Training in the United States ,
Harry J. Malony,
Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Ben Lear, Walter Krueger,
Lesley J. McNair|alt=Group portrait of six men in Army uniforms. Lear is conspicuously wearing a campaign hat. Krueger and Eisenhower wear garrison caps. Krueger became commander of
IX Corps on 31 January 1940. This corps was created to control units of the
Third Army engaged in large scale maneuvers in 1940, in which Krueger's IX Corps conducted a series of mock battles against
Walter Short's
IV Corps. On 27 June, Krueger became commander of the
VIII Corps. On 16 May 1941, he was promoted to
lieutenant general, in command of the Third Army. He also became commander of the
Southern Defense Command on 16 July 1941. Krueger asked for—and got—Colonel
Dwight D. Eisenhower assigned to him as his chief of staff. The
Louisiana Maneuvers pitted Krueger's Third Army against Lieutenant General
Ben Lear's
Second Army. The maneuvers were a test ground for doctrine and equipment, and gave senior commanders experience in maneuvering their formations. In the first phase, Krueger quickly proved himself to be the more modern general. He responded adroitly to a changed battle situation by re-orienting his front from northeast to northwest, and was able to inflict a series of reverses on Lear's forces. In the second phase, Krueger had a superior force, and had to advance on
Shreveport, Louisiana. Lear's forces conducted a stubborn withdrawal, demolishing bridges in order to slow Krueger down. Krueger responded by sending Major General
George S. Patton, Jr.'s
2nd Armored Division on a wide flanking maneuver through Texas. Afterwards, Eisenhower became the head of the War Plans Division, and was replaced as Krueger's chief of staff by Colonel
Alfred M. Gruenther. After he too was transferred, Krueger replaced him with Colonel George B. Honnen. Krueger wrote to a friend that:
Sixth Army It therefore came as a surprise when Krueger was informed that a theater commander had requested his services.
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), said that he was "especially anxious to have Krueger due to my long and intimate association with him". This too came as a surprise to Krueger; while the two men had known each other for forty years, and Krueger had been chief of the War Plans Division when MacArthur was chief of staff, the two had never been close. The War Department approved Krueger's transfer to SWPA, but did not approve MacArthur's request for Third Army headquarters. There were only three American divisions in SWPA: the
32nd Infantry Division at
Rockhampton, Queensland, the
41st Infantry Division in the
Buna area in
Papua, and the
1st Marine Division in
Melbourne, Victoria. The
1st Cavalry Division and the
24th Infantry Division were scheduled to arrive in 1943, and other divisions would follow in 1944, but for the time being there were many fewer troops than an army would normally control. The War Department therefore saw no need for a full strength army headquarters. Instead, Krueger had to make do with a skeleton staff of a new
Sixth Army, which was activated in January 1943, with less than half the establishment strength of an army headquarters. Krueger took with him several key members of the Third Army staff, including Brigadier General George Honnen as chief of staff, Colonel
George H. Decker as deputy chief of staff, Colonel George S. Price as assistant chief of staff, G-1 (Personnel), Colonel Horton V. White as assistant chief of staff, G-2 (intelligence),
Clyde Eddleman as assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations) and Colonel Kenneth Pierce as assistant chief of staff, G-4 (supply). Honnen had health problems, and spent much of April, May and June 1943 in hospital before being ordered home on 18 June. He was replaced by Brigadier General
Edwin D. Patrick, who had served on the staff of
Admiral William F. Halsey in the
South Pacific Area. Patrick did not get along smoothly with Krueger or the rest of the Sixth Army staff, and in May 1944 Patrick was appointed to command the
158th Regimental Combat Team, and Decker became chief of staff.
Command in the Southwest Pacific Area was complicated. Instead of operations being conducted by the Sixth Army, its headquarters was used for what became Alamo Force. As a task force, Alamo Force came directly under MacArthur, rather than under the Allied Land Forces. Krueger noted that "the inherent difficulties faced by my dual headquarters in planning and administration were aggravated by the command setup, which was a novel one to say the least." Because Alamo Force was a purely operational entity, administration was handled by the
United States Army Forces in the Far East. Although there was only one army staff, Alamo Force was in New Guinea while the main body of Sixth Army headquarters was in
Brisbane until February 1944, when the two were finally brought together. They still had a dual role as Alamo Force and Sixth Army until September, when Alamo Force was discontinued and the Sixth Army became directly responsible for operations.
