Nixon was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Northern Army in India in February 1915.
Baron von der Goltz with his Ottoman army reached Kut a week behind the British. At this point, Townshend asked for permission to withdraw from Kut and, in another mistake, General Nixon refused. While Townshend's cavalry and some
Royal Flying Corps assets were sent down the river, the vast majority of the 6th Poona Division stayed and dug in at Kut. Nixon had ordered transports and reinforcements from London. But by December 1915, the relief force was still in the Suez region. In three very specific memos Nixon expressed grave concerns at a worsening situation, and expressed deep urgency. The continuing prevarication and delay in Whitehall deliberating on the best course of action: was the threat that serious? Would one divisional reinforcement do, or would at least two be necessary? Nixon could not have known that almost all of Townshend's military communications were being intercepted by the enemy. Increasingly all sides of the British military establishment were operating with blinkers on. Nixon's apologists, that included the first historian of the Mesopotamian campaigns, Field Marshal Robertson, have pointed out that the War Office was undergoing extensive Imperial reorganization, amidst a critical time on the Western Front. The expedition had been authorized by the Viceroy of India in conjunction with the India Office. In future all military operations would be conducted by the joint commands of the War Office. The upheaval led to a change in the Imperial General Staff, and Cabinet war policy that had a delaying impact upon General Nixon's command. The issue of supplies for the defenders at Kut became critical. Once withdrawal became impossible, Major-General Townshend reported that he only had enough supplies for a month. In fact, his garrison held out for five months, though at reduced rations. The supply problem caused Nixon to rapidly gather his remaining divisions and launch a hasty effort to break the siege. The relief force, under the local command of Lieutenant-General
Aylmer began its efforts in early January, 1916. They forced the Ottomans out of two fortified positions (
Sheikh Sa'ad and
Wadi) while suffering significant casualties. However, the
Battle of Hanna was a complete failure. The British troops never even reached the Ottoman defensive positions at a loss of 2,700 casualties. Nixon had to take the blame for the looming disaster at Kut and the inability of his army to rectify the situation and so he was removed from command (officially it was due to ill-health). He was replaced by General Sir
Percy Lake, who would also fail to rescue the garrison at Kut and be removed from command for his failure. The stress and fatigue became too great for Nixon himself. In the new year he had suffered a mental collapse, and in March 1916 asked to be retired from active duty. He returned to India. In 1917 an
official commission reported on the failure at Kut. Nixon was found principally responsible for the failure of the Mesopotamian Expedition. ==Notes==