criticizing the monarch (let alone calling him illegitimate) for much of his career, and even after bitterly attacking Muhammad Reza Shah in the mid-1960s, didn't attack the monarchy as such until his lectures on Islamic Government in 1970. Though Islamic Government implicitly threatened clerical opponents of rule by faqih, for decades before, Khomeini had been "extremely close", (serving as the teaching assistant and personal secretary), to Hossein Borujerdi, the premier Shia cleric of his age, known for being conservative and "highly apolitical". Scholar of Islam Vali Nasr describes Khomeini's concept as reducing Shi'ism "to a strange (and as it would turn out violent) parody of Plato". The goals of ending poverty, corruption, national debt, harsh punishments, or compelling all other governments to surrender before the armies of the Islamic government, have not been met. But even more modest and basic goals like downsizing the government bureaucracy, using only senior religious jurists or marjas for the post of faqih guardian/Supreme Leader, or implementing sharia law and protecting it from innovation, have eluded the regime. While Khomeini promised, "the entire system of government and administration, together with the necessary laws, lies ready for you.... Islam has established them all," once in power Islamists found many frustrations in their attempts to implement the sharia, complaining that there were "many questions, laws and operational regulations ... that received no mention in the shari'a." Disputes within the Islamic Government compelled Khomeini himself to proclaim in January 1988 that the interests of the Islamic state outranked "all secondary ordinances" of Islam, even "prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage." ;Other complaints When a campaign started to install velayat-e faqih in the new Iranian constitution, critics complained that Khomeini had made no mention of velayat-e faqih "in the proclamations he issued during the revolution", that he had become the leader of the revolution promising to advise, rather than rule, the country after the Shah was overthrown, as late as 1978 while in Paris "he explicitly stated that rather than seeking or accepting any official government position, he would confine himself to the supervisory role of a guide in order to pursue the society's best interest", when in fact he had developed his theory of rule by jurists rather than by democratic elections, and spread it among his followers years before the revolution started; a complaint that some continue to make. The severe loss of prestige for the fuqaha (Islamic jurists) as a result of dissatisfaction with the application of clerical rule in Iran has been noted by many. "In the early 1980s, clerics were generally treated with elaborate courtesy. Nowadays [in 2002], clerics are sometimes insulted by schoolchildren and taxi drivers and they quite often put on normal clothes when venturing outside" the holy city of "Qom." According to journalist David Hirst, the Islamist government in Iran  has turned people in ever increasing numbers not only against the mullahs but also against Islam itself. The signs are everywhere, from the fall in attendance at religious schools to the way parents give pre-Islamic, Persian names to their children. If they are looking for authenticity, Iranians now chiefly find it in nationalism, not in religion. As of early October 2022, "women and men, Persians and minorities, students and workers" in Iran are said to be "united ... against the mullahs' rule", to ”have made up their minds, ... they don't want reform, they want regime change". == Notes ==