On 12 May 1919 the National Assembly met in Berlin for the first time. There it heard and then debated a statement by Minister President Philipp Scheidemann on the peace terms of the
Versailles Treaty. In his speech Scheidemann, to great applause from all parties, called the
Entente Powers' terms a "dictated" or "enforced" peace () intended to strangle the German people. The territorial, economic and political demands would deprive Germany of the air to breathe. The conditions were unacceptable, he said, and were in stark contrast to the assurances given by U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson. The Reich government could not agree to the conditions and would make counterproposals based on Wilson's
14-point program. Prussian Minister President
Paul Hirsch assured the Reich government of full support on behalf of the constituent states of the German Reich and also sharply criticized the Entente's conditions. Speakers from all parties, from the USPD to the DNVP, also declared the Entente's demands unacceptable. The chairman of the liberal
German People's Party (DVP) and later Reich Foreign Minister
Gustav Stresemann described the peace terms of the victorious powers as "an outpouring of political sadism". Only
Hugo Haase, chairman of the USPD, combined his rejection of the Entente's demands with sharp attacks on the Reich government, accusing it of having caused the current situation in the first place through its policy of enforcing a
truce between political parties () during the war. Following the Entente's rejection of its counterproposals, the Scheidemann cabinet resigned on 20 June 1919 because it was unwilling to give its assent to the Treaty of Versailles. The new Minister President,
Gustav Bauer (SPD), who headed a government of the SPD and the Centre, promoted the signing of the treaty but continued to criticize individual provisions, especially those concerning the extradition of Germans to the Entente and the imposition of war guilt on Germany alone. He combined his call for approval with the comment that it would be impossible for the German Reich to fulfill all the economic conditions of the treaty and regretted that it had not been possible to extract further concessions from the Entente.
Initial vote in favor Speakers from the SPD and the Centre,
Paul Löbe and Adolf Gröber, also condemned the treaty. They objected in particular to the statement in the Entente draft treaty that Germany was solely to blame for the war. On behalf of their parliamentary groups, however, they spoke in favor of acceptance, since the only alternative was the resumption of hostilities, which would lead to even worse consequences.
Eugen Schiffer, the former Reich Finance Minister, spoke on behalf of the majority of German Democratic Party deputies against accepting the treaty. He reminded the two governing parties of Philipp Scheidemann's 12 May warning that the hand that signed the treaty would wither. He did not see that the situation had changed since then. The DNVP and DVP were also strongly opposed to the treaty. The USPD was the only opposition party to endorse its acceptance. Hugo Haase called the issue at stake a terrible dilemma for the National Assembly. Although he too sharply criticized the treaty, he pointed out, as had the representatives of the governing parties, the consequences if the treaty were rejected. In a 22 June roll call, 237 deputies voted in favor of signing the peace treaty, 138 against, and five abstained. Of the major parties, the SPD, Centre and USPD approved, while the DDP, DNVP and DVP rejected the treaty, on both sides by large majorities of the delegates. The Reich government informed the Entente the same day that it would sign the treaty but with reservations as to the provisions on war guilt and the extradition of Germans to the victorious countries. French Prime Minister
Georges Clemenceau replied that evening on behalf of the Allied Powers that the treaty could only be accepted or rejected in its entirety.
Second vote following allied ultimatum At the meeting of the National Assembly on 23 June, Minister President Bauer informed the plenum of the Entente's position and stated that the government no longer had a choice; it had to sign the treaty:Let us sign, that is the proposal I have to make to you on behalf of the entire cabinet. The reasons that compel us to make the proposal are the same as yesterday, only now we are separated by a period of barely four hours before the resumption of hostilities. We could not justify a new war even if we had weapons. We are defenseless, but without defense does not mean without honor (). Certainly, our enemies want to take away our honor, there is no doubt about that, but that this attempt at cutting away our honor will one day fall back on the originators, that it is not our honor that will perish in this world tragedy, that is my belief until my last breath.Eugen Schiffer (DDP) and
Rudolf Heinze (DVP), whose parties had rejected the treaty the day before, explicitly stated in their speeches that the supporters of the treaty would act exclusively out of "patriotic sentiment and conviction" (Schiffer), even if they had different opinions about the right path forward. The DNVP speaker Georg Schultz, however, did not make his opinion on the issue clear. Ratification of the treaty through the "Law on the Conclusion of Peace between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers" () finally took place on 9 July 1919 with results similar to the 22 June vote. The only exception was that the majority of the deputies of the
Bavarian Peasants' League, who had abstained from the first vote, now approved the ratification law. In part as a response to the treaty, and particularly
Article 231 that assigned sole responsibility for the war to Germany, the Assembly established an
inquiry into guilt for the war on 20 August 1919. Its four subcommittees were tasked with examining the causes of the war, what brought about its loss, what missed opportunities for peace had presented themselves, and if international laws had been broken. The inquiry continued for thirteen years, until the Nazi Party victory in the
election of July 1932. The inquiry's findings were hampered by lack of cooperation from both the government and the military and were in general watered down and deflected blame away from Germany. == Constitutional deliberations ==