Bismarck Archipelago The geographical, engineering and logistical difficulties of conducting operations in SWPA were driven home by Alamo Force's first operation,
Operation Chronicle, the occupation of
Woodlark and
Kiriwina Islands in June 1943. Despite the fact that the operation was unopposed by the Japanese, it was subject to delays. Krueger visited Kiriwina, where road work and airbase development were held up by heavy rains, on 11 July. He was dissatisfied with the rate of progress and relieved the task force commander. The arrival of additional engineers sped up the base development effort, and
No. 79 Squadron RAAF commenced operations from Kiriwina on 18 August. and
Innis P. Swift|alt=Four officers in a jeep, with a steel helmeted driver. The one on the left is wearing a garrison cap with three stars, the one in the center a cloth peaked cap with one star, while the one on the right had a steel helmet with two stars. He was also concerned by reports of the
invasion of Kiska in the
Aleutian Islands in August 1943, in which a large Allied force invaded an island that had already been evacuated by the Japanese. If this could happen, it was also possible that a force might attack where the Japanese were unexpectedly strong. Different levels of command sometimes came up with widely varying estimates of Japanese strength because they used different methods to estimate it. An attempt to obtain information for
Operation Dexterity, the attack on New Britain, with a joint Army-Navy reconnaissance team raised issues of inter-service cooperation. The Navy was mainly interested in gathering
hydrographic data rather than information on the state of the Japanese defenders. Because of a breakdown in communications, the
PT boat that was supposed to collect the team was unable to rendezvous with it, and the team had to spend eleven more days on the island. Finally, the Navy tried to prevent the Army commander from briefing Alamo Force headquarters on what had occurred. Krueger decided that he needed to have his own strategic reconnaissance capability. In November 1943, he formed the
Alamo Scouts as a special unit for reconnaissance and raiding. An
Alamo Scouts Training Center for volunteers was established on
Fergusson Island, not far from Alamo Force's headquarters on
Goodenough Island, under the command of Colonel Frederick W. Bradshaw, whom Krueger had first encountered during the Louisiana maneuvers. The top graduates of the six-week training course were assigned to the Alamo Scouts; the other graduates were returned to their units where they could be used for similar work. By the end of the war, Alamo Scouts teams had conducted 106 missions. In what became a standard procedure in SWPA, MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) nominated the objectives, set the target date, and allocated the troops to the operation, leaving Alamo Force to work out the details. MacArthur was not inflexible, however, and allowed Krueger to alter the staging areas, and postpone the operation by a month. Krueger's concerns about the possibility of high casualties in securing the
Gasmata area, and doubts as to whether the area was suitable for airbase development, led to it being dropped as a target.
Arawe was substituted, and the size of the whole operation was scaled back. Krueger hoped to observe the 1st Marine Division's
landing at Cape Gloucester in December 1943, but was unable to do so until the planning for the January 1944
landing at Saidor was complete. He crossed the
Dampier Strait in a PT boat in stormy weather.
PBY Catalinas sent to bring him back were unable to land, and he had to return on the
destroyer . Krueger accepted reports of a Japanese counterattack at Saidor, and sent reinforcements in response, but the attack did not eventuate. Because the 32nd Infantry Division was required for the upcoming
Hansa Bay operation, he was initially reluctant to authorize it to block the trails behind the American beachhead. When he finally did so, it was too late. The retreating Japanese made good their escape, thereby defeating the whole purpose of the operation. The next operation, the
Admiralty Islands campaign in February 1944, played out differently. Based on
Fifth Air Force reports that the islands were unoccupied, MacArthur accelerated his timetable and ordered an immediate
reconnaissance in force of the islands. Krueger sent in the Alamo Scouts, who confirmed that the islands were still well-defended. Krueger did what he could to accelerate the movement of units of Major General
Innis P. Swift's 1st Cavalry Division to the Admiralty Islands in response to urgent pleas from Brigadier General
William C. Chase, who managed to defeat the numerically superior Japanese forces. Krueger was unimpressed with Chase. "His task", Krueger wrote to Swift, "was undoubtedly a difficult one, but did not, in my judgment, warrant the nervousness apparent in some of his despatches. This, and his failure to obey repeated positive orders to furnish detailed information of his situation and his losses, his closing his radio station during long periods, and his evident ignorance that reinforcements could not reach him by the times he demanded, were not calculated to inspire confidence."
