Geography Island No. 10 owed its name to the fact that it was at one time the tenth island in the Mississippi River south of its junction with the Ohio. An evanescent product of the river, it was an enlarged sandbar, roughly long and wide at its maximum width, and standing about above low water. More important than the island itself was the course of the river in its neighborhood. Island No. 10 was at the southern extremity of a clockwise turn of the river through 180°, which was followed immediately by a counterclockwise turn that left the river moving almost parallel to its original course, but displaced to the west by about . The turns are quite tight: the distance from the southern limit of the first turn to the northern limit of the second is only by air, or measured along the river channel. The double bend, which still exists in almost the same location, is known as the New Madrid Bend. However, the area across the Mississippi River from New Madrid, Missouri on the Kentucky and Tennessee shore was known during the Civil War simply as Madrid Bend. The town of
New Madrid (pronounced MAD-rid), which gives the bend its name, is at the northern apex of the second turn. The mainland behind the island on the south side was connected to the town of
Tiptonville, Tennessee, by a good road on the natural levee of the river. This was the only approach to the island on dry land through Tennessee, as the region is otherwise a mixture of lakes, sloughs, and swamps, with the nearest high ground nearly to the east.
Reelfoot Lake, the largest of these, was long and in places wide. In low water, the northern end of Reelfoot Lake was near Tiptonville, but in high water such as was present in the spring of 1862, it extended north to beyond the bend. The water was nowhere very deep, so individual soldiers could cross it by wading or using makeshift rafts, but an army trying to do so would not be able to move its heavy equipment, and also would lose cohesion. For these reasons, Island No. 10 was considered to be invulnerable to land attack from the Tennessee side. It also meant, however, that the only route for either reinforcement or escape was the Tiptonville road. The land on the Missouri side was higher, although not high enough to give guns mounted there the advantage of
plunging fire. The river banks, about above low water, were only about one-third as high as the bluffs that had aided the Confederate defense against gunboats at the
Battle of Fort Donelson. At high water, although shore-based guns would not be drowned as they had been at the
Battle of Fort Henry, they would nevertheless be no higher than the guns of vessels on the river.
Confederate command During the first year of the war, the Confederate forces in the West went through a series of command changes that are often confusing, and left responsibility for particular actions hard to pin down. Although New Madrid was in Missouri, it was in a pro-Southern part of the state, and therefore fell within the purview of Confederate Department No. 2. In command of the department was
Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk. The region of the bend was brought to official notice by one of Polk's subordinates,
Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow. Neither Pillow nor Polk was actively involved in developing the defenses at the bend; the latter assigned an army engineer, Captain Asa B. Gray, to the task, but he was not given adequate resources. On September 15, General
Albert Sidney Johnston superseded Polk in command of Department No. 2, with Polk remaining in a subordinate position. Like his predecessor, Johnston took no active interest in Island No. 10. In early February, just in time for the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, General
P. G. T. Beauregard was sent to the West to command the Army of the Mississippi, and became in effect Johnston's second in command. He recognized the importance of Island No. 10, and issued the orders to abandon Columbus and move its garrison there. His health failed him at this time, so he could not take personal charge. When he recovered, he and General Johnston were preoccupied with preparations for the forthcoming
Battle of Shiloh. Transferred from Columbus to Island No. 10 was Major General
John P. McCown, who thereby became local commander. He remained in charge until after New Madrid was taken by the Union Army of the Mississippi; on March 31, 1862, he was replaced by Brig. Gen.
William W. Mackall. Through all of these command changes, the vessels of the Confederate States Navy along the entire length of the Mississippi were led by Flag Officer
George N. Hollins. Because the river lay in two military departments, Hollins had to work with both the man in charge at the New Madrid Bend and the man in charge of the defenses of New Orleans.
Union command At this time, command of the Union forces was also in flux, but it had little bearing on the issue. From the time the campaign against New Madrid began, in late February 1862, the Army of the Mississippi was led by Maj. Gen.
