The text of Roosevelt's order did not use the terms "Japanese" or "Japanese Americans," instead giving officials broad power to exclude "any or all persons" from a designated area. (The lack of a specific mention of Japanese or Japanese Americans also characterized Public Law 77-503, which Roosevelt signed on March 21, 1942, to enforce the order.) Nevertheless, EO 9066 was intended to be applied almost solely to persons of Japanese descent. Notably, in a 1943 letter, Attorney General
Francis Biddle reminded Roosevelt that "You signed the original Executive Order permitting the exclusions so the Army could handle the Japs. It was never intended to apply to Italians and Germans." Public Law 77-503 was approved (after only an hour of discussion in the Senate and thirty minutes in the House) in order to provide for the enforcement of the executive order. Authored by War Department official
Karl Bendetsen—who would later be promoted to Director of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration and oversee the incarceration of Japanese Americans—the law made violations of military orders a misdemeanor punishable by up to $5,000 in fines and one year in prison. Using a broad interpretation of EO 9066, Lieutenant General
John L. DeWitt issued orders declaring certain areas of the western United States as zones of exclusion under the Executive Order. In contrast to EO 9066, the text of these orders specified "all people of Japanese ancestry." As a result, approximately 112,000 men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry were evicted from the West Coast of the continental United States and held in American relocation camps and other confinement sites across the country. Roosevelt hoped to establish concentration camps for Japanese Americans in Hawaii even after he signed Executive Order 9066. On February 26, 1942, he informed Secretary of the Navy Knox that he had "long felt most of the Japanese should be removed from Oahu to one of the other islands." Nevertheless, the tremendous cost, including the diversion of ships from the front lines, as well as the quiet resistance of the local military commander General
Delos Emmons, made this proposal impractical, resulting in Japanese Americans in Hawaii never being incarcerated
en masse. Although the Japanese-American population in Hawaii was nearly 40% of the population of the territory and Hawaii would have been first in line for a Japanese attack, only a few thousand people were temporarily detained there. This fact supported the government's eventual conclusion that the mass removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast was motivated by reasons other than "military necessity." In early 1941, President Roosevelt secretly commissioned a study to assess the possibility that Japanese Americans would pose a threat to U.S. security. The report, submitted one month before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, predicted that in the event of war, "There will be no armed uprising of Japanese" in the United States. "For the most part," the
Munson Report said, "the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs." Both were ignored by military and political leaders. Over two-thirds of the people of Japanese ethnicity who were incarcerated were American citizens; many of the rest had lived in the country between 20 and 40 years. As a result, most Japanese Americans, particularly the first generation born in the United States (the
Nisei), identified as loyal to the United States of America. In addition, no Japanese-American citizen or Japanese national residing in the United States was ever found guilty of
sabotage or
espionage. There were 10 of these internment camps across the United States, euphemistically called "relocation centers". There were two in Arkansas, two in Arizona, two in California, one in Idaho, one in Utah, one in Wyoming, and one in Colorado. ==World War II camps under the Order==