New Guinea Campaign Over the next few months, the tempo of operations increased, forcing the Sixth Army to plan and execute multiple operations simultaneously.
Operations Reckless and
Persecution in April 1944 together comprised the largest operation yet in SWPA, with the 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions of Lieutenant General
Robert L. Eichelberger's
I Corps landing at
Tanahmerah and
Humboldt bays near
Hollandia, while the
163rd Regimental Combat Team landed at
Aitape. Eichelberger was Krueger's most senior subordinate, but when he did not meet Krueger's expectation, Krueger let him know in no uncertain terms. "In my more than 40 years as an officer", Krueger told one of his staff, "I have never raised my voice to an enlisted man, but a corps commander should know better." Krueger visited the beachhead with MacArthur and Eichelberger on the first day. After inspecting the beachhead, they went to the for ice cream sodas, whereupon MacArthur suggested, in view of the victory at Hollandia, they could accelerate the campaign timetable by moving on to
Wakde-
Sarmi immediately. Krueger was willing to consider the idea, although he had already ordered the troops designated for Wakde-Sarmi, the 32nd Infantry Division, to reinforce the position at Aitape, where he expected a major Japanese counterattack. Eichelberger was vehemently opposed, and the matter was dropped. Krueger moved his headquarters to Hollandia in May 1944. The swampy area with its restricted anchorages proved unsuitable for a major airbase complex, although fighter strips were constructed, and it was developed as a staging area. MacArthur was compelled to press on with the Wakde-Sarmi project lest his troops become stranded without adequate air cover. A shortage of shipping meant that the operation had to be carried out by the troops in the Hollandia area, so Krueger nominated the 163rd Regimental Combat Team for Wakde, while the rest of the 41st Infantry Division captured Sarmi. However, with only days to go, doubts surfaced about the viability of construction in the Sarmi area, and
Biak was substituted. In view of the difficulties involved in changing plans, and moving the troops around, MacArthur agreed to postpone both operations, Wakde until 17 May and Biak to 27 May. As a result, Alamo Force became involved in desperate fighting on three different fronts simultaneously. The landing at Wakde was opposed by nearly twice as many Japanese troops than had been expected. When Krueger discovered that the Japanese were massing for an assault on the American position, he ordered a pre-emptive attack. "Krueger", wrote Edward Drea, "was too good a soldier to stand pat and wait for a Japanese attack." Official historian Robert Ross Smith noted that "This decision, based upon the scanty, incomplete information concerning Japanese strength and dispositions available to General Krueger at the time, was destined to precipitate a protracted and bitter fight." However, even if Krueger had known the true size of the Japanese force, he might still, under the circumstances, have taken the same approach. The estimates of the number of Japanese troops on Biak were out by a similar margin, resulting in heavy casualties. In the
Battle of Biak, stubborn Japanese resistance halted the 41st Infantry Division, and forced its commander, Major General
Horace H. Fuller, to appeal to Krueger for reinforcements. In response, Krueger sent the 163rd Regimental Combat Team from Wakde. MacArthur soon grew impatient, as he needed the airstrips on Biak to support Admiral
Chester Nimitz's
Invasion of Saipan. Nimitz's operation ultimately drew Japanese attention away from Biak. MacArthur put pressure on Krueger for results, and Krueger in turn put pressure on Fuller. Krueger decided that Fuller had too many responsibilities as both task force commander and division commander, and decided to supersede him by sending Eichelberger to take over the task force. Fuller then submitted his resignation. Eichelberger's chief of staff, Brigadier General
Clovis Byers, offered to have Decker intercept and destroy the resignation before Krueger saw it, but Fuller decided against this. The battle raged for nearly a month. Afterwards, Krueger demanded an explanation from Eichelberger as to why he had allowed Fuller to quit. Meanwhile, Japanese forces under Lieutenant General
Hatazō Adachi attacked Alamo Force's position at Aitape in the
Battle of Driniumor River. Krueger called for an energetic defense, but the cautious commander of
XI Corps, Major General
Charles P. Hall, retained nine battalions around the airbase at
Tadji. This left Brigadier General
Clarence A. Martin without the resources to implement Krueger's strategy, and he conducted a fighting withdrawal instead. Krueger travelled to Aitape where Hall presented him a counterattack plan, which he approved. By August, the fighting had ended and Adachi had been defeated.
