Software-based keyloggers from a software-based keylogger, based on the screen capture above A software-based keylogger is a computer program designed to record any input from the keyboard. Keyloggers are used in
IT organizations to troubleshoot technical problems with computers and business networks. Families and businesspeople use keyloggers legally to monitor network usage without their users' direct knowledge.
Microsoft publicly stated that
Windows 10 has a built-in keylogger in its final version "to improve typing and writing services". However, malicious individuals can use keyloggers on public computers to steal passwords or credit card information. Most keyloggers are not stopped by
HTTPS encryption because that only protects
data in transit between computers; software-based keyloggers run on the affected user's computer, reading keyboard inputs directly as the user types. From a technical perspective, there are several categories: •
Hypervisor-based: The keylogger can theoretically reside in a
malware hypervisor running underneath the operating system, which thus remains untouched. It effectively becomes a
virtual machine.
Blue Pill is a conceptual example. •
Kernel-based: A program on the machine obtains
root access to hide in the OS and intercepts keystrokes that pass through the kernel. This method is difficult both to write and to combat. Such keyloggers reside at the
kernel level, which makes them difficult to detect, especially for user-mode applications that do not have root access. They are frequently implemented as
rootkits that subvert the operating system kernel to gain unauthorized access to the hardware. This makes them very powerful. A keylogger using this method can act as a keyboard
device driver, for example, and thus gain access to any information typed on the keyboard as it goes to the operating system. •
API-based: These keyloggers
hook keyboard
APIs inside a running application. The keylogger registers keystroke events as if it was a normal piece of the application instead of malware. The keylogger receives an
event each time the user presses or releases a key. The keylogger simply records it. This is usually done by inject a
DLL to other processes. • Windows APIs such as GetAsyncKeyState(), GetForegroundWindow(), etc. are used to poll the state of the keyboard or to subscribe to keyboard events. A more recent example simply polls the
BIOS for pre-boot authentication
PINs that have not been cleared from memory. •
Form grabbing based:
Form grabbing-based keyloggers log
Web form submissions by recording the form data on submit events. This happens when the user completes a form and submits it, usually by clicking a button or pressing enter. This type of keylogger records form data before it is passed over the Internet. •
IME-based: A malicious
IME can do keylogging. •
JavaScript-based: A malicious script tag is injected into a targeted web page, and listens for key events such as onKeyUp(). Scripts can be injected via a variety of methods, including
cross-site scripting,
man-in-the-browser,
man-in-the-middle, or a compromise of the remote website. •
Memory-injection-based: Memory Injection (
MitB)-based keyloggers perform their logging function by altering the memory tables associated with the browser and other system functions. By patching the memory tables or injecting directly into memory, this technique can be used by malware authors to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control). The
Zeus and
SpyEye trojans use this method exclusively. Non-Windows systems have protection mechanisms that allow access to locally recorded data from a remote location. Remote communication may be achieved when one of these methods is used: • Data is uploaded to a website, database or an
FTP server. • Data is periodically emailed to a pre-defined
email address. • Data is
wirelessly transmitted employing an attached hardware system. • The software enables a remote login to the local machine from the Internet or the local network, for data logs stored on the target machine.
Keystroke logging in writing process research Since 2006, keystroke logging has been an established research method for the study of writing processes. Different programs have been developed to collect online process data of writing activities, including
Inputlog, Scriptlog, Translog, GGXLog, and TypeFlow. Keystroke logging is used legitimately as a suitable research instrument in several writing contexts. These include studies on cognitive writing processes, which include • descriptions of writing strategies; the writing development of children (with and without writing difficulties), • spelling, • first and second language writing, and • specialist skill areas such as translation and subtitling. Keystroke logging can be used to research writing, specifically. It can also be integrated into educational domains for second language learning, programming skills, and typing skills.
Keystroke logging as a secure defense Recently, there has been extensive research completed into the use of keystroke logging data not only as a form of attack, but also as a form of behavioral defense for users. A 2020 study, “Passphrase and Keystroke Dynamics Authentication” by Ahmed and Traore evaluated whether keystroke-dynamics models could support the strategy of continuous authentication. Continuous authentication is a prevention strategy that takes advantage of the users normal behaviors to establish a baseline, and then checks for deviations from that baseline to detect adversarial activity. This study analyzed the performance of several machine learning classifiers to identify user typing patterns, latencies, and timing. The authors found that even small deviations in typing patterns could be strong indicators of impersonations. This suggests that keystroke logging data can serve defensive purposes when captured ethically and with the users permission. This study also reported that machine learning models trained on genuine typing behavior achieved low false acceptance and false rejection rates in most instances, showing that the use of continuous authentication systems can operate with low error rates. They also found that the typing patterns of most people have enough discriminatory signals that you could create a personal profile based on the typing habits alone. This shows that the same core exploits used by malicious attackers can also form the basis of security systems designed to protect users from intrusions and impersonations. The authors concluded that while keystroke-dynamics authentication is promising, its deployment must carefully balance security, usability, and privacy considerations for the optimal user experience.
Related features Software keyloggers may be augmented with features that capture user information without relying on keyboard key presses as the sole input. Some of these features include: • Clipboard logging. Anything that has been copied to the
clipboard can be captured by the program. • Screen logging.
Screenshots are taken to capture graphics-based information. Applications with screen logging abilities may take screenshots of the whole screen, of just one application, or even just around the mouse cursor. They may take these screenshots periodically or in response to user behaviors (for example, when a user clicks the mouse). Screen logging can be used to capture data inputted with an on-screen keyboard. • Programmatically capturing the text in a
control. The
Microsoft Windows API allows programs to request the text 'value' in some controls. This means that some passwords may be captured, even if they are hidden behind password masks (usually asterisks). • The recording of every program/folder/window opened including a screenshot of every website visited. • The recording of
search engines queries,
instant messenger conversations, FTP downloads and other Internet-based activities (including the bandwidth used).
Hardware-based keyloggers Hardware-based keyloggers do not depend upon any software being installed as they exist at a hardware level in a computer system. • Firmware-based:
BIOS-level
firmware that handles keyboard events can be modified to record these events as they are processed. Physical and/or
root-level access is required to the machine, and the software loaded into the BIOS needs to be created for the specific hardware that it will be running on. • Keyboard hardware: Hardware keyloggers are used for keystroke logging utilizing a hardware circuit that is attached somewhere in between the
computer keyboard and the computer, typically inline with the keyboard's cable connector. There are also
USB connector-based hardware keyloggers, as well as ones for laptop computers (the
Mini-PCI card plugs into the expansion slot of a laptop). More stealthy implementations can be installed or built into standard keyboards so that no device is visible on the external cable. Both types log all keyboard activity to their
internal memory, which can be subsequently accessed, for example, by typing in a secret key sequence. Hardware keyloggers do not require any software to be installed on a target user's computer, therefore not interfering with the computer's operation and less likely to be detected by software running on it. However, its physical presence may be detected if, for example, it is installed outside the case as an inline device between the computer and the keyboard. Some of these implementations can be controlled and monitored remotely using a wireless communication standard. • Wireless keyboard and mouse
sniffers: These passive sniffers collect packets of data being transferred from a wireless keyboard and its receiver. As encryption may be used to secure the wireless communications between the two devices, this may need to be cracked beforehand if the transmissions are to be read. In some cases, this enables an attacker to type arbitrary commands into a victim's computer. • Keyboard overlays: Criminals have been known to use keyboard overlays on
ATMs to capture people's PINs. Each keypress is registered by the keyboard of the ATM as well as the criminal's keypad that is placed over it. The device is designed to look like an integrated part of the machine so that bank customers are unaware of its presence. • Acoustic keyloggers:
Acoustic cryptanalysis can be used to monitor the sound created by someone typing on a computer. Each key on the keyboard makes a subtly different acoustic signature when struck. It is then possible to identify which keystroke signature relates to which keyboard character via
statistical methods such as
frequency analysis. The repetition frequency of similar acoustic keystroke signatures, the timings between different keyboard strokes and other context information such as the probable language in which the user is writing are used in this analysis to map sounds to letters. A fairly long recording (1000 or more keystrokes) is required so that a large enough
sample is collected. • Electromagnetic emissions: It is possible to capture the
electromagnetic emissions of a wired keyboard from up to away, without being physically wired to it. In 2009, Swiss researchers tested 11 different
USB,
PS/2 and laptop keyboards in a semi-
anechoic chamber and found them all vulnerable, primarily because of the prohibitive cost of adding
shielding during manufacture. The researchers used a wide-band
receiver to tune into the specific frequency of the emissions radiated from the keyboards. • Optical surveillance: Optical surveillance, while not a keylogger in the classical sense, is nonetheless an approach that can be used to capture passwords or
PINs. A strategically placed camera, such as a hidden
surveillance camera at an
ATM, can allow a criminal to watch a PIN or password being entered. • Physical evidence: For a keypad that is used only to enter a security code, the keys which are in actual use will have evidence of use from many fingerprints. A passcode of four digits, if the four digits in question are known, is reduced from 10,000 possibilities to just 24 possibilities (104 versus 4!
[factorial of 4]). These could then be used on separate occasions for a manual "brute force attack". •
Smartphone sensors: Researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to capture the keystrokes of nearby computer keyboards using only the commodity
accelerometer found in smartphones. The attack is made possible by placing a smartphone near a keyboard on the same desk. The smartphone's accelerometer can then detect the vibrations created by typing on the keyboard and then translate this raw accelerometer signal into readable sentences with as much as 80 percent accuracy. The technique involves working through probability by detecting pairs of keystrokes, rather than individual keys. It models "keyboard events" in pairs and then works out whether the pair of keys pressed is on the left or the right side of the keyboard and whether they are close together or far apart on the
QWERTY keyboard. Once it has worked this out, it compares the results to a preloaded dictionary where each word has been broken down in the same way. Similar techniques have also been shown to be effective at capturing keystrokes on touchscreen keyboards while in some cases, in combination with
gyroscope or with the ambient-light sensor. • Body keyloggers: Body keyloggers track and analyze body movements to determine which keys were pressed. The attacker needs to be familiar with the keys layout of the tracked keyboard to correlate between body movements and keys position, although with a suitably large sample this can be deduced. Tracking audible signals of the user' interface (e.g. a sound the device produce to informs the user that a keystroke was logged) may reduce the complexity of the body keylogging algorithms, as it marks the moment at which a key was pressed. == Cracking ==