John Pope. The army was a part of, first, the Department of the Missouri, and after March 11, the Department of the Mississippi, both under Maj. Gen.
Henry W. Halleck. The name change represented organizational changes in the army that did not affect the campaign. The warships employed in the campaign were part of the
Western Gunboat Flotilla, led by
Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote. Foote was a captain in the US Navy, but the flotilla was organized as part of the U.S. Army, so he reported to, and was subordinate to, Halleck.
Early defense preparations The widespread publicity given to Union General in Chief
Winfield Scott's
Anaconda Plan made the Confederate government aware of the threat that would be posed to the Mississippi Valley by a water-borne invasion along the course of the river. In response, they set up a series of defensive positions along the river. Among them were Fort Pillow, north of
Memphis, and
extensive works at
Columbus, Kentucky, both of which positions were important in relation to Island No. 10. Construction of the batteries on and near the island began in mid-August 1861, directed by Captain Asa B. Gray. He began by laying out a battery on the Tennessee shore about above the island. This battery, known as Battery No. 1 or the Redan Battery, commanded the approach to the bend. Vessels coming down the river would have to move directly toward its guns for more than a mile. It was not very effective, as it was sited on low ground subject to flooding. Almost as soon as work was started, however, the attention of Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk was diverted to the capture and fortification of Columbus. Work continued at Island No. 10, but it was not regarded as urgent and so was denied both equipment and workers. The importance of the New Madrid Bend rose dramatically when
Fort Henry and then
Fort Donelson fell to Union forces in early February 1862. Columbus was cut off from rest of the Confederate Army, and faced capture by Union troops advancing overland from the Tennessee River to the Mississippi. To avoid losing the garrison and its equipment, General Beauregard ordered that the position be abandoned as quietly as possible. The process began on February 24, when the first members of the Columbus garrison arrived at Island No. 10. Two days later, its new commander, Brig. Gen.
John P. McCown, arrived, and immediately set to work to strengthen the position from Battery No. 1 to Point Pleasant. McCown, with adequate resources, was able to transform the island and nearby mainland into a formidable obstacle for any fleet attempting to pass. By the middle of March, five batteries containing 24 guns had been built on the shore above the island; 19 guns were in five batteries on the island itself; and the floating battery
New Orleans, with nine guns, was moored at the west end of the island. In addition, two forts had been set up at New Madrid: Fort Thompson to the west, with 14 guns, and Fort Bankhead with 7 guns to the east, where St. John's Bayou met the Mississippi. The Confederate Navy also supported the position. Flag Officer
George N. Hollins commanded six gunboats in the river between Fort Pillow and Island No. 10. All of these were unarmored; the armored ram CSS
Manassas would have been there also, but she was found to be unable to operate in the relatively shallow water. She was damaged by running aground on the way north, so she was sent back to New Orleans.
Union preliminaries Preparations by the Union for the attack on New Madrid and vicinity began before the evacuation of Columbus. On February 23, 1862, Maj. Gen. Pope was placed in command of the (Union) Army of the Mississippi, assembling at
Commerce, Missouri. It was common practice at that time to go into winter quarters and await the arrival of good weather in the spring, but Pope soon had his army, which at this early stage of the campaign numbered 10,000 men, on the march, corduroying roads when necessary. The army arrived at New Madrid on March 3, but were not yet prepared to attack the Confederate positions. Preparing for a siege, Pope requested that his army be supplied with some heavy artillery, which arrived on March 12. The
gunboats under Flag Officer
Andrew H. Foote were not ready to cooperate with the Army of the Mississippi at this early date, as the damages they had received at Fort Donelson were still being repaired. They were finally sent down from Cairo on March 14, with Foote yet believing that they were not ready for combat. The Union fleet was augmented by the addition of 14 mortar rafts, vessels that each mounted a single mortar. The mortars were a semi-autonomous unit under the command of (Army) Captain
Henry E. Maynadier. ==Opposing forces==