Philippines campaign '' (29 January 1945) MacArthur accelerated his timetable yet again in September 1944, and brought forward the planned
invasion of Leyte to October 1944. That this was the worst time of the year for campaigning on Leyte was not overlooked. Typhoons and heavy rains hampered the efforts to construct and rehabilitate airbases, and without them, large numbers of aircraft could not operate from Leyte. This meant not only that few air strikes could be flown in support of the Sixth Army, but that the Allied Air Forces could not prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Leyte. An additional five Japanese divisions and two mixed brigades were sent to Leyte, and the battle became one of grinding attrition. Able to view his troops in action more often than hitherto, Krueger found much to criticize. He noted that tanks were employed poorly, that the infantry were not aggressive enough, and saw poor sanitation and meals as a sign that officers were not taking adequate care of their men. Krueger's generalship has also been questioned, with
Ronald Spector criticizing "Krueger's disastrous decision to delay the push into the mountains west of
Carigara in favor of beach defense." Krueger based his cautious appreciation of the situation on various intelligence sources rather than relying solely on
Ultra. In January 1945, the Sixth Army embarked on its largest, longest and last campaign, the
invasion of Luzon. Krueger intended to make "maximum utilization of America's materiel and industrial superiority". Once again, intelligence estimates of Japanese strength were questionable. MacArthur's intelligence officer, Brigadier General
Charles A. Willoughby, basing his estimates on Ultra, believed that there were about 172,000 Japanese troops on Luzon. Krueger's intelligence officer, Colonel Horton V. White, reckoned that there were 234,000. MacArthur did not believe there were anywhere near that number. In fact, General
Tomoyuki Yamashita had 287,000 troops on Luzon. For the first time since Louisiana in 1941, Krueger was able to maneuver his army as a single body instead of having elements employed on multiple battles on scattered islands. He regarded Yamashita's employment of armor as poor. Instead of using the
2nd Armored Division for a decisive counterattack against the vulnerable flank, Yamashita frittered away its strength in piecemeal efforts. (left) shakes hands with Krueger on Luzon. In the center is Major General
Charles L. Mullins Jr.|alt=Two men in uniform shake hands. One is bear headed; Krueger wears his garrison cap. With them is a man wearing a steel helmet. A jeep is parked behind them. (right) at the airport in the Philippines in early 1945 As the campaign unfolded, Krueger was pressured by MacArthur to capture
Manila. He sent messages reporting what he saw as a lack of drive among the troops, and even moved his theater headquarters forward of Krueger's. MacArthur tried to exploit Krueger's rivalry with Eichelberger by allowing the latter's
Eighth Army to conduct its own drive on Manila from the south. Krueger eventually sent a
flying column from the 1st Cavalry Division, but MacArthur's expectation that the Japanese would not defend Manila was proven incorrect. Weeks of ferocious fighting were required to capture the city. Krueger was promoted to general on 5 March 1945. MacArthur recommended Krueger for the rank, even as he clashed with him over the drive on Manila, and rated Krueger's generalship higher than that of Patton or
Omar Bradley. Krueger's campaign on Luzon continued until 30 June 1945, when he handed over responsibility to Eichelberger in order to prepare for
Operation Olympic, the invasion of
Kyushu. This proved unnecessary when
Japan surrendered, and in September 1945 the Sixth Army took up occupation duty in Japan. Krueger established his headquarters in
Kyoto, and assumed responsibility for Kyushu,
Shikoku and southern Honshu. The Sixth Army remained in Japan until it handed over its occupation responsibilities to the Eighth Army on 31 December 1945. It was deactivated on 25 January 1946, and Krueger retired in July. For his service as commander of the Sixth Army in World War II, Krueger was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross, an
oak leaf cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal, and the
Navy Distinguished Service Medal. He was awarded a second oak leaf cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal for his part in the
Occupation of Japan. ==Later life==