Jackson's operations against the B&O Railroad (1861)

Virginia Militia forces deploy and defend Harpers Ferry After the Virginia Secession Convention reconvened and voted on April 17, provisionally, to secede, on the condition of a future ratification by a statewide referendum, the Governor of Virginia immediately began mobilizing the Virginia State Militia to strategic points around the state, including the assignment of Colonel Kenton Harper to Virginia's "Forces In and About Harper's Ferry, Virginia" on April 18. Hours before Virginia Militia forces from Charlestown, West Virginia, and Winchester, Virginia, arrived on April 18, the Federal troops guarding the arsenal evacuated and burned it. Nine days later, on 27 April, Colonel Thomas J. (later "Stonewall") Jackson, then of the Virginia State Militia, was ordered to relieve Colonel Harper. He began the task of organizing the defense of Virginia at that location. Sometime following this, Colonel Jackson, while familiarizing himself with the B&O Railroad line, inspected Captain John D. Imboden's (later a CSA Brigadier General) assigned post, possessing the bridge across the Potomac River at Point of Rocks, Maryland. Tensions build in May 1861 For the immediate time being, "B&O trains continued to run, with many interruptions and only with the consent of Virginia." On May 5, 1861, Federal forces seized control of the B&O Relay House west of Baltimore, so that Brigadier General B. F. Butler could "inspect and stop any further freight headed for military forces of Virginia." Butler was eager to assume authority in the absence of official instructions and finally occupied all of Baltimore on May 13, shortly before his promotion to Major General on May 16. He "started to arrest citizens known for their open Confederate support" including "Ross Winans, long-time inventor and locomotive builder." Political instability began to mount, as martial law was declared in Baltimore, which was a very secession-sympathetic city. ==May 23, 1861 Raid==

:The events as described in this section are contested in the "Raid controversy" section below. Colonel Jackson, gathering intelligence on freight passing on the line, determined that coal was being shipped in large quantities from the Ohio Valley to Union naval bases in Baltimore that were fueling U.S. Navy warships attempting to blockade the more southern states. Jackson complained to the B&O Railroad that the "noisy night railroad traffic" in order to ensure their rest was not disturbed. Delagrange notes "He complained strongly that the trains were disturbing the rest of his tired troops at Harper's Ferry. Garrett agreed to run as many trains as possible through around noon." The 5th Virginia positioned themselves at a bridge spanning the Potomac River near Cherry Run, thirty-two miles west of Harpers Ferry on the Potomac River north and west of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Martinsburg Shops. This one-hour period allowed for just enough time for these trains to make it only part way into their forty-four mile stretch without reaching the other end on the doubled-up tracks of that main stem section. Then, "at the end of the busy noontime traffic," The B&O Railroad's main stem now filled with "dozens of wrathy, impatient locomotive engineers wondering what was causing the tie up." Locomotives and trains were caught in various places all along this section, and this trapped a large quantity of rolling stock in between, which "was soon concentrated in the big rail yard at Martinsburg, West Virginia." From Harpers Ferry, the Winchester and Potomac Railroad ran as a spur off the B&O Railroad mainline south to Winchester, Virginia, allowing Jackson an opportunity to try and move his captured rail assets quickly to Winchester. The entire forty-four mile railline between Cherry Run and Harper's Ferry, with the huge railyard at Martinsburg, and the thirty-two mile Winchester spur was now entirely isolated as a whole and separate system of seventy-six miles of railroad, apart from the western and eastern runs of the main B&O Railroad stem. ==Hauling away the bounty==

: Initial capture Sources disagree on both the number of locomotives and railroad cars captured and the dates that the captures occurred. Historian Edward Hungerford, in his centennial history of the B&O Railroad published in 1928, describes the May capture as follows: Hungerford writes, This was real strategy and Jackson undoubtedly would have repeated it, had it not been that Harper's Ferry was beginning to be untenable for him." After the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, beginning on June 20, Jackson fell back to Martinsburg and "forty-two locomotives and their tenders at that important railroad center, in addition to 305 cars, chiefly coal gondolas, were given the torch. Railroad historian Thomas Weber presents a different scenario regarding the dates and the events culminating in the capture of significant rail stock. Weber does not mention the May 23 raid but does state that on May 28 Confederate forces occupied of the B&O line. Jackson, reluctant to antagonize Confederate sympathizers in the area, continued to allow the trains to move through the entire area for another two weeks until June 13 when Jackson was ordered to abandon Harper's Ferry. This is when Jackson, according to Weber, decided to "spring the trap" by blocking any trains from leaving a stretch of track after they were allowed, from either end, to enter. This resulted in a large capture of locomotives and cars. Closure of the railroad Historian Angus James Johnston, II, "To make sure the trains stayed trapped and to prevent Union armies under George B. McClellan and Robert Patterson from using the road, the Confederates [still officially Virginia Militia] began destroying bridges and track on May 25," taking down seventeen bridges over the next thirty-day period. due to a combination of miscommunications and over-zealousness, Confederate forces continued destroying B&O Railroad assets, including the B&O Railroad bridge over Opequon Creek east of Martinsburg. Here they lit 50 coal cars on fire and ran them off the destroyed trestle, "where they burned for two months, the intense heat melting axles and wheels." The 52 remaining locomotives and various rail cars left in Martinsburg were thus left stranded by this uncoordinated action, and this ended the ability to move the remaining locomotives "by rail to the south". "This destruction was carried out in accordance with Lee's order of May 6 to Jackson to destroy the railroad bridges in order to frustrate the Union armies then advancing upon Harper's Ferry", says Johnston referencing Official Records, II, 806. Historian John F. Stover notes that John W. Garrett, President of the B&O Railroad acknowledged that by May 28 the Virginia forces (called Confederate by Garrett) had taken control of of the main stem from Point of Rocks westward. However, Stover indicates that the destruction of the railroad did not begin until "early June", culminating in the destruction of the "800-foot combined highway-railroad bridge at Harpers Ferry" on June 14. Stover writes, "With this dramatic action, the main line of the B&O was to be effectively closed down for nearly ten months." Historian Thomas Weber also indicates that the trains continued to run from May 28 for another 17 days until June 14, and gives his account of the raid by Jackson as occurring coincidentally with his view of a June 14 shutdown: William Prescott Smith, master of transportation for the railroad and the "good man Friday" to Garrett, who notes that at least through June 2 the railroad was still operating through the Virginia stretch: ==Secession and retreat from Harper's Ferry==

