Battle of Jalalabad (1989)

The Soviet Union officially withdrew from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, marking the end of the Soviet–Afghan War. The war was fought between mujahideen guerilla groups (supported by Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and other nations) and the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. However, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which the mujahideen perceived as a "puppet government", remained in power after the withdrawal. The mujahideen were supported by Pakistani intelligence. ISI Director Hamid Gul's stated goal was to establish a mujahideen government in Afghanistan, The plan was for Jamiat-e Islami to close the Salang Pass, paralyzing the Afghan Government's supply lines. The plan was to establish an interim government in Jalalabad that would be recognized by western nations as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. On 6 March 1989, a private meeting was held by Bhutto and ISI officials, responsible for their strategy in Afghanistan, to discuss Hamid Gul's proposal to attack Jalalabad. Bhutto, out of concern for the ISI's plan, invited the U.S. ambassador, Robert Oakley, to attend the meeting. Although Oakley had not received specific instructions from Washington, he attended the meeting. Various strategies were discussed, and former ISI director Hamid Gul promised Bhutto that Jalalabad would fall within a week. Bhutto later noted that Hamid Gul spoke so passionately and confidently that she believed Jalalabad might fall within 24 hours. Steve Coll additionally states that the idea of attacking Jalalabad did not originate with the Mujahideen, rather, it was the Pakistani government, in collaboration with the CIA, that planned the attack and directed the Mujahideen to participate in the operation's execution. Al-Qaeda positions in Nangarhar Province According to Mustafa Hamid, an Egyptian journalist and al-Qaeda member who had close connections to Jalaluddin Haqqani, claimed that the Arab fighters were positioned in a crescent-shaped line surrounding the city, extending from the Saracha line to the left of the main road up to the Jalozai area, covering a distance of about 15 kilometers. They had established approximately 30 posts or bases, with each post housing between 8 and 145 or 300 fighters. These positions were strategically aligned for the occupation of Jalalabad, and they launched a broad offensive against the city. • In Samar Khel, three posts—two at the bottom of the Samar Khel mountain and the third along the main road leading to Jalalabad. The peak of the mountain was used as an al-Qaeda observation center, but it was elevated and lacked water, so personnel were rotated every 24 hours • Karez-e-Buzurg Village, located two kilometers south of the Jalalabad Airport • Zahrani Base (also known as "Farm Two” or “Olive Farms”). Large trenches were dug here and covered with roofs. Heavy weapons were stored here, and at one point, 3,500 BM-14 rockets were kept. It also served as a resting place for al-Qaeda fighters • Several logistical and reserve bases located in Zahrani (referred to as “Farm Four”) • Lalmai Village: One of the most important bases, named "Suraqa”, housed thirty Al-Qaeda fighters. Other groups were also concentrated in Lalmai, including Abu Tariq's and Zamari's groups, who eventually captured the Dawlatzai area. This served as the command center for al-Qaeda jihadists in Jalalabad • Ibrahim Bahraini Base, located between Dawlatzai and Lalmai, commanded by Zamari • Three posts positioned ahead of Saracha Bridge. They were well-equipped, including anti-armor weapons. These groups would ambush in the canals leading to the main road • A post near the Afghan Army’s 11th Infantry Division. In this post, alongside Arabs, forty Bengali fighters were also stationed • Another large post, not far from the 11th Division headquarters, under the command of Abu Humam Saidi. In this base, in addition to Arab fighters, forty Bengali fighters were present and were equipped with a BM-12 device. Over a kilometer to the west, they had another post equipped with a BM-12 • Jalozai Post: Two active tanks were stationed there under the command of Abu Ali Yemeni, while Abu Khalid Masri trained fighters on tank operations. Abu Ali Yemeni was previously a soldier in South Yemen • The command center post in Lalmai Village had about thirty personnel • The forward command center post in Lalmai Village was named Sakhri. The Sabaa Layl post was behind the command center in the Lalmai village and was equipped with a BM-12 device • Qaba Base, situated atop the Samar Khel Mountain, responsible for reporting intelligence on the movements of government forces to other bases • Behind Qaba Post One, a command center equipped with 82mm mortars was active • Ghani Khel Post, near the Markore mountain and another post at the junction of the main road with the secondary road leading to Ghani Khel village • Al-Qaeda base at the Torkham border crossing == Battle ==

