Inheritance, reappointments, and titles Transition from Yuan to Ming Historians disagree on what the relationship was between the Ming court and Tibet and whether or not Ming China had sovereignty over Tibet. Van Praag writes that Chinese court historians viewed Tibet as an independent foreign tributary and had little interest in Tibet besides a lama-patron relationship. The historian
Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa supports van Praag's position. They also state that since successors of lamas granted the title of "prince" had to travel to the Ming court to renew this title, and since lamas called themselves princes, the Ming court therefore had "full sovereignty over Tibet." They state that the Ming dynasty, by issuing imperial edicts to invite ex-Yuan officials to the court for official positions in the early years of its founding, won submission from ex-Yuan religious and administrative leaders in the Tibetan areas, and thereby incorporated Tibetan areas into the rule of the Ming court. Thus, they conclude, the Ming court won the power to rule Tibetan areas formerly under the rule of the Yuan dynasty. Laird asserts that the ruling Mongol khans never administered Tibet as part of China and instead ruled them as separate territories, comparing the Mongols with the
British ruling over India and
New Zealand, reasoning that much like Tibet, this did not make India part of New Zealand as a consequence. Of later Mongol and Tibetan accounts interpreting the Mongol conquest of Tibet, Laird asserts that "they, like all non-Chinese historical narratives, never portray the Mongol subjugation of Tibet as a Chinese one." The
Encyclopedia Americana describes the Yuan dynasty as "the line of Mongol rulers in China" and adds that the Mongols "proclaimed a Chinese-style Yüan dynasty at
Khanbaliq (
Beijing)." The
Metropolitan Museum of Art writes that the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty "adopted Chinese political and cultural models; ruling from their capitals in Dadu, they assumed the role of Chinese emperors," although Tibetologist Thomas Laird dismissed the Yuan dynasty as a non-Chinese polity and plays down its Chinese characteristics. The Metropolitan Museum of Art also noted that in spite of the gradual assimilation of Yuan monarchs, the Mongol rulers largely ignored the literati and imposed harsh policies discriminating against southern Chinese. Nevertheless, the
ethno-geographic caste hierarchy favoring the Mongols and other ethnicities were accorded higher status than the Han Chinese majority. Although Han Chinese who were recruited as advisers were often actually more influential than high officials, their status was not as well defined. Kublai also abolished the
imperial examinations of China's
civil service legacy, which was not reinstated until
Ayurbarwada Buyantu Khan's reign (1311–1320). Rossabi writes that Kublai recognized that in order to rule China, "he had to employ Chinese advisors and officials, yet he could not rely totally on Chinese advisers because he had to maintain a delicate balancing act between ruling the sedentary civilization of China and preserving the cultural identity and values of the Mongols." Van Praag writes in
The Status of Tibet that the Tibetans and Mongols, on the other hand, upheld a dual system of rule and an interdependent relationship that legitimated the succession of Mongol khans as universal Buddhist rulers, or
chakravartin. However, Robinson highlights how this rhetoric contradicts the Hongwu Emperor's continuation of Yuan institutions such as the hereditary garrison system
and occupations. He initiated campaigns to conquer areas not previously controlled by native Chinese dynasties, including
territories in Yunnan,
Liaodong (Manchuria),
and Mongolia. He continued to recruit Mongols into the military and maintained the Yuan-era tradition of bringing
Korean concubines and eunuchs into the imperial palace. The Yongle Emperor was far more explicit in invoking a comparison between his rule and that of Kublai Khan, as reflected in his very active
foreign policy,
projection of Ming Chinese power abroad and
expansionist military campaigns. Following the 1449
Tumu Crisis, the Ming government actively discouraged further immigration of Mongol peoples (favoring occasional relocation policies for those who already lived in China). Mongols continued to serve as Ming military officers even after Mongol involvement in the failed 1461
Rebellion of Cao Qin, yet their numbers began to decline as hereditary officers in general were gradually replaced by men of more humble origins.
Ming practices of giving titles to Tibetans The official position of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China is that the Ming implemented a policy of managing Tibet according to conventions and customs, granting titles and setting up administrative organs over Tibet. The
State Council Information Office of the People's Republic states that the Ming dynasty's Ü-Tsang Commanding Office governed most areas of Tibet. It also states that while the Ming abolished the policy council set up by the Mongol Yuan to manage local affairs in Tibet and the Mongol system of Imperial Tutors to govern religious affairs, the Ming adopted a policy of bestowing titles upon religious leaders who had submitted to the Ming dynasty. Of the county (zong or dzong) leaders of Neiwo Zong and Renbam Zong, Chen states that when "the Emperor learned the actual situation of the Phachu Kargyu, the Ming court then appointed the main Zong leaders to be senior officers of the Senior Command of Dbus and Gtsang."
Hans Bielenstein writes that as far back as the
Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE), the Han Chinese government "maintained the fiction" that the foreign officials administering the various "Dependent States" and
oasis city-states of the
Western Regions (composed of the
Tarim Basin and oasis of
Turpan) were true Han representatives due to the Han government's conferral of Chinese seals and seal cords to them.
Changchub Gyaltsen PRC government states that after the official title "Education Minister" was granted to
Tai Situ Changchub Gyaltsen (1302–1364) by the Yuan court, this title appeared frequently with his name in various Tibetan texts, while his Tibetan title "Degsi" (
sic properly
sde-srid or
desi) is seldom mentioned. The book takes this to mean that "even in the later period of the Yuan Dynasty, the Yuan imperial court and the
Phagmo Drupa regime maintained a Central-local government relation." For example, instead of the 13 governorships established by the Mongol Sakya viceroy, Changchub Gyaltsen divided Central Tibet into districts (dzong) with district heads (dzong dpon) who had to conform to old rituals and wear clothing styles of old Imperial Tibet. According to Chen, the Ming officer of Hezhou (modern day
Linxia) informed the Hongwu Emperor that the general situation in Dbus and Gtsang "was under control," and so he suggested to the emperor that he offer the second Phagmodru ruler,
Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen, an official title. According to the Records of the Founding Emperor, the Hongwu Emperor issued an edict granting the title "Initiation State Master" to Sagya Gyaincain, while the latter sent envoys to the Ming court to hand over his jade seal of authority along with tribute of colored silk and satin, statues of the Buddha, Buddhist scriptures, and sarira. When the Ming Yongle Emperor invited
Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), founder of the
Gelug school, to come to the Ming court and pay tribute, the latter declined. Chen Qingying states that Tsongkhapa wrote a letter to decline the Emperor's invitation, and in this reply, Tsongkhapa wrote: while Rossabi adds that Tsongkhapa cited the "length and arduousness of the journey" to China as another reason not to make an appearance. Norbu writes that, although this would have been true for the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham's "tribute-cum-trade" relations with the Ming, it was untrue if applied to the western Tibetan regions of Ü-Tsang and Ngari. After the Phagmodrupa Changchub Gyaltsen, these were ruled by "three successive nationalistic regimes," which Norbu writes "Communist historians prefer to ignore." Shih-Shan Henry Tsai writes that the Yongle Emperor sent his eunuch Yang Sanbao into Tibet in 1413 to gain the allegiance of various Tibetan princes, while the Yongle Emperor paid a small fortune in return gifts for tributes in order to maintain the loyalty of neighboring vassal states such as
Nepal and Tibet. However, Van Praag states that Tibetan rulers upheld their own separate relations with the kingdoms of Nepal and
Kashmir, and at times "engaged in armed confrontation with them." Wylie argues that Ming titles of "King" granted indiscriminately to various Tibetan lamas or even their disciples should not be viewed as reappointments to earlier Yuan dynasty offices, since the viceregal Sakya regime established by the Mongols in Tibet was overthrown by the Phagmodru myriarchy before the Ming existed. Helmut Hoffman states that the Ming upheld the facade of rule over Tibet through periodic missions of "tribute emissaries" to the Ming court and by granting nominal titles to ruling lamas, but did not actually interfere in Tibetan governance. He asserts that "by conferring titles on Tibetans already in power, the Ming emperors merely recognized political reality."
Hugh Edward Richardson writes that the Ming dynasty exercised no authority over the succession of Tibetan ruling families, the Phagmodru (1354–1435),
Rinpungpa (1435–1565), and
Tsangpa (1565–1642). A Tibetan translation in the 16th century preserves the letter of the Yongle Emperor, which the
Association for Asian Studies notes is polite and complimentary towards the Karmapa. Traveling to Lhasa either through
Qinghai or via the
Silk Road to
Khotan, Hou Xian and Zhi Guang did not return to
Nanjing until 1407. from the reign of the
Xuande Emperor (r. 1425–1435) During his travels beginning in 1403, Deshin Shekpa was induced by further exhortations by the Ming court to visit Nanjing by April 10, 1407. According to Karma Thinley, the emperor gave the Karmapa the place of honor at his left, and on a higher throne than his own. Throughout the following month, the Yongle Emperor and his court showered the Karmapa with presents. Elliot Sperling asserts that the Yongle Emperor, in bestowing Deshin Shekpa with the title of "King" and praising his
mystical abilities and miracles, was trying to build an alliance with the Karmapa as the Mongols had with the Sakya lamas, but Deshin Shekpa rejected the Yongle Emperor's offer. In fact, this was the same title that Kublai Khan had offered the Sakya Phagpa lama, but Deshin Shekpa persuaded the Yongle Emperor to grant the title to religious leaders of other Tibetan Buddhist sects. (1384–1415) Tibetan sources say Deshin Shekpa also persuaded the Yongle Emperor not to impose his military might on Tibet as the Mongols had previously done. However, Hok-Lam Chan states that "there is little evidence that this was ever the emperor's intention" and that evidence indicates that Deshin Skekpa was invited strictly for religious purposes. Marsha Weidner states that Deshin Shekpa's miracles "testified to the power of both the emperor and his guru and served as a legitimizing tool for the emperor's problematic succession to the throne," referring to the Yongle Emperor's conflict with the previous Jianwen Emperor. Tsai writes that Deshin Shekpa aided the legitimacy of the Yongle Emperor's rule by providing him with portents and omens which demonstrated
Heaven's favor of the Yongle Emperor on the Ming throne. Patricia Ann Berger writes that the Yongle Emperor's courting and granting of titles to lamas was his attempt to "resurrect the relationship between China and Tibet established earlier by the Yuan dynastic founder Khubilai Khan and his guru
Phagpa." She also writes that the later Qing emperors and their Mongol associates viewed the Yongle Emperor's relationship with Tibet as "part of a chain of
reincarnation that saw this Han Chinese emperor as yet another emanation of
Manjusri." Zhengtong had the following message delivered to the Great Treasure Prince of Dharma, the Karmapa: Despite this glowing message by the Emperor, Chan writes that a year later in 1446, the Ming court cut off all relations with the Karmapa hierarchs. The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed
Shangri-La County in
Yunnan. Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that
Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. ''The Historical Status of China's Tibet'' argues that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "
corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a
laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and
Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses,
thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after
Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the
Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. ''The Historical Status of China's Tibet'' states that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western
Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying () was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in
Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. One of the Ming princes was noted for delinquent behavior involving Tibetans.
Zhu Shuang (Prince of Qin), a son of the Hongwu Emperor, had some Tibetan boys castrated and Tibetan women seized while under the influence of drugs, following a war against minority Tibetan peoples. After his death in 1395 from either a drug overdose or toxins mixed with his medicine, Zhu Shuang was posthumously reprimanded by his father for various actions, including those against Tibetan prisoners of war (involving the slaughter of nearly two-thousand captives). . Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the
Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes." Sperling finds no textual evidence in either Chinese or Tibetan sources to support this thesis of Petech and Hisashi. These two religious leaders were preoccupied with an overriding concern for dealing with the powerful secular
Rinpungpa princes, who were patrons and protectors of the Karma Kargyu lamas. The prince of Rinbung occupied Lhasa in 1498 and excluded the Gelug from attending New Years ceremonies and prayers, the most important event in the Gelug. While the task of New Years prayers in Lhasa was granted to the Karmapa and others, Gendün Gyatso traveled in exile looking for allies. Zhengde's top advisors made every attempt to dissuade him from inviting this lama to court, arguing that Tibetan Buddhism was wildly heterodox and unorthodox. Liu commanded a fleet of hundreds of ships requisitioned along the
Yangtze, consuming 2,835 g (100 oz) of silver a day in food expenses while stationed for a year in
Chengdu of
Sichuan. When the request was delivered, the Karmapa lama refused to leave Tibet despite the Ming force brought to coerce him. He writes that Chinese writers of the early 20th century were of the view that Tibet was not annexed by China until the Manchu Qing dynasty invasion during the 18th century. Yet he states that this was a radical change in regards to all previous eras of Sino-Tibetan relations. According to him, the Tibetan lamas and Mongol khans upheld a "mutual role of religious prelate and secular patron," respectively. Chinese state media publication
China Daily states in a 2008 article that although there were dynastic changes after Tibet was incorporated into the territory of Yuan dynasty's China in the 13th century, "Tibet has remained under the jurisdiction of the central government of China." It also states that the Ming dynasty "inherited the right to rule Tibet" from the Yuan dynasty, and repeats the claims in the
History of Ming about the Ming establishing two itinerant high commands over Tibet. == Mongol-Tibetan alliance ==