On May 23, the Commonwealth of Virginia conducted its popular vote, and secession was formally ratified. Immediately Major-General Joseph E. Johnston, then of the Virginia State Militia, relieved Colonel Jackson and took command at Harpers Ferry on May 24. Shortly afterward, on June 8, all Virginia State troops were transferred to the authority of the Confederate States. Jackson moves to Martinsburg The Virginia legislature had ratified the Confederate constitution on May 2, and General Joseph Johnston had been given the Confederate command over the area covering Harper's Ferry. Johnston arrived in Harper's Ferry on the afternoon of the 23rd and informed Jackson of the change. From the beginning Johnston felt that Harper's Ferry was indefensible, and he soon began pleading his case with Richmond. On June 13, in a telegram from Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, Johnston was authorized, if he felt the enemy "is about to turn [his] position", to "destroy everything at Harper's Ferry" and "retire upon the railroad towards Winchester." On June 19, while Johnston and Jackson were on the road, Colonel "Jeb" Stuart was in Martinsburg, north of Winchester, and Johnston was concerned that Union troops might be advancing towards Martinsburg. Johnston ordered Jackson to join Stuart and destroy the important B&O railroad shops before they fell into Union hands. Jackson arrived in Martinsburg on the afternoon of June 20. Robertson wrote: Jackson was conflicted over supervising the destruction of material badly needed by the Confederacy. Within a few days Jackson worked out a plan with the assistance of two railroad employees, Hugh Longust and Thomas R. Sharp, to select the 13 least damaged locomotives, dismantle the engines, and transport overland by forty-horse teams the to Strasburg. At Martinsburg, as Jackson proceeded with this "wreckage", he started to have doubts as "word [came] from his beloved Southland of the desperate need of locomotives." He noted that "some of these Baltimore and Ohio engines had not been so very badly burned; after all, there is very little about a locomotive that can ever be destroyed by fire.". Hungerford writes: Hungerford states that "In this way, fourteen Baltimore and Ohio engines, of every sort and variety, 'made the Gap' that summer of '61." Jackson's plan was to move these assets down the Winchester and Potomac Railroad via Harpers Ferry to Winchester, disassemble them and mount them on special wagons, and move them overland to Strasburg, Virginia, where they were to be reassembled and moved south on the Manassas Gap Railroad. With the assistance of the chief engineer of the Winchester and Potomac Railroad, Thomas R. Sharp, Remaining engines hauled all summer to Strasburg In the weeks following this, Jackson decided to salvage ten of the burnt locomotives at Martinsburg and move them into the Confederate rail system. The evacuation of any more locomotives or rail cars by the Manassas Gap Railroad became too risky for potential re-capture by Union forces, and so those ten locomotives and additional rail cars were moved by the same carriage and dolly method south from Martinsburg through Winchester and on to the Virginia Central Railroad in Staunton, Virginia. Robert C. Black has yet a different view. He notes that "nine miles of rail" plus "five well-furbished [not burnt] steam locomotives, plus $40,000 worth (U.S.) of machine tools and other materials [were] removed from the Martinsburg shops." The five locomotives presented a "strange procession" that "could be seen moving down the famous Valley Pike" as they "were dragged painfully southward behind multiple teams of horses. Under the direction of Thomas R. Sharp ... the locomotives arrived safely in Strasburg early in September, where they were hoisted onto Confederate rails." 80 rail cars moved by end of July Many of the rail cars that had been captured were hidden in barns and farms throughout the Winchester area, and Confederate forces along with citizens continued to move these up the valley through the summer months of 1861, and for a period of the next two years. By the 25th of July, Captain Thomas Sharp reported that 80 cars had been successfully moved on to Confederate rails Eyewitness Julia Chase One of the pro-Union Winchester diarists, Julia Chase gave the following eyewitness accounts of "secesh" activities concerning these 10 locomotives: and notes that things had been "thrown in the river at Martinsburg" in reference to the destruction of the Opequon Creek B&ORR bridge. Several historians note that the actual quantities of horse involved in pulling any one locomotive varied between 32 and 40. As late as 1863 many of the railroad cars were still being hauled away up the Shenandoah Valley to Staunton for service on Confederate rail lines all throughout the South. Final locomotive moved to Staunton Railroad Station, final destination of several locomotives taken further south to avoid Manassas Gap Railroad risks Eyewitnesses living along the Valley turnpike witnessed some locomotives being moved all the way to Staunton, Virginia about the same time that General Johnston was evacuating Manassas in the spring of 1862. Mounting any more of the locomotives at Strasburg for evacuation on the Manassas Gap Railroad had become too risky. The last time that Captain Sharps "railroad corps" moved any of the captured locomotives was when the last of the engines to have been taken from Martinsburg to Strasburg was stranded by Johnston's evacuation. The same night of the evacuation, the B&O camelback Engine number 199 was put on the Manassas Gap Railroad tracks at Strasburg and moved south up the Shenandoah Valley to the very end of the line at Mount Jackson, Virginia. From there it was remounted onto the teamsters heavy duty wagon trucks and hauled overland on the Valley Turnpike again another to Staunton. The trip took four days, and when Engine 199 reached Staunton early in the morning, a majority of the towns population turned out to witness the incredible sight. ==Aftermath==