Beginning of the battle Involved in the operation were Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittehad-e Islami, and Arab fighters totaling 14,000 men. Before the battle, Afghan Arab volunteers from al-Qaeda reportedly cut the corpses of surrendering Afghan Army soldiers into pieces and displayed them to other units in the area. Unsubstantiated reports from the Afghan government additionally confirmed that the mujahideen assault on Jalalabad was supported by rocket and artillery fire from Pakistan's 11th Infantry Division. The intense rocket and artillery bombardments on Jalalabad, marked by their scale and severity, not only highlighted the actions of the aggressors but also necessitated the creation of underground shelters, commonly referred to as "bunkers." In response, Jalalabad quickly transformed into a network of bunkers, as local authorities in Nangarhar Province recognised the importance of safeguarding civilians alongside defending the city. Orders were issued permitting the use of trees from roads and public streets for shelter construction. Local councils, urban organizations, and members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (then referred to as the Watan Party of Afghanistan) coordinated efforts to provide medical services, food, water, and other essential supplies to the population. Within a week, Jalalabad had become an underground city, with daily life continuing under the constant threat of bombardment. The attack began on 5 March 1989, and went well at first for the mujahideen, who captured the Jalalabad airfield before facing a counterattack. On 7 March, an Afghan Army base in Samarkhel temporarily fell to the mujahideen but was taken back by June, as well as the entire district in what would be known as the Siege of Samarkhel. On the second day of the battle, according to a report from Chief of Staff Major General Asif Delawar, an estimated force of 10,000 afghan mujahideen fighters, Pakistani, and Arab volunteers launched a coordinate three-pronged offensive towards Jalalabad. Supported by artillery and missile fire, the mujahideen successfully breached the government's defensive positions, leading to the capture of the headquarters of the 11th Infantry Division. Notably, captured Afghan soldiers, prisoners of war, were executed by beheading by the mujahideen. When government troops began to surrender, the attacking forces were soon blocked by the main Afghan Army positions held by the 11th Division, which were protected by bunkers, barbed wire and minefields. The government troops received on intensive air support, as the Afghan Air Force flew 20 sorties a day over the battlefield. An-12 transport aircraft, modified to carry bombs, flew at high altitude out of range of the Stinger missiles used by the mujahideen; cluster bombs were used intensively. Despite their lack of precision, these weapons had a significant effect on the morale of the mujahideen, who were unable to defend against them. The Battle of Jalalabad is considered to be the most concentrated ballistic missile campaign since the V2 attacks on London during World War II. Approximately 12,000–15,000 civilians were killed, and 10,000 fled the conflict. The Afghan Army reported around 1,500 casualties during the battle. Towards the end of the battle, the ISI-backed Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin launched an attack Jamiat-e Islami forces in Takhar Province, resulting in the deaths of 36 of Ahmad Shah Massoud's commanders. In retaliation, Massoud pursued the perpetrators and sent them to face trial in Peshawar, where they were subsequently executed. BBC reporter John Simpson, who was temporarily embedded with Jamiat-e Islami, was not allowed to film or be present during the operation to hunt the perpetrators, under the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Survivors considered men who died in the initial ambush as "lucky", as those of Massoud's men who were captured were subject to mutilation and torture; having their eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off after having their limbs broken and being disemboweled. Hekmatyar justified the treatment of the prisoners by saying actions like these happen all around the world and that every nation had factions with "slight differences". == Aftermath ==

Contrary to American and Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan Army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of the mujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government. Both the Pakistani and the American governments were frustrated with the outcome. As a result of this failure, General Hamid Gul was immediately sacked by Benazir Bhutto and replaced with General Shamsur Rahman Kallu as the Director-General of the ISI. Kallu pursued a more classical policy of support to the Afghan guerillas. == Criticism ==

Afghanistan The Jalalabad operation was seen as a grave mistake by some mujahideen leaders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Haq, who did not believe the mujahideen had the capacity to capture a major city in conventional warfare. Neither Massoud nor Abdul Haq have participated in the attack on Jalalabad. Massoud claimed it was through BBC radio that he learned about the operation, although other sources allege 500 men from Jamiat-e-Islami took part in the beginning of the battle. Massoud was tasked with closing the Salang Pass, but he advised against it, saying the plan was unsound and would risk the lives of his men, therefore refusing to take part. Haq advocated the pursuit of coordinated guerilla warfare that would gradually weaken the Afghan government and cause its collapse through internal divisions. Abdul Haq was also quoted as asking: "How is that we Afghans, who never lost a war, must take military instructions from the Pakistanis, who never won one?" Foreign Fighters Jihad magazine, an Arabic propaganda magazine known for glorifying the achievements of the Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan, could not downplay the disastrous defeat at Jalalabad. In its report of the battle, the magazine reported the Afghan communist forces had rained down Scud missiles with two thousand-pound warheads on the Arab fighters resulting in the slaughter of more than a hundred Arab fighters, and that each fallen warrior was soon followed by another rocket taking down another jihadist. In the account of the battle by Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, bin Laden claimed that the defeat at Jalalabad had inflicted greater casualties on the Arab fighters than they had sustained in the entire war against the Soviets. The defeat in Jalalabad led to internal squabbles between al-Qaeda and Maktab al-Khidamat. Ayman al-Zawahiri turned bin Laden against Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, accusing him of mishandling the MAK. Al-Zawahiri accused Azzam of being a puppet of the U.S. and the Saudi Arabian monarchy. He distributed leaflets in Peshawar, depicting Azzam as a questionable Muslim and advising Arabs not to pray with him. Azzam was later killed by a bomb in November of the same year. While the identity of Azzam's killer remains uncertain, it is possible that it was the work of al-Qaeda or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad affiliated jihadists operating in Pakistan. Bin Laden himself is unlikely to have been involved, as he was in Saudi Arabia at the time of the murder and still on relatively good terms with Azzam. The assassination of Azzam has also been attributed to KhAD. == Further reading ==