Creation of the Confederate States Locomotive Works All of the locomotives were collected at Richmond, Virginia until the last one had arrived. The threat imposed on Richmond by Major General McClellan's advance up the Peninsula in May 1862 caused Captain Sharp to direct the movement of the locomotives further south to Allamance County, North Carolina, about fifty miles west of Raleigh, North Carolina. Here the large shop buildings of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad were leased, much of the Martinsburg shop equipment installed, and the "Confederate States locomotive shops" were established and began operating, first to refit and repair the locomotives. The total amount of repair work facing the B&O was extraordinary, including 26 bridges (127 spans with a total length of 4,713 feet), of telegraph line and a pair of water stations. "This was in addition to all the rolling stock lost and burnt at Martinsburg." "The polygonal engine house, the half round engine house, the large and costly machine shops, warehouse, ticket and telegraph offices, the company's hotel and dining and wash house, coalbins, sandhouses, blacksmith shop and tool houses, pumping engine for water station and connecting pipes were all destroyed. The destruction of tracks also commenced and continued ... making a total of 37½ miles of track [destroyed]", including of track between Harpers Ferry and North Mountain. Following the war Following the war, all but one of the locomotives taken were returned to full service in the B&O Railroad. The one locomotive not returned, Engine No. 34, had been damaged by a Union cavalry raid, and so the boiler from that engine was installed in a Confederate ironclad, the CSS Neuse, which was later destroyed. CSX, the current owner of the B&O Railroad claims that this May 1861 raid was "one of the most notorious raids in railroad history." ==Raid controversy==

Historian James I. Robertson Jr. in his biography of Stonewall Jackson calls the May 23 raid and the subterfuge engaged in by Jackson as "the most intriguing anecdote of the first weeks of the war." He states, however, that "John. D. Imboden manufactured it, Jackson biographer G. F. R. Henderson gave it credence, and writers over the past century have delighted in recounting it in detail." After reviewing the documentation for the raid, Robertson asserts: On May 12, 1861, Lee wrote to Jackson, "I am concerned at the feeling evinced in Maryland, & fear it may extend to other points, besides opposite Sheperdstown. It will be necessary, to allay it, if possible to confine yourself to a strictly defensive course." In a May 22, 1861 letter to General Milledge L. Bonham at Manassas Junction, Lee further elaborated Virginia's policy, "But it is proper for me to state to you that the policy of the State at present is strictly defensive. No provocation for attack will therefore be given, but every attack resisted to the extent of your means." Robertson writes that there is no record in the Official Records of this massive capture of railroad stock, although William Prescott Smith's personal records on the war do record a small seizure of a train of cars on May 14 in Harper's Ferry. In analyzing the way the Imboden "fable" has spread, Robertson states that both railroad historians and later general historians used it as their source in their own works. The works Robertson cites as examples are Hungerford's Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Thomas Weber's The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, Angus James Johnson III's Virginia Railroads in the Civil War, Allen Tate's Stonewall Jackson: The Good Soldier, Burke Davis' They Called Him Stonewall,and Clifford Dowdey's The Land They Fought For. Robertson writes of the reliability of Imboden as a source for information on the war: Biographer Byron Farwell echoes Robertson's views, stating the Imboden story is, "A wonderful tale, it illustrates Jackson's aggressiveness. But it almost certainly never happened." He adds